

**AN ASSESSMENT OF TANZANIA'S FOREIGN POLICY
AND HER RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL**

RICHARD MICHAEL CHONJO

**MASTER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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BY
RICHARD MICHAEL CHONJO

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE UNIVERSITY OF DODOMA
DECEMBER, 2020

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
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The undersigned certify that he has read and here by recommend for acceptance by the University of Dodoma a dissertation entitled *An Assessment of Tanzania's Foreign Policy and Her Relations with Israel* in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master in International Relations of the University of Dodoma.

Dr. Lufunyo, Hussein

Signature.......... Date: 

(SUPERVISOR)

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DEDICATION

To my late mother Grace Kaoma, my father Michael Chonjo, my aunt Agnes Bengesi, my supervisor Dr. Lufunyo Hussein, and my friend Sued Msami. Thank you.

ABSTRACT

This study assessed Tanzania's Foreign Policy and the factors that prompted the reorientation of Tanzania's relations with Israel. The study draws from the historically unstable relations between the two countries especially from 1967 to 1995 and stagnant relations between 1995 to 2014. However, as of May 2018, Tanzania established her embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel, signifying a shift in the relations between the two countries. From this setting, the study had three specific objectives: determining the motives for reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations; examining the expected outcomes; and identifying the challenges that may arise from the reoriented relations between the two countries.

The area of study was Dodoma city, where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation as well as the University of Dodoma are located. From these two institutions, various views from 30 respondents were obtained via a cross-sectional design in which data was collected only once but in-depth from the respondents. Additionally, a mixed analytical approach was utilized whereby the SPSS version 16.0 was used to quantitatively analyze numeric data while various themes were used to interpret the findings qualitatively. All the respondents (100%) concurred that 'economic needs and incentives' were the major motive for reorientation of relations between Tanzania and Israel and that every other motive apart from the 'military and security concerns' have economic attachments.

On the second objective, the social sectors like tourism, medical, agricultural and the educational sectors were expected to reap greater benefits from the reoriented Tanzania-Israel relations. Finally, the study pointed out the presence of unequal gains between the two countries and the shift in Tanzania's support to Palestine as challenges of the reoriented Tanzania-Israel relations. Among the recommendations put forward by the study was that Tanzania should not be carried away in her support for Palestine and the two-state solution simply because it is reaping benefits from its strengthened relations with Israel.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
BPM	Bureaucratic Politics Model
EA	East Africa
EAC	East African Cooperation
FP	Foreign Policy
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
FPDM	Foreign Policy Decision-Making
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IR	International Relations
KLNT	Kingdom Leadership Network Tanzania
MFA&EAC	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation
MNC	Multinational Organization
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OPM	Organizational Process Model
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
RAM	Rational Actor Model
SUGECO	Sokoine University Graduate Entrepreneurs Cooperatives
TANAPA	Tanzania National Parks
TIC	Tanzania Investment Center
TIDIF	Tanzania-Israel Business and Investment Forum
TTB	Tanzania Tourist Board
UDOM	University of Dodoma
UN	United Nations
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
US	United States
WWI	World War One
WWII	World War Two

CHAPTER ONE

THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT

1.0 Introduction

This study assesses Tanzania's Foreign Policy and the factors that prompted the reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations. The study draws from the historically unsteady relations between the two countries which began positively with Israel's technical support to Tanzania shortly after the latter's independence. However, the relations between the two countries soured following radicalization of Tanzania's policies and ideology through the Arusha Declaration of 1967, Mwalimu Nyerere's personal exigencies, and Israel's Zionistic tendencies against the Arab world (Mathews & Mushi, 1981).

Tanzania finally severed her diplomatic ties with Israel in 1973 while their economic ties remained strong. The two countries restored their diplomatic ties in 1995 though they took place via Nairobi, Kenya. From 1995 to 2014 the relations appeared stagnant until the establishment of the annual Tanzania-Israel Business and Investment Forum (TIDIF) in 2014. The TIDIF breathed new life into such relations from 2014 to 2018. As of May 2018, Tanzania-Israel relations underwent a great revival following the opening up of Tanzania's embassy in Israel (URT, 2018).

This chapter provides for the background information and statement of the research problem. Concomitantly, the objectives, research questions and significance of this study were provided in this same chapter.

1.1 Background of the Study

Today's world encompasses various actors at the world stage such as international organizations, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, societies and even citizens with the ability of shaping world relations (McGlinchey, 2017). Yet, states are still the main actors because of the various powers they solely possess, such as vast military and economic power; states are sovereign; and they are actors of the first order under international law (Barkin, 2006:1). This makes the analysis of states' relations very important in international relations. States' interactions are normally facilitated by their foreign policies (FP) which help them achieve their national interests.

Foreign policies of countries are always dynamic as a result of both internal and external factors (McGlinchey, *op. cit.*:38). For instance, European states shifted from policies of imperial warfare to cooperative policies through international organizations like the League of Nations and the UN after WWI and WWII. Similarly, the United States which adopted “isolationist policies” with regard to European affairs during WWI, shifted to “cooperative policies” through NATO and the UN after WWII. The same was the case after the collapse of the Soviet Union and bipolar system which opened up more foreign policy options for countries like the US, Germany, Central and Eastern Europe countries, and other socialist countries around the world like Tanzania (Duffield, 1994).

During the colonial times, the foreign policies of African nations and states were for attaining independence. This was dubbed as the period of “liberation diplomacy” for most African colonies especially between 1945 and the 1960s. However, after gaining independence, many African countries could not completely free themselves from Western grasps due to both economic and socio-political fragility. This led to contradictions of African countries’ foreign policies because of aspects like donor dependency syndrome, debt relief efforts, together with economic and political immaturity (Moon, 1983).

The inconsistencies of the foreign policies of African countries can be pointed out through a divergence of the three major parts of any country’s FP. These parts which are meant to be closely related are: FP principles or guidelines; FP decisions; and foreign or external relations. Although these three aspects may not always coincide, in the African context they tend to deviate from one another to a large extent. For instance, during the Cold War, African countries embraced Non-alignment, but this was only on paper because in reality, they gathered foreign aid from both the Western and Eastern blocs (Hoskyns, 1968).

Furthermore, the deviation among the different parts of foreign policy is also pronounced at the regional level. For instance, Gitelson (1974), argues that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had often failed to intervene in cases where major foreign powers were present such as during the French nuclear tests in the

Sahara Desert, during the Algerian war, the Congo crises, struggles for independence in Southern Africa and in the Arab-Israeli conflicts.

In Tanzania, foreign policy reorientation or restructuring is visible throughout her history since independence. For instance, between 1964 and 1965, her relations with major Western powers sharply deteriorated due to a number of reasons. One among them was the genuine attempt of the then President of Tanganyika, Julius Nyerere of pursuing independent-minded policies, ones which truly reflected his and Tanzania's own values and interests like non-alignment and self-determination. Another view was more psychological, based on radical opposition to colonialism, which saw most of the former colonies pursuing policies that were 'pro-East' rather than 'pro-West' ones (Mathews & Mushi, 1981:24).

This allowed for Tanzania to establish relations with the Arab World because of close neighborliness, shared colonization history, Swahili culture and religion. However, shortly before and after independence, many newly independent African countries aligned themselves with Israel through the latter's popular "constructive cooperation and technical aid diplomacy." Israel's technical assistance was strategically directed towards agriculture, cooperative commercial ventures and military expertise. Israeli assistance in these fields was being provided to as many as twenty-eight independent African countries by 1965 (Jacob, 1971).

Israel's assistance together with its seemingly neutral position of neither belonging to the capitalist West nor the communist East, placed Tanzania more at ease with forming foreign relations with it than with the Western powers for ideological and psychological reasons. Hence, this marked the beginning of Tanzania-Israeli relations because Israel seemed the right choice for rapid development, progress and the supreme example of democracy and socialism (Mathews & Mushi, *op. cit.*:154-55).

Similarly, Israel had also been looking for relations outside the Arab world where it had been facing hostility since its establishment in 1948, where just six days after Israel's independence proclamation it was invaded by her neighbors: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. This necessitated Israel to build itself up

in the form of a garrison state in order to safeguard her new territory, annex more of the surrounding territories and curb Islamic militancy. Israel's security capability ensured her cooperation with Ethiopia and later on with the East African (EA) countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania especially when it came to protection of maritime merchandise in the early 1960's when these three nations gained independence (Bishku, 2017).

However, by the late 1960s Tanzanian fascination with Israel began to decline due to a number of reasons. These include: radicalization of Tanzania's ideology via the 1967 Arusha Declaration; Israel's relations with the Apartheid South African regime where one supported racism while the other supported Zionism in consolidating the Israel state. Third was the Six-day Arab-Israel War of 1967 which portrayed Israel as the aggressor in the war and so Tanzania sympathized with Egypt and the Arab World. Finally, and even more strongly was President Nyerere's personal exigencies (Mathews & Mushi, *op. cit.*:156-57).

President Nyerere had a firm grasp on both the domestic and foreign policy of Tanzania. He imprinted in both his values and philosophical standpoints (Pratt, 1978). But it was in foreign policy where he placed a further personal touch since he considered it to be delicate and sensitive, thus an area which needed close personal supervision. His concerns with social justice translated to anti-colonialism, anti-racism, support of liberation movements, and support for the oppressed people. Similarly, his concerns with unity and self-reliance translated to 'collective self-reliance' at regional, continental and Third World levels (Frangonikolopoulos, 1988).

Nyerere's exigencies both domestically (ideological radicalization to socialism) and internationally (anti-colonialism, anti-racism, fighting for social justice) affected Tanzania's relations with Israel on many levels. Economically, the 1967 Arusha Declaration which saw to the adoption of socialist policies such as nationalization of private enterprises unfavorably affected Israel's neo-imperialistic interests. Socio-politically, Israel's Zionist annexations and collaboration with the South African apartheid regime was equated to racism, colonialism and unacceptable attributes of social injustice. Thus, in October 1967, President Nyerere proceeded to express Tanzania's stance of not condoning any acts of aggression nor accepting exploitation

of other lands, governments, nor other people simply because one side was a victor of war (Nyerere, 1967; Mathews & Mushi, *op. cit.*: 156-57).

Thereafter, relations between Tanzania and Israel were officially severed after the fourth Arab-Israel 'Yom Kippur' war in 1973, though such a breakaway was paradoxical since trade between the two countries continued strongly. For example, between 1973 and 1978, Israel exports to Eastern and Southern African countries doubled (Ojo 1988). This scenario indicated that while Tanzania's FP guidelines were clearly in support of liberation struggles, anti-colonialism, anti-Zionism and anti-racism; together with FP decisions by Nyerere of ending ties with Israel, the reality of Tanzania-Israel economic relations contradicted the previous two parts of FP.

Despite the resumption of relations between Tanzania and Israel in 1995 as a result of the Oslo Accords, Tanzania has had and continues to have great relations with Israel's nemesis, Palestine ever since the Arab-Israel wars. Tanzania supported Palestinian territorial claims at various instances such as on 24th November 1988, when she officially recognized the State of Palestine together with 80 other states following the Algiers Declaration of the Palestinian National Council. Additionally, in October 2011 the then Tanzanian foreign minister, Bernard Membe affirmed that Tanzania would give everything required to support Palestine in gaining membership within the UN and in any other international organization (Chiume, 2014).

Notwithstanding the good relations between Tanzania and Palestine, Tanzanian President John Pombe Magufuli (JPM) sent a letter through his foreign minister, Augustine Mahiga to the Israel Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu during an East African Summit held in Entebbe on 4th July 2016. The letter expressed Dodoma's intention of establishing a permanent envoy (The Times of Israel, 2016). Further progress came when the embassy of Israel in Nairobi opened a visa handling center in Dar es Salaam with the official inauguration taking place at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Dar es Salaam on November 4th, 2016 (URT, 2016).

Afterward Tanzania through her minister of Foreign Affairs, East Africa, Regional and International Cooperation, Augustine Mahiga oversaw the opening up of a Tanzanian embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel on May 8th, 2018. Dodoma argued that Israel

should walk the same line by opening an Israeli embassy in Tanzania. Previously, the Israel ambassador to Kenya, Yahel Vilan stated that Israel also wanted to establish an embassy in Tanzania but faced budgetary constraints (Magarula, 2016).

This improvement of diplomatic Tanzania-Israel relations made Palestine wary. The state of Palestine has had Tanzania as an ally throughout decades. Dodoma's reorientation of relations with Israel necessitated the new ambassador of the State of Palestine to Tanzania, Hamdi Mansour Abuali to warn Tanzania to tread carefully in her newly found ties. Ambassador Abuali boldly stated that Israel is known for not respecting agreements in a relationship (The Citizen, 17 October, 2018).

In summary, the background has presented the dynamic nature of the Tanzania-Israel relations. Some of the noticeable aspects of the dynamic relations include: in spite diplomatic ties being severed, economic ties between the two countries remained strong and improved. Additionally, the period between 2014 to 2018 witnessed an acute rejuvenation of relations between the two countries which ultimately culminated into the establishment of the Tanzanian embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel. With Tanzania's foreign policy not having changed since 2001, this study seeks to assess the factors for such reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations.

1.2 Statement of the Problem.

Holsti (2016:103-5), speaks of foreign policy *reorientation* which involves the intent by policy-makers to completely restructure a country's pattern of relations with other countries. Such reorientation results from a number of factors which can be summarized as 'responses to new conditions and opportunities in the internal and external environment'. Naturally, FP (guidelines, decisions and relations) change over time but the extent of such change differs among countries.

Successful foreign policy reorientation can occur only when the total pattern of external actions, transactions and/or commitments have been altered. Foreign policy reorientation is quicker and abrupt unlike normal foreign policy change which is slower and incremental. This results into a gap between FP formulation (guidelines) and FP implementation (decisions and relations) since orientation motives like economic vulnerability, consequences of modernization, dependence,

neocolonialism, military and strategic concerns are not proclaimed in FP guidelines (ibid).

Blavoukos & Bourantonis (2014), correspondingly argue that foreign policy output or relations may change or undergo reorientation without the need for change in foreign policy inputs or guidelines. This can be caused by cognitive and ideational shifts surrounding the existing members of the main policymaking group, especially the leadership which changes periodically.

Tanzania is no stranger to foreign policy reorientation and restructuring. For instance, when it was sustaining a number of treaty agreements with Britain, Tanzania abruptly increased its number of treaties with China, the Soviet bloc and Eastern Europe from 1967. This shift was an attempt to reduce Tanzania's ties and dependence on Great Britain by diversifying its sources of aid (Holsti, 2016). Under President Magufuli, Tanzania re-energized her relations with Israel in a period of three years (2016-2019). Domestically, such reorientation has occurred while Tanzania's FP guidelines or principles remain unchanged since 2001 when Tanzania adopted a new foreign policy.

Similarly, Balawi (2019), questions whether the reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations is veering Tanzania away from Nyerere's freedom-fighting legacy, veering it from some of its foreign policy principles that support Palestinian claims and rights. Israel continues to occupy Palestinian territories while exercising detentions, surveillance and even extra-judicial executions using drones (Cook, 2013). While Israel continues its trend of aggression in some parts of the Arab world, in the same manner it did during Nyerere's presidency, it is puzzling as to why Tanzania would reorient her relations with Israel.

On the basis of this backdrop, this study intended to make an in-depth assessment on the factors for Tanzania's reorientation of her relations with Israel.

1.3 Research Objectives

1.3.1 General Objective

The overall objective of this study was to assess the factors that prompted Tanzania to reorient her relations with Israel.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

- i. To find out the motives behind the reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations.
- ii. To examine the expected outcomes of the reoriented Tanzania-Israel relations.
- iii. To identify and analyze the challenges that may arise from such relations.

1.4 Research Questions

- i. What motives have influenced the reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations?
- ii. What outcomes are to be expected from the reoriented Tanzania-Israel relations?
- iii. What are the challenges that may arise from such relations and their effects on Tanzania's foreign policy?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The study seeks to contribute to the empirical gap by presenting the motives behind reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations from stagnation to rejuvenation. Similarly, the study will also present the benefits and challenges of the reoriented relations. Empirically, the field of foreign policy reorientation has received less attention especially in the developing world. And most of the available scholarly literature assert that foreign policy orientation in the developing countries is guided by their dependence on major powers. Thus, this study seeks to test the plausibility of such assertions.

Moreover, the study seeks to explore the similarity and differences between the past and current reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations. By comparing the orientation processes or the past and present, the study seeks to establish whether today's motives for reorientation are different from those of the past. Such an observation is aimed at providing theoretical contribution to the study of foreign policy orientation or alteration with reference to the change in time.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter presents a review of scholarly literature on foreign policy concepts, perspectives, and reorientation. The chapter is divided into five parts: the first part looked at the concepts of public policy, policy-making, foreign policy, foreign relations, diplomacy and foreign policy decision-making as various scholars have defined them. The second part presents the models related to foreign policy decision-making within international relations. The third segment portrays an empirical review of foreign relations reorientation among countries as well as in the case of Tanzania. Additionally, the third part also provides previous studies on foreign policy reorientation. The fourth and final parts were the research gap and the conceptual framework respectively.

2.1 Definition of Concepts

2.1.1 Public Policy

A policy here will be taken to mean public policy. For Lowi & Ginsburg (1996:607), public policy is “an officially declared intention which is further reinforced by a sanction that takes the shape of either a reward or a punishment.” When it is a course of action (or inaction), a public policy can transform into ‘a law, a rule, a statute, an edict, a regulation or an order’ (Fischer, Miller & Sidney, 2007: xix). Both definitions portray public policy as a law that binds actions of actors. When practiced at the international level as foreign policy, public policy binds the actions of states. When states act accordingly as stipulated by public policy relations among them are stabilized, but in case of violation, relations may weaken as a result of either condemnation of the aggressor, sanctioning or complete termination of ties with the aggressor.

2.1.2 Foreign Policy

While public policy remains paramount, its extension abroad, commonly referred to as ‘foreign policy’ has become even more important. The dynamic relationship between domestic and foreign policy is undeniable as pointed out by Good (1962) that, “foreign policy is domestic policy carried out beyond the boundaries of the state.” Meanwhile, Heywood (2011:129), opined that, “foreign policy refers to,

attempts by governments to influence or manage events outside the state's borders, usually, but not limited to their relations with external governments.” From Heywood's definition, one cannot help but notice the number of issues foreign policy must address, some of which include: both states and non-state actors, as well as the use of both peaceful and coercive strategies.

2.1.3 Foreign Relations

Hogan & Paterson (2004:10), observe foreign relations as a term that may be used to refer to the totality of interactions, that is, economic, political, sociological, cultural, and more among peoples and states. Foreign relations are also known as “foreign affairs” which refer to the conduct of a state's foreign policy, diplomacy together with the coordination of all of the state's international activities (Berridge & James, 2003:105). Foreign relations can either be bilateral or multilateral and the kinds of actors can range from influential individuals in world affairs, to NGOs, MNCs, IGOs and states.

2.1.4 Diplomacy

While most people would point out to diplomacy as simply, ‘the entire process through which states conduct their foreign relations or simply how states communicate, bargain, influence one another, and adjust their differences without the use of force’ (Griffiths and O’Callaghan 2002), skepticism lingers over such a definition. Such skepticism arises because of the realist connotations of the lack of acknowledgement of non-state actors in diplomacy. This is why the conceptualization of diplomacy as “the peaceful conduct of relations among entities, their principles and accredited agents” is more preferable because it leaves room for other actors apart from the state alone. However, this second definition also faces criticism from Jonsson and Hall, because it incorrectly reduces diplomacy down to ‘method’, that is, diplomacy as “the conduct of international relations by negotiation.”

For the pair, diplomacy is much more and so it should be viewed as *an institution which encompasses a relatively stable collection of social practices consisting of easily recognized roles coupled with underlying norms and a set of rules or conventions defining appropriate behavior for, and governing relations among,*

occupants of these roles. These norms and rules “prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.” Thus, the institution of diplomacy has norms and rules for individuals assuming diplomatic roles throughout the ages, even in the absence of organizational frameworks as foreign ministries, embassies and professional diplomatic services like in ancient times (Jönsson and Hall, 2005:25).

2.1.5 Foreign Policy Decision-Making (FPDM)

Before defining FPDM, it is first important to know what it means by decision-making. Koontz & O'Donnell (1972), who are well-known scholars of management, the principal branch of decision making, define decision making as “the actual selection from among alternatives of a course of action.” Likewise, Roth & Mullen (2002), define decision-making as “a technique that is designed to help arrive at the best possible choice that satisfies the higher order values and goals that have been selected.” When it comes to the state, decision-making is a group activity even though one individual may pronounce the decision because such a decision affects a segment of or the entire country. In summary, decision-making is the continuous process of choosing the best out of the rest in a mix after an adequate cost-benefit analysis.

In simple understanding, FPDM explains why the government takes a certain action, how the decision is going to work out and what could be the possible alternatives and its outcomes. More specifically, Mintz & DeRouen (2010), see FPDM as “the choices individuals, groups and coalitions make that affect a nation’s actions on the international stage”. Correspondingly, Goldstein & Pevehouse (2010), look at foreign policy decision-making as “the navigation process through which modifications are made depending on the feedback from the outside world”. This makes FPDM an ongoing and dynamic process, the reason behind the definition by Raman (2000), that FPDM “involves the analysis and assessment of past and current data, in light of our past experiences and those of others, who have dealt with similar circumstances, in order to identify the need and available options for action in the future and the likely implications of each of those options for the protection and promotion of national interests.”

Though FPDM involves an array of agencies and actors, it is the leadership which takes the ultimate decision after a close examination of the costs and benefits of available alternatives. Renshon & Renshon (2008), pointed out that no crisis or war can be understood “without direct reference to the decision making of individual leaders.” FPDM can provide deeper considerations of biases, motivations and perceptions. The individual level of analysis supports the role played by individual leaders as portrayed by the great man theory of history. This theory suggests that the course of human history is determined not only by larger social, political and economic forces but also by the beliefs and character of the individuals who rise to positions of influence. From this perspective, the twentieth century history would have turned out quite differently if individuals like Nyerere, Mandela, Castro, Lenin, Hitler, Roosevelt, Churchill, Mao, Gorbachev had not been born (Bova, 2012).

2.2 Theoretical Literature Review

International relations (IR) as an academic discipline are often categorized into two fields: “systemic” IR, which provides a broad view of the international system holistically, and “sub systemic” foreign policy analysis (FPA), which zooms in on the placement and actions of ‘states’ which are considered to be the most fundamental units of this system. In American IR, these two subfields are seen as distinct from one another, while in scholarships outside the United States, connections and mutual dependencies between the two fields is acknowledged and emphasized (Hellmann 2013).

Waltz (1979), claims persuasively that while systemic IR grand theories like realism, liberalism and Marxism will remain paramount, they are not and cannot be theories of foreign policy. This is because systemic IR theories: focus more on major powers; international political patterns and outcomes rather than foreign policy; they are evolutionary rather than revolutionary; do not inform us on decisions or rationale behind states’ policy moves; and systemic theories fail to explain why states with the same structural positions in the world pursue different foreign policies, such as Tanzania and Kenya (Fearon 1998).

FPDM models on the other hand, specifically provide the required understanding on why states act the way they do, with their actions and choices ranging from the

dramatic to the mundane. Leaders of states make decisions to go to war, make peace, form alliances, establish diplomatic relations, and the like. This is why the course of world politics is shaped by leaders' decisions Mintz & DeRouen (*op. cit.*:3-4). However, leaders do not make such decisions in total singularity. Bureaucrats and organizations also play a part as pointed out by Allison and Zelikow (1999), in the most key work about FPDM models. Three models were given with regard to FPDM: the Rational Actor Model (RAM); Organizational Process Model (OPM); and the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM).

2.2.1 The Rational Actor Model (RAM)

Allison (1971), defines rationality as the “consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints.” Here the rational decision maker chooses the alternative that provides the outcome that is most preferable. Consequently, Duncan *et al.* (2009), define this model as the process of choosing the right options for the achievement of a ‘national objective’ after the analysis of all the possibly available alternatives and their consequences. Put more simply, RAM is the ability to relate the means to the ends in a given situation. The RAM can be traced to the works of von Neumann and Morgenstern in the 1940s under the name expected utility theory (EUT). This model is also associated with the realist paradigm because of its individual tendency when it comes to decision making. Another RAM-realist relation stems from their hallmark in microeconomics since both are interested in utility or gains maximization and costs or losses minimization.

In the Tanzanian case, the constitution stipulates the president as the Head of the state as well as Head of government. He has authority over all union matters and can delegate such matters to other persons holding office in the government of the URT. The president has the authority to appoint governmental personnel to hold positions of leadership in policy formulating departments and institutions of the government. On top of that, the President is free and not obliged to take advice given to him, unless required by the constitution, though even if he is obligated to take such advice, the President shall act upon it or not (URT, 1997).

Hence, the decision to appointing the members of cabinet including the foreign minister falls upon the President. The power of the President on both domestic and

external matters in Tanzania is historical in itself, where at one point in time, President Nyerere was nicknamed the 'Chief of Diplomacy' (Tunze, 1977). Generally, the Presidency is the ultimate decision maker in foreign policy, as it has been proven by President Magufuli in the reorientation of diplomatic ties between Tanzania and Israel. Magufuli's personal exigencies of economic pragmatism have played a significant role in the reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations.

Nonetheless, this model falls short since in most cases there is never enough reliable information, something which ultimately limits the number of available alternatives. In foreign policy, this problem is much higher since the true intentions of states is never truly known and guaranteed (Allison, 1971). Ostensibly, the tendency of RAM to focus on alternatives that maximize economic gains subordinates other important alternatives. For instance, the reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations has been for the state of Palestine as they witnessed the reduction in Tanzania's radical stances on Israel occupation of Arab territories. Tanzania went as far as to vote in favour of acknowledging Jewish ties to religious sites in Jerusalem during a UNESCO vote (Eichner, 2016). While the reorientation has revitalized Tanzania-Israel economic and political ties, it has seemingly placed a strain on Tanzania-Palestinian relations.

2.2.2 The Organizational Process Model (OPM)

Today, the role of non-state actors has increased in decision-making both within and outside states. This model posits that policy decisions result not from individual rationality alone but rather from large organizational discourse under standard operating procedures. Cashman (2000), describes the government as a 'conglomerate of large autonomous semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations'. So do Hollis & Smith (1991), who see OPM as a top-down approach where the agencies usually function as per the requirement of the government of the top leadership. Under this model, the whole structure of decision making has been divided into several sub-agencies that are eventually arranged as the top-down approach where the leader dismantles the whole problem and assigns the sub-parts among the small specialized agencies.

But this model is often used during times of crisis like wars and war-like situations where leaders mostly go for the first alternative which is usually more satisfactory

rather than optimal. Also, in OPM the leaders make decisions with limited information, time, and incrementally. Decisions making is carried out by qualified and experienced professionals and specialized organizations, rather than a small group of top-level leadership (Cashman, *op. cit.*:80-82).

Under the Magufuli regime the redirection of Tanzania's relations with Israel did not abruptly take the shape of ambassadorial exchange. It took some incremental moves through the Tanzania-Israel Business and Investment Forum (TIDIF) which began in 2014 as an annual forum promoting investment and industrialization. Apart from that, the reorientation of relations also involved collaboration between technical governmental institutions and private organizations such as the Kingdom Leadership Network Tanzania, Tanzania Tourism Board, Tanzania Investment Center, Ministries of Foreign Affairs and that of Industry, Trade and Investment. Hence, the inputs of such organizations have solidified the relations between Tanzania and Israel.

2.2.3 The Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM)

Sometimes known as the governmental model, the BPM looks at how decisions involving various bureaucracies are capable of causing political competition. Basically, the BPM elucidates that there is no predominant grand plan, rather decisions arise from political struggle and bargaining between groups in the governmental institutions and parastatals (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1990). Under this model, decision making is seen as a blend of various organizations and technocrats such as the administrators, senior and junior bureaucrats. With their unlimited tenure in office and expertise, bureaucrats do not only assist their governments, but also advice governments in domestic and foreign policy formulation. However, bureaucracies tend to be hierarchical institutions guarded by jealous interests and turfs by controlling the policy advice they give to the government. They may even go as far as to distort, add or deduct information before presenting alternatives to the executive (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010).

For instance, in the spirit of development through economic diplomacy, Tanzania improved her relations with Israel because the later has been able to do what is most difficult, that is, farm in the desert and yield great harvest. On top of that, Tanzania is also interested in Israel's technological capability in sectors like the military.

However, in achieving these efforts, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and EAC; and that of Industry, Trade and Investment would seem to be the ones most involved in transformation of such relations. Meanwhile, Ministries of Agriculture; of Education, Science, Technology and Vocational Training; and that of Water and Irrigation have not been as much involved. From the BPM perspective, it can perhaps be pointed out that the former ministries were able to ‘pull and haul’ the government in their favour compared to the latter ministries.

2.3 Empirical Literature Review

2.3.1 Reorientation Cases of Israel and Tanzania

This subsection provides a review of reorientation of relations between Israel and other states as well as between Tanzania and other states.

2.3.1.1 Reorientation of Israel-South Korea Relations

As a “garrison state”, Israel’s relations with other countries have historically been unstable. For instance, Song (2014), argues that Israel’s relations with South Korea began on the right foot with the former providing medical and food aid support to the latter during the Korean War of 1950 to 1953. However, due to Syngman Rhee’s administrative dictatorship and corrupt Israel regime, it took almost ten years for Israel to officially recognize South Korea. Such recognition came on 9 July 1961, and the two states officially established diplomatic relations in April 1962.

Yet still, relations between the two remained stagnant for majority of the 1960s and soured in the 1970s and 80s. The main reasons for this were Israel’s Middle Eastern security situation, South Korea’s wobbly political context, and pressures of the Arab World on South Korea. The oil crises of 1973 and 79 shifted South Korea to the Arabs since the Koreans recognized the PLO and called for the Israel withdrawal from “occupied Arab territories.” In the meantime, Israel’s Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan made a decision to close the Israel embassy in Seoul in 1978 under claims of financial consideration (Song, *op. cit.*:141).

But, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War, something which presented Iraq as a new enemy, a preliminary reconciliation between the Arab World and Israel was achieved through the Madrid Middle-East Peace Conference of 1991.

South Korean was no longer in a dilemma on Israel vis-à-vis the Arab countries. This saw to Israel reopening its embassy in Seoul in January 1992 and South Korea opening its embassy in Tel Aviv in December 1993. From then, relations between the two countries have only grown via yearly exchange of official dignitaries; vast number of bilateral military, economic cooperation in high-tech fields; and religious interactions between Israel and “the second Israel”- South Korean (ibid).

2.3.1.2 Reorientation of Israel-China Relations

Sino-Israel relations began on the right foot back in 1920 when Sun Tat-Sen wrote to the founder of the Shanghai Zionist Association, Nissim Elias Benjamin Ezra, and expressed sympathy for the Zionist movement. Additionally, a few months after Israel achieved its independence, China sent a formal recognition of Israel. Shortly afterwards when a new Communist regime took control of mainland China, in January 1950, Israel in a surprising and daring decision recognized the newly formed People’s Republic of China. However, Sino-Israel relations deteriorated during the Korean War where Israel supported the UN resolutions aimed at stopping Communist aggression in Korea. Other reasons for deterioration came in 1955 when China improved her relations with the Arab world, especially Egypt. Then the Suez War broke out in 1956 where Beijing accused Israel of serving the imperialist cause. This led to cessation of relations between the two countries until 1992 when the two countries established full diplomatic relations (Shai, 2009:18-22).

2.3.1.3 Tanzania’s Reorientations of her Turbulent Relations

Tanzania has also had its share of unstable relations. Between 1964 and 1965, Tanzania expelled two American diplomats over allegations of subversion against the Zanzibar government; withdrew from West Germany military aid; and broke off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom (Mathews & Mushi, 1981:24). In 1968, Tanzania also had a fallout with Nigeria when she recognized Biafra (URT, 1968). Also, between 1971 and 1979, Tanzania’s relations with Uganda were poor because Amin’s regime constantly provoked Tanzania, consequently culminating into the 1978-79 war between the two countries. After Amin’s army was defeated, the first post-Amin government in Uganda asked for Tanzanian troops to stay in the country so as to ensure a peaceful transition of power. This signified a new chapter in

the Tanzania-Uganda relations after almost a decade of turbulent relations (Mathews & Mushi, *op. cit.*:271-72, 312).

There was also bad blood between the South African minority regime and Tanzania because of the apartheid policies and minority rule. However, Tanzania's relations with all these countries improved in the 1990s when Nyerere left office, the Cold War ended which marked a shift from liberation diplomacy to economic diplomacy, and the triumph of capitalism against socialism.

2.3.1.4 Reorientation of Tanzania-Israel Relations

The relations between Tanzania and Israel began with an intrigue of the former on the latter. In the 1960s when many newly independent African countries were in urgent need for economic and technological help, Israel supplied such needs. Also, Israel's seemingly neutrality as neither capitalist West nor communist East; its success in the Nahal (combat units with military preparedness, agricultural training and settlement pioneering) and Gonda organizations made Israel a safe haven for most infant African countries South of the Sahara. Tanzania was among the twenty-eight African countries to receive Israel aid in the form of agricultural technical assistance, joint commercial ventures and much needed military assistance through the National Service Corps (Mathews & Mushi, *op. cit.*:154, 170).

But, Tanzania's intrigue with Israel fell short when two of their trainees, Mobutu Sese Seko and Idi Amin both toppled their respective governments. Uganda's Milton Obote directly blamed Israel when he was overthrown in January 1971. Also, many African countries were suspicious of Israel's economic and technological stature in spite of itself being formed only in 1948. Soon, the African countries realized and saw Israel as an agent of 'Western Imperialism', friend of the minority regimes in southern Africa and a 'tool for neocolonialism' (Grigoryev 1961).

The radicalization of Tanzania's ideology in 1967 through the Arusha Declaration which affected Israel's imperialist economic interests in the country, leading to the beginning of deterioration of relations between the two countries. The final blows towards their relations probably came as a result of Zionism, which had more in common and was supported by the apartheid South African regime. This was

followed by four Arab-Israel wars, with the fourth one acting as the final nail to the coffin that buried Tanzanian-Israeli diplomatic relations in 1973 (Mathews & Mushi, *op. cit.*:156-59).

Fast forward to 1995 where Tanzania re-established her diplomatic ties with Israel following the Oslo Accords, although such relations were conducted via Nairobi, Kenya. But, major efforts towards the improvement of relations between the two countries took shape in the year 2014 through the Tanzania-Israel Business and Investment Forum (TIDIF). The TIDIF has been an economic-diplomatic move towards industrialization, something that is central to President Magufuli's regime. The TIDIF was the first of its kind with the objective of enhancing cooperation between foreign investors with particular reference between Israel related businesses and local Tanzanian enterprises. Subsequently, Tanzania has improved such relations even further in 2018 when she opened up her embassy in Tel Aviv under the leadership of President John Magufuli (Kingdom Leadership Network Tanzania, 2014).

Through this forum, further relations between the two countries filled the air headlines when Israel ambassador to Kenya, Yahel Vilan said that Tanzania was among the African countries that Israel had been looking to for business and diplomatic co-operation. President JPM reciprocated by expressing his intention to open an embassy in Tel Aviv in a letter addressed to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during his official visit to Uganda in July, 2016 (Tairo, 2017). On top of that, Tanzania and Israel continued with the TIBIF which according to the Tanzania Tourist Board (TTB) saw to the increase of Israeli tourists to Tanzania from 3,007 in 2011 to 14,754 in 2015 (URT, 2018).

The fifth TIBIF themed "Industrialization Through Strategic Partnerships and Value-Based Principles" which took place in April 2018, was graced by the presence of Tanzania's president JPM and Israel Minister of Justice, Ayelet Shaked. During the forum, the Industry, Trade and Investment Minister Charles Mwijage pointed out that the URT government has been in talks with Israel about the agricultural sector which Israel is highly developed in. He praised the people of Israel on their ability to farm in the desert and yield higher produce compared to those who farm on arable land.

He also described Israel as a country of high expertise in science and technology, all of which Tanzania is in dire need of on her road to industrialization. Similarly, Minister Ayelet Shaked said, “Israel is a superpower in technology and Tanzania is a superpower in natural attractions and resources, I think we can combine our endowments” (The Guardian, 2018).

2.3.2 Foreign Policy Reorientation

This subsection presents literature on foreign policy reorientation as covered by various previous studies. As a phenomenon, foreign policy reorientation is not new. The threat of and shifts in balance of power (military threats) have historically been the common condition for foreign policy alteration. For instance, the United States abandoned its policy of non-involvement in European conflicts following the growing threat of Nazi-Germany. Moreover, in late 1939, the Soviet Union abandoned its anti-Nazi foreign policy by signing the Non-Aggression Pact with Hitler’s government. A major reason of the pact was British and French’s indecisiveness in forming of an alliance with the Soviet Union (Holsti, 2016:105).

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries foreign policy reorientation or restructuring was attributed to issues of military and strategic concerns. However, from 1960s, reorientation became more complex as it came to be influenced by both domestic and external conditions. Non-military threats like economic vulnerability as a result of complex interdependence, dependence, the social effects of globalization, neo-colonialism, and nationalism also came to underline reorientation processes (ibid).

Academically, there was scarce scholarly literature on the dynamic circumstances of foreign policy relations up until the mid-1980s. Most studies focused on foreign policy stability and inertia compared to its transitions through different states of affairs (Gustavsson, 1998). But, with the end of the Cold War, fall of the Soviet Union and many socialist regimes, waves of democratization, a small but quickly growing body of literature addressing foreign policy change grew (Holsti, 1982).

The motives of foreign policy reorientation differ among states; however, political and economic reasons are the major ones both domestically and internationally.

Domestically, the political factors feature the leadership and coalition between major political actors. The economic reasons are associated with the overall development of the economy. Meanwhile, internationally, the political factors include power relations (balance of power) and the traditional military aspect of national security. The international economic reasons for reorientation include opportunities for transnational economic transactions (Gustavsson, *op. cit.*:23).

Thus, foreign policy reorientation generally takes into account the domestic and international parameters. After consideration of such parameters, governments usually opt for the following types of relations: isolation where the level of external contact is minimal and the policies adopted are exclusionist. A second option is self-reliance where trade, diplomatic and cultural transactions are diversified but kept to a minimum. This is a less extreme form of isolation. Thirdly, is dependence whereby countries enjoy a high level of external contact and transaction, although economic, technical, communications and military requirements are imported usually from a single country. Finally, is non-alignment diversification where external transactions are well scattered among many states and groups of states (Holsti, 2016:106).

Since independence, was guided by self-reliance which led her to advocate for 'collective self-reliance' at the regional, continental and Third World levels. Similarly, non-alignment was a crucial guiding principle in Tanzania's foreign relations during the Cold War. Nonetheless, in October 1967 President Nyerere found it necessary to clarify that self-reliance did not mean internal isolationism nor was non-alignment a ploy to access aid from both the East and West blocs. And as a developing country Tanzania has been dependent on economic and technical assistance since its independence (Mathews & Mushi, 1981:35-43). In the beginning she was dependent on the West but after a fallout, she thought to diversify her dependence. Hence, Tanzania's foreign policy reorientation in the 1960s shows how it mimics three out of the four types of reorientations.

Currently, Tanzania's foreign policy focuses on economic diplomacy. However, the country still reaffirms non-alignment and collective self-reliance (URT, 2001:21-22). This scenario continues to place Tanzania in a unique position that allows for its continued flexibility when it comes to reorient its foreign relations.

2.4 Research Gap

Gustavsson (1998:3), asserts that there is limited literature on foreign policy change because of the assumption that foreign policies tend to be rigid such that once a particular policy comes into existence, it becomes too difficult to change it. The difficulty in change stems from institutional inertia and the presence of vested interests of political actors. Thus, Gustavsson suggested that studies should focus on identifying the necessary conditions that would reduce the obstacles to foreign policy change.

Blavoukos & Bourantonis (2014) and Hoslti (2016), both identified a way around the obstacles to change through foreign policy reorientation which allows for the change in foreign relations (output) without significant change in foreign policy guidelines or principles. Foreign policy reorientation has become necessary because of the rapid increase in the pace of change in socio-economic, political and cultural contexts. Hence, rather than continuously changing their foreign policy documents, states have opted to change their foreign relations.

Furthermore, foreign policy reorientation takes place much faster and involves the conscious linking of different sectors. Foreign policy reorientation usually emanates from the recognition of an opportunity in which a political actor (s) seeks to capture after consideration of both the domestic and international circumstances. This is why it takes place more quickly than normal foreign policy change (ibid).

However, there are few empirical studies that portray the actual reality of how foreign policy orientation occurs, especially in the twenty-first century where military threats are no longer the major reasons of foreign policy orientation. Thus, this study seeks to fill the empirical knowledge gap by looking at the motives behind reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations.


2.5 Conceptual Framework

A conceptual framework is a written account which outlines the relationship between the variables mostly through diagrams and arrows. Some of the variables to this study are: Tanzania foreign policy principles, objectives, and strategies which were the independent variables; motives or factors of foreign policy decisions were the

intervening variable. Lastly, the dependent variable was Tanzania-Israeli relations. The independent variables involved Tanzania's foreign policy, the focus being on the principles and objectives as they are stipulated and documented. The intervening variables were the internal and external motives that led Tanzania to reinvigorate her relations with Israel. The dependent variable focused on the areas where Tanzania and Israel relations have been and will be improved.

While there is a direct relationship between the factors and areas where Tanzania-Israel relations are expected to take place, the relationship between the principles and objectives of Tanzania's new foreign policy and areas for Tanzania-Israel relations is not as direct. In support of Blavoukos & Bourantonis (2014) and Hoslti (2016), it is normal for foreign policy inputs and outputs not to have a direct relationship.

Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework



Source: Researcher's Construct (2019)

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the research methods and procedures used in the study. It describes the study area, design of the study, approach that the study took, sample size, sampling techniques, data collection tools, data analysis techniques, ethical considerations, limitations to this study, as well as the study's validity and reliability.

3.1 Area of Study

This study was conducted in Dodoma, the capital of Tanzania where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation as well as the University of Dodoma are located. The ministry has evolved throughout the years and has been responsible in Tanzania's foreign policy conduct. This ministry currently has its temporary offices at the University of Dodoma where foreign policy as a course is provided under the master's and bachelor degree programs of international relations. Hence, Dodoma was chosen because it is where the two institutions are located. These institutions provided both vital primary and secondary data relevant to this study.

3.2 Research Design

Selltiz *et. al* (1959), define a research design as "the arrangement of conditions for the collection and analysis of data in a way that seeks to combine relevance to the research purpose with economy in procedure." In the same way, Bryman & Bell (2007), see a research design as a roadmap providing a framework for the collection and analysis of data. This study employed a cross-sectional design because it allowed for the in-depth collection of data at a single point in time, with the aim of exploring the factors that have prompted Tanzania to reorient her relations with Israel. This design was both convenient to the researcher and respondents who were very hard to come by, and it also kept the monetary costs low. Moreover, this study was exploratory because it showcases the historical trend of relations between the two countries as well as the infancy of their rejuvenated relations.

3.3 Research Approach

At times it is known as research paradigm whereby according to McBurney & White (2009), a paradigm consists of a 'set of laws, theories, methods and applications that

form a scientific research tradition'. For Kothari (2004:5), there are two approaches to any research, quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative approach to research comprises of the generation of data in numerical form which can be subjected to rigorous quantitative analysis in a formal and rigid fashion. Qualitative approach on the other hand is concerned with subjective assessment of attitudes, opinions and behaviours. Research in such a situation is a function of researcher's insights and impressions.

This study embraces a mixed-method approach through the sequential explanatory strategy where quantitative data is initially collected and analyzed and the findings are used to inform the consequent qualitative phase. Concomitantly, in the qualitative phase, the collected data is used to gain more understanding of an understudied phenomenon (hence the exploratory nature). In the sequential explanatory strategy, the presentation of quantitative statistical results examines the phenomenon in a more generalizable fashion while qualitative data is integrated to further interpret the statistical findings in specific ways (Ivankova, Creswell & Stick, 2006; Statistics Solutions Team, 2020).

In this study, quantitative data and analysis was presented first followed by integration of qualitative data which further explored in more depth the views, perceptions, feelings and expertise of the respondents regarding Tanzania's foreign policy and her altered relations with Israel.

3.4 Sampling Techniques

The part of the population selected for study is known as the 'sample' and how they are chosen is referred to as 'sampling technique' (Kothari *op. cit.*: 55). And since this study was a mix between cross-sectional and exploratory design, and employed a mixed approach, purposive sampling was used. The decision to use purposive sampling is because foreign policy and actions are usually less known compared to domestic policies. Therefore, the choice of sample had to be judged by the researcher who chose the respondents that had firm knowledge on the subject matter.

Henceforth, a total of 30 respondents were chosen for this study, including: personnel of the Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African

Cooperation; lecturers at the University of Dodoma, Department of Political Science and Public Administration; as well as graduate and undergraduate students that took and are taking international relations programmes. All the respondents chosen were selected because they either study, lecture or practice within the field of foreign policy. The criteria for identifying respondents under purposive or judgmental sampling were based on various qualities such as the position one held in the ministry, educational level, and job experience.

3.5 Data Collection Tools and Methods

Primary and secondary tools of data collection were utilized to acquire relevant information from respondents.

3.5.1 Primary Tools

When a researcher is closest to an event, he or she is able to directly observe, experience and record or collect information about a phenomenon under study. This type of information is known as primary data and since it is obtained for the first time, it is considered to be fresh and original in character (Walliman, 2011). In most cases, primary data collection methods such as interviews, surveys and questionnaires place the researcher closest to the phenomenon being studied (ibid). This study used interviews and questionnaires to collect primary data.

The primary tools of data collection were distributed depending on the convenience and availability of respondents as well as their level of knowledge, expertise and experience.

3.5.1.1 Interview

This is a primary data collection technique that involves a person known as the interviewer asking questions generally in a face-to-face contact to the other person or persons known as the interviewee (s) in a structured or unstructured manner. *Structured* interviews employ the use of a set of prearranged questions, a rigid procedure and highly standardized methods of recording. While *unstructured* interviews tend to be more flexible in their approach to questioning because they do not follow a system of pre-determined questions and standardized techniques of recording information (Kothari 2004).

This study employed both types of interviews where the structured interview was used because it was less time consuming, easier and mostly provided to stakeholders of foreign policy that were not as critical on the subject matter such as students. Unstructured interviews were provided to foreign relations officers and some lecturers who had far more experience in the field in an effort to explore relevant additional information that was missing in the structured interviews.

3.5.1.2 Questionnaire

This technique involves written questions that are mostly arranged in a definite order which are used to obtain information required in a study (Kothari, 2004). In this study, the questions were structured according to the specific objectives to ensure their coherence to the study. Questionnaires resembling structured interviews were provided to those who were unable to sit for interviews. Quantitative data was mostly obtained from the questionnaires.

3.5.2 Secondary Tools

Secondary data refers to data that has already been recorded, analyzed and made readily available by someone else through various academic platforms (Walliman, 2011). Documentary review is the most popular method of collecting secondary data.

3.5.2.1 Documentary Review

This secondary data collection tool involves going through published and unpublished documents like books, journals, articles, academic papers, policy documents, statutes, digital documents, websites, newspapers and magazines. The documents that were reviewed included foreign policy speeches and research reports, scholarly books and articles, newspapers, government speeches and diverse library materials both in paper and digital form.

Because of the infancy of the strengthened Tanzania-Israel relations, newspapers were the richest in literature concerning this study. Also, various sites including the Tanzania Foreign Affairs Ministerial site together the Embassy of Tanzania in Tel Aviv site provided regular updates on continuous Tanzania-Israel relations. Israel sites such as the MASHAV were also helpful. Governmental documents and

speeches complimented what the respondents provided since documents and sites had more statistical evidence.

3.6 Data Analysis Plan

‘Analysis’ refers to the computation of certain measures along with searching for patterns of relationship that exist among data-groups as argued by Kothari (*op.cit.*:122). Since the study utilizes a mixed approach, both qualitative and quantitative data were analyzed respectively, but with more focus being placed on qualitative analysis. Bhattacharjee (2012), points out that qualitative analysis relies heavily on the researcher’s analytical, integrative skills and personal knowledge of the social context where data was obtained. Similarly, Dawson (2002), sees qualitative analysis as a very personal process, one with few rigid guidelines and procedures. Qualitative analysis includes comparative analysis, content, discourse and thematic analysis. This study applied content analysis which involves breaking down of the obtained information into meaningful themes like economic, political and social subjects.

Quantitative data were coded, edited and analyzed by use of the SPSS version 16 program which will then be presented in terms of tables of frequencies and percentages. Likert scale will also be employed in presenting qualitative statements quantitatively.

3.7 Limitations to the Study

The first limitation was the time frame offered by the university which did not suffice to comfortably conduct all that is academically necessary to this study. In addressing time constraints, the researcher employed a cross-sectional design that allowed for the collection of data from the respondents only once. Also, through the sequential explanatory approach, both qualitative and quantitative data were collected and analyzed simultaneously. Apart from time, resources were also a challenge and they hindered any efforts of an extensive investigation in the study such as reaching the Israel authorities for inquiry. Documentary review ensured that relevant information was obtained cheaply through electronic sources.

The infancy of the topic at hand also limited the ability to pinpoint exactly the impacts that the newly improved relations between Tanzania and Israel would have to each other and other states of concern and even on non-state actors like NGOs. Fourth, is the delicacy of the issue area itself whereby foreign policy is likely to be treated as an issue of national security, thus documents were treated as highly confidential and remote. Documentary review also helped to reduce this limitation whereby unlike in the past, today foreign policy documents and materials are readily available.

3.8 Ethical Considerations

In order to ensure ethical conduct and avoid infringement to any person that contributed to this study, all the respondents were informed accurately and in full on the study issue so as to ensure their informed consent to participate. This was done through open and honest communication on the part of the researcher to seek permission from respondents prior to the interviews. Given the nature of the study, anonymity was guaranteed to the respondents and any information they provided was treated confidentially and used exclusively for academic purposes. Similarly, the purpose and relevance of the study were communicated to the respondents so as to enable the respondents to make rational and informed decisions on whether to participate or not to participate in the study.

3.9 The Validity and Reliability of the Study

This study applied triangulation method, which involves the application of and combination of more than one method in the study of the same phenomenon. The combination can be of several data sources, observers, theories and methods all of which aim at overcoming the weaknesses and intrinsic biases of single data sources, single observer, single theory and single method (Bogdan & Bikien, 2006). This study triangulated the methods of data collection such that it used interviews, questionnaires and documentary review so as to increase credibility and validity of the results. It also used a mixed approach.

3.9.1 Validity

Saunders *et al* (2007) opine that validity is concerned with showing whether the results of a study are really what they appear to be about. In other words, validity

involves the ability of measuring what one intends to measure in a study with the utmost accuracy, efficiency and effectiveness. It is intended to ensure that the findings are related to the study. To ensure validity of this study, the questionnaires and interview guide were designed in a way that captured the relevant and crucial themes of this study. On top of that, the questionnaire and interview guide directly reflected the study's objectives.

3.9.2 Reliability

In its simplicity, when a research is reliable it means that when other researchers use the same methods and tools under similar conditions, then they are able to generate the same results. Basically, it entails the attainment of consistency in the results whenever the same technique is repeated when conducting a similar study (Babbie, 2005). Reliability of a study seeks to provide a shield against subjectivity of both, the researcher and respondents (ibid). For the assurance of reliability, the study triangulated the methods of obtaining data, that is, questionnaires, interviews and documentary review

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter encompasses the presentation and discussion of findings of the study with reference to the research objectives outlined in the first chapter. Through the sequential explanatory strategy, first the quantitative data will be presented and qualitative data will be used for deeper elaboration of the quantitative findings. The findings were obtained from 30 respondents. The quantitative findings incorporated the background information of the respondents including their age groups, gender, occupation and knowledge of Tanzania's FP. Meanwhile, the qualitative findings presented the knowledge, expertise and perception of the respondents on Tanzania's FP as well as the reoriented Tanzania-Israel relations.

4.1 Presentation of Background Quantitative Findings

This first part presents the background information of the respondents including their age, gender, occupation and knowledge on FP of Tanzania.

4.1.1 Respondents' Age Group

The depiction of the age of respondents in many studies plays a vital role when it comes to variation in knowledge, perception, expertise, and experience. In this study, the respondents ages were categorized into five age group intervals. Respondents who fell within 20-29 years were 12 (40%), those within 30-39 years were also 12 (40%), 4 (13.4%) respondents were between 40-49 years, while the last two age groups had 1 (3.3%) respondent each as depicted in table 4.1 below. The findings revealed that most of the respondents are youthful and in the productive age.

Table 4.1: Respondents' Age Group

Age group of Respondents	Frequency	Percentage (%)
20-29	12	40.0%
30-39	12	40.0%
40-49	4	13.4%
50-59	1	3.3%
60 years and above	1	3.3%
Total	30	100.0%

Source: Field Data (2019)

4.1.2 Gender of Respondents

The distribution of the respondents according to their respective gender had a total number of 17 (57%) men and 13 (43%) women. Despite this not being a gender study, a good gender balance among respondents is always important so as to reduce the chances of biasness.

Table 4.2: Respondent's Gender

Gender	Frequency	Percentage
Male	17	56.7%
Female	13	43.3%
Total	30	100.0%

Source: Field Data (2019)

4.1.3 Occupation of the Respondents

The study gathered 9 (30%) foreign relations officers, 9 (30%) lecturers, 7 (23.3%) graduates and 5 (16.7%) undergraduate students as respondents who either practice, lecture and study the subject matter.

Table 4.3: Respondents' Occupations

Respondents' Occupation	Frequency	Percentage
Foreign Relations officer	9	30.0%
Lecturer	9	30.0%
Graduate	7	23.3%
Undergraduate	5	16.7%
Total	30	100.0%

Source: Field Data (2019)

4.1.4 Knowledge of Tanzania's Current Foreign Policy and Justification of Reorientation of Tanzania-Israel Relations

This study also inquired upon respondents' knowledge or awareness of Tanzania's FP and whether they were aware if Tanzania had opened its embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel. As many as 29 (96.7%) respondents knew the current FP of Tanzania as economic diplomacy while 1 (3.3%) respondent was unaware of Tanzania's FP.

Table 4.4: Respondent's Awareness of Tanzania's FP

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	29	96.7%
No	1	3.3%
Total	30	100.0%

Source: Field Data (2019)

Currently, Tanzania's external relations are guided by economic diplomacy that is stipulated in the 2001 foreign policy document. The adoption of economic diplomacy resulted from a number of reasons including: achievement of certain goals such as the attainment of independence of most states in the world, the defeat of apartheid and the end of the Cold War. Also, there arose new aspects such as the need to liberalize and globalize, the need to support the UN even more, and the need to deal with new forms of conflicts and crises like diseases (URT, 2001:6-10). These achievements along with the shifts in domestic and international context necessitated the shift from liberation diplomacy to concentration on economic diplomacy.

The shift from liberation to economic diplomacy involved the reduction of some FP principles such as the support for the struggles against racism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism; and the support for the oppressed people in the world. However, the reduction in such principles did not mean that Tanzania would be silent in when people are oppressed and racially discriminated. Thus, even though the liberation principles no longer appeared in the 2001 foreign policy document, Tanzania has continued to show support to struggles of oppressed people in the world such as in the Palestinian struggles for statehood. In an interview conducted on 17th July, a key ministerial official reported the following with regards to Tanzania's foreign policy;

“..... our traditional foreign policy principles and objectives enable earned us immense respect both in Africa and outside the continent. Tanzania through Mwalimu Nyerere stood for what was right even when infringements were done by major powers. Tanzania was able to command diplomatic practice and influence of the highest order that far surpassed its economic capability. Thus, despite the change in both domestic and international circumstance, Tanzania tries to maintain its reputation as an active player in the world arena” (Foreign Relations Officer, 2019).

Thus, despite the reduction of some principles that underlined liberation diplomacy, there are other principles such as defence of freedom, justice, human rights, equality and democracy still serve the same purpose. However, the addition of principles like the promotion of deeper economic cooperation with the development partners, support of the UN in its search for international economic development have further asserted the importance of economic development. Furthermore, through objectives like ensuring that URT's external relations are aligned with economic interests and building a self-sustaining economy, Tanzania's economic desires are clearly laid out (URT, 2001:12-13).

Additionally, various strategies have been employed by Tanzania in realizing economic diplomacy. These include: the redefinition of bilateral diplomacy by placing economic objectives as the driving forces; redefining the scope of bilateral relations be on economic, industrial, trade and technological co-operation with

individual countries; and promoting trade, investments and tourism as priority functions (URT, *op. cit.*:14-21). From the principles, objectives and strategies, the reasons for reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations can be justified whereby the Israel qualifies as the perfect development partner whose technical capability can significantly benefit Tanzania in her efforts of establishing an industrial-based economy.

4.1.5 Awareness on Tanzania's Ambassadorial Establishment in Tel Aviv

In an effort to strengthen Tanzania-Israel relations, the former established her embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel. About 28 (93%) respondents were aware of such an ambassadorial move while 2 (7%) were unaware as tabulated below.

Table 4.5: Awareness on Establishment of Tanzania's Embassy in Tel Aviv

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	28	93.3%
No	2	6.7%
Total	30	100.0%

Source: Field Data (2019)

4.2 Presentation and Discussion of Quantitative and Qualitative Findings

This second segment presents the perception, knowledge, expertise, and experience of the 30 respondents on Tanzania's foreign policy and the reoriented relations between Tanzania and Israel. The presentation of the qualitative findings aligned with the three specific objectives of this study which included: finding out the motives, expected outcomes and challenges that might arise following the restructured Tanzania-Israel relations.

4.2.1 Motives for Strengthening Relations between Tanzania and Israel

The first objective of the study was to find out the motives behind the reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations. This objective sought out the reasons as to why despite re-establishing relations since 1995, Tanzania has chosen to strengthen relations with Israel in from 2014 to 2018 when it opened up its embassy in Tel Aviv in 2018. Under this segment, the study looks at the proximity of motives and the types of motives that have influenced reorientation of relations between the two countries.

4.2.1.1 Proximity of Motives

The proximity of motives simply means whether the motives are influenced internally, externally or result from a mixture of both internal and external reasons. A total of 10 (33.3%) respondents associated the factors for strengthened relations between Tanzania and Israel to be internal, only 1 (3.3%) respondent saw the motives to be externally driven, while 19 (63.4%) respondents attributed the motives to be a mix of both internal and external factors.

Table 4.6: Proximity of Motives for Reorientation Tanzania-Israel Relations

Proximity	Frequency	Percentage
Internal	10	33.3%
External	1	3.3%
Both	19	63.4%
Total	30	100.0%

Source: Field Data (2019)

In the contemporary world, the formulation and implementation of both domestic and foreign policy must take into account a mix of internal and external conditions. Holsti (2016), argues that foreign policy reorientation in current times relies on the mix of complex dynamic internal and external circumstances. Issues of economic susceptibility, pressures of globalization, dependence and interdependence, domestic politics have to be taken into account when altering foreign policy outputs or relations.

Similarly, the nexus between internal and external factors is also embraced by Sørensen (2001), who pointed out that the essential features of modern statehood all involve both internal and external aspects and neither side can be privileged over the other. Similarly, game theorists as posited by Putnam (1999), analyze foreign policies and decisions as influenced by both domestic and international factors.

The findings revealed that the strengthening of relations between Tanzania and Israel was mostly motivated by a mix of both internal and external factors. The internal factors included: a domestic policy that steers Tanzania towards an industrial economy; a Tanzanian foreign policy of economic diplomacy, and the incumbent

regime (leadership). External factors included military threats like terrorism and military procurement; non-military threats like technological deficit; and the structure of previous relations between Tanzania and Israel. In this day and age, states have to take into consideration both internal and external factors even when it comes to their domestic policies. Aspects such as globalization have made it almost impossible to separate internal and external factors when it comes to foreign policy alteration.

4.2.1.2 Motives for Reorientation of Tanzania-Israel Relations

Various factors were attributed to the strengthening of relations between Tanzania and Israel. The respondents assigned different ranks to the factors whereby some factors were perceived to have influenced the improvement of relations between Tanzania and Israel to a greater extent than others. All the respondents (100%) agreed that ‘economic incentives and needs’ were the leading motive in the strengthening of Tanzania-Israeli relations. About 90% of the respondents pointed out ‘social concerns and needs’ like medicare and tourism as the major motive; while 83% of the respondents attributed ‘presidential exigency’ to be the most important factor in the reorientation of Tanzania-Israeli relations. More than 73% of the respondents were in agreement that ‘industrial and technological needs’ were the main factor for the improvement of relations between Tanzania and Israel. ‘Military and security concerns’ ranked lowest as a motive for the enhancement of Tanzania-Israeli relations as supported by 64%% of the respondents.

Table 4.7: Motives Behind Improvement of Tanzania-Israel Relations

MOTIVES	Strongly Disagree (SA)		Disagree (D)		Agree (A)		Strongly Agree (SA)		(A & SA)	RANK
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	%	
Economic Incentives and Needs	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0	30	21	70.0	100	1st
Military and Security Concerns	4.0	13.3	7.0	23.3	11.0	36.7	8.0	26.6	63.7	5th
Industrial and Technological Needs	0.0	0.0	8.0	26.7	21.0	70.0	1.0	3.3	73.3	4th
Social Needs and Concerns	0.0	0.0	3.0	10.0	10.0	33.3	17	56.7	90.0	2nd
Presidential Exigency (Preference, Perception and Personality)	0.0	0.0	5.0	16.7	19.0	63.3	6.0	20.0	83.3	3rd

Source: Field Data (2019)

From the findings, economic incentives and needs were ranked as the major motive behind the reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations. This is because domestically, economic needs and incentives are reflected in Tanzania's need to move from being a peripheral to a semi-peripheral country through building an industrial-based economy. Under foreign policy, economic incentives and needs are reflected through economic diplomacy which underlines the basis of all Tanzanian external relations.

Economics is the major force when it comes to statecraft. For Hill (2016:175), economics is naturally a major concern of politicians. As for Heywood (2011: 459), economics is the most obvious area of interdependence amongst states. Hence, any policy maker always aims for his country to continuously improve economically. Even when it comes to FPD and foreign policy in general, such policies and decisions are created in such a way that economic interests are secured and a state is able to benefit more by attracting more funds. Henceforth, the promotion of economic interests of a state is the ultimate aim in foreign policy and it would be safe to say that Tanzania's foreign policy is guided more by economic factors than by political ones.

The findings also correspond to the situation in the mid-1960s when Tanzania first oriented its foreign policy in an effort to reduce its dependence on aid from Western Powers. Being a newly independent state, Tanzania was in urgent need of technological and economic assistance. The Israeli moderate model of social development acted as some sort of economic third wheel that fit perfectly in between the western imperial model and the communist model (The Tanzanian Standard, 1970). Thus, the economic dimension was vital in the orientation of relations between Tanzania and Israel both in the 1960s and in the most recent reorientation.

The second, fourth and fifth motives were social needs and concerns; industrial and technological needs; and military and security concerns respectively. The three motives are placed together because at their core they all require technical assistance, which is Israel's specialty. Israel has made significant strides in the technical sphere. In the 1960s, Israel captured Africa through its 'technical aid diplomacy' where it provided aid in the form of technical assistance in agriculture; joint business ventures and investments; and militarily (Jacob, 1971; Bishku, 2017).

Today, most of Israel's aid is conducted through its Foreign Ministry's MASHAV, Israel's Agency for International Development Cooperation. In her journey towards establishing an industrialized economy, Tanzania recognized the need for technical assistance of its labour force in areas of agrostudies, economics, medicine, and industries, ICT, and water (Mbago, 2018). Furthermore, the rise of new security concerns such as extremism, cyber-crime and the increase in international organized crime have also led to a demand in military assistance. Israel's technical prowess in all these fields attracted foreign policy reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations in the past and presently.

Nonetheless, during the more recent reorientation process, Tanzania has had more to offer apart from political support of Israel vis-à-vis the Arab world on international meetings (Bishku, *op. cit.*:80). Tanzania's tourism sector has served as a field of exchange where a yearly increase in the number of Israeli tourists has been witnessed especially after the reorientation of relations between the two countries.

The results also depict ‘presidential exigency’ as the third motive in the reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations. US President Truman used to say that the president was the maker of foreign policy. Even in other forms of rule like parliamentary democracy, it is the Prime Minister and in an authoritarian state it is the dictator. In Tanzania, President Nyerere was nicknamed ‘Chief of Diplomacy’ because of the personal touch and imprint he had in the Tanzanian traditional foreign policy (Mathews & Mushi, 1981:11-12). This is why Tanzania’s traditional FP was found in the Presidential Circular No. 2 of 1964.

The role of the presidency in the reorientation process can be traced as far back as 2016 when President Magufuli wrote a letter to Prime Minister Netanyahu on the intention of improving bilateral relations between the two countries. The letter was delivered to Netanyahu by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tanzania, Augustine Mahiga (Kishore, 2016). When Israel defence Minister, Avigdor Lieberman visited the Tanzanian state house in 2018, President Magufuli asked Israel to open up its embassy in Tanzania after Dodoma had already done so in Tel Aviv, Israel. Such statements, decisions and actions by the Tanzanian President reflect the relevance of the presidency and leadership when it comes to their ability to influence foreign policy in Tanzania. Even the Israel ambassador to Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Malawi and Seychelles, Mr Noah Gal Gendler, pointed out to what he called the “President Magufuli factor” to no doubt be the first reason behind strengthening relations between the two countries (Masare, 2019).

Generally, various motives have influenced the reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations with varying degrees. These motives are a mix of both internal and external circumstances. The internal circumstances include the presidency and socio-economic needs while the external conditions include military threats, economic vulnerability, and non-military threats like social consequences of globalization. Correspondingly, most of the motives that influenced the current reorientation of relations resemble those that led to reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations in the early to mid-1960s though they differ with regards to intensity. Also, the preexisting conditions in the past differ from the ones existing today such as in the past Tanzania was still a newly independent state with socio-economic and political instabilities.

Internationally, the presence of the Cold War resulted and colonization of other states led to Tanzanian foreign policy of non-alignment and liberation diplomacy.

Today, Tanzania's circumstances are better off with more socio-economic and political stability. Domestically, the abandonment of socialist policies has increased economic opportunities of investment which pioneered for reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations through the Tanzania-Israel Business and Investment Forum (TIDIF). Integration of Tanzania into the world capitalist system has also forced Tanzania to pursue more pragmatic foreign policy of economic diplomacy in its efforts of developing an industrial based economy.

4.2.2 The Expected Outcomes

The second objective of this study was examining the expected outcomes of the reoriented relations between Tanzania and Israel. Due to the fact that the relations between the two countries have only been improved recently (focusing on the establishment of the Tanzania embassy in Tel Aviv in May 2018), the outcomes were presented in terms of expectations. However, this is not to say that there have not yet been outcomes in various sectors already. The tourism and medical sectors have already experienced positive effects.

4.2.2.1 Expected Sectoral Benefits

Various sectors of Tanzania were presented to the respondents who chose which sector (s) would benefit the most from the revitalized Tanzania-Israel relations. Six (20%) respondents argued that the 'defence and security sector' would benefit more; five (17%) respondents leaned towards the 'industry, trade and investment sector' as the sector that will mostly benefit. About 7 (23%) respondents favored the 'educational, science, technology and vocational sector (EDTV)' as the one that will reap more benefits. The 'agricultural sector' was supported by 4 (13%) respondents; while social sectors like the 'tourism and medical sectors' were seen as sectors that would mostly benefit by 8 (27%) respondents.

Table 4.8: Expected Sectoral Benefits of Improved Tanzania-Israel Relations

Sector	Frequency	Percentage
Defence and Security	6	20.0%
Industry, Trade and Investment	5	16.7%
EDTV	7	23.3%
Agricultural	4	13.3%
Tourism and Medical	8	26.7%
Total	30	100.0%

Source: Field Data (2019)

The Foreign Minister of Tanzania, Augustine Mahiga lamented that the reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations is geared towards multisectoral benefits. Tanzania seeks to benefit in various sectors with which Israel can help with such as agriculture, health, industries, tourism, defence and security, ICT, and water (Mbago, 2018). While economic incentives and needs appeared to be the major driving motive, the sectors which seem to have benefited more from the reoriented relations between Tanzania and Israel are the social sectors such as the tourism, medical as well as the “educational, science, technology and vocational sector.” In combination, 63.3% of the respondents concurred that the social sectors in Tanzania are the most likely to benefit more from the reoriented Tanzania-Israel relations. These were the tourism and medical sector (26.7%); the educational, science, technology and vocational sector (23.3%); and the agricultural sector (13.3%).

A foreign relations officer interviewed on July 16th disclosed the following on why the social sector would benefit the most:

‘..... simply the infancy or underdevelopment of Tanzania’s industrial base puts it at a disadvantage when it comes to sectors directly related to the economy such as the “industry, trade and investment sector. The basis of industrial operations is education and acquisition of necessary skills. Hence, if we receive technological help from Israel, Tanzanians first need to become experts of such technologies. This is why the government has

entered agreement with Israel to train Tanzanians in Agrostudies, ICT and industrial mechanization’ (Foreign Relations Officer, 2019)

But this is not to say that the economic sector would not benefit because ultimately all the sectors are tied to economic needs, some even more than others such as the tourism sector. The following subsection involves a look at the sectoral benefits in more detail.

4.2.2.1.1 Tourism Sector

Tanzania has been receiving Israeli tourists long before relations between the two countries had been strengthened. Although, considered to be a socio-cultural sector at its core, the tourism sector has immense economic benefits to Tanzania which has more than its fair share of tourist destination areas. For instance, there has been a yearly rise in the number of Israeli tourists visiting Tanzania, from 3,007 in 2011 to 14,754 in 2015 (Tairo, 2017).

During the Easter week of this year, that is, 20th – 27th of April, more than 1,000 Israel tourists were in the northern tourism circuit of Tanzania sampling the Serengeti, Ngorongoro, Tarangire and Lake Manyara attraction destinations. Because of this period being an off-season, one TANAPA communications official described this arrival from the Middle East as a typhoon of tourists (The Guardian, 2019). According to the TTB Managing Director, Devotha Mdachi, a similar group as the ‘typhoon’ from Israel were expected to arrive in Tanzania by June 2019 (Mohamed, 2019). Mr Fredierich G. Mwakitwange, a financial attaché from the URT embassy in Tel Aviv, made projections that by the end of this year Tanzania would receive more than 40,000 tourists from Israel (Mayallah, 2019).

4.2.2.1.2 Medical Sector

The Tanzanian government has always stressed on the aspect of health ever since Tanzania’s founding father, Julius Nyerere portrayed diseases as one among the three enemies of development. Nyerere associated being healthy to freedom, that is, freedom from hunger, diseases and poverty (Nyerere, 1973). From such an understanding, Tanzania has constantly been improving aspects related to health.

And through the strengthened relations, MASHAV (Israel's Agency for International Development Cooperation) helped design, finance and construct a modern Intensive Care Unit (ICU) at the Benjamin William Mkapa Hospital in Dodoma. Equipped with the most up to date Israel medical technology, specialists from MASHAV arrived before the official handing out of the facility so as to train the local technicians and medical teams of how to operate the ICU equipment (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). The head of MASHAV, Gil Haskel officially handed over the finished ICU on April 2nd, of this year (Taboola, 2019).

4.2.2.1.3 Educational, Science, Technology and Vocational Sector

This sector acts as a basis for all the other sectors apart from the tourism sector where Tanzania seems to be benefiting most compared to Israel. In the medical, agricultural and even the sectors which involve direct transfer of technology, training is vital. According to Foreign Minister Mahiga, Israel was ready to offer free training to more than two hundred Tanzanians in the agricultural sector. The training program was to begin with an initial batch of 45 people whom would receive an additional \$10,000 each after they completed their training. Such a dividend would help the 45 kick-start and boost their agricultural production when they returned to Tanzania (Mbago, 2018).

After the reoriented relations, in early September, 2019, one hundred Tanzanian students arrived at the Ben Gurion International Airport in Lod, Israel for their one-year training at the Institute of Agrostudies (Embassy of URT, 2019a). Although this apprenticeship program between the two countries has been taking place since 2015 via the Sokoine University Graduate Entrepreneurs Cooperatives (SUGECO) which involved only 125 youths (SUGECO, 2019), the intake after improvement of Tanzania-Israel relations has grown and is expected to improve. In this very same month, 45 previous students have graduated from the institute and were awarded certificated by the Minister of Agriculture, Japhet Kasunga (The Guardian, 2019).

Training has not only been in the agricultural field but also in the medical field. For instance, in the beginning of this year, four Tanzanian doctors, two radiation oncologists and two radiation therapists completed their advanced radiotherapy training at two Israeli leading cancer centers, the Assuta Ramat Hachayal Center and

the Sheba Medical Center. The training was funded with the help of the International Atomic Energy Agency. With Tanzania only behind Kenya when it comes to cancer-related deaths, the country's need for radiotherapy continues to increase. Consequently, Tanzania is investing in additional radiotherapy facilities through the support of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). But such facilities will need more trained staff, and Israel seems to be the likely candidate to facilitate the training of such staff (United with Israel Staff, 2019).

4.2.2.1.4 Agricultural Sector

This remains to be the backbone sector of Tanzania's economy and central to the country's industrialization journey. Although agriculture employs about 67% of the employed population and accounting for 23% of GDP (URT, 2016:8), it is still underdeveloped and subsistent. The government seeks to change this especially with the help of Israel which has one of the greatest success stories when it comes to modern-day agricultural revolution. Historically, Tanzania cooperated with Israel in the agricultural field during the 1960s when relations between the two countries were first established (Mathews & Mushi, 1981). In recent years when the relations between the two countries gained momentum, this sector was one of the key areas of cooperation yet again. For instance, in 2018 when Minister Mahiga met with Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel promised to help Tanzania's agricultural sector by transforming it and the country into Africa's food source (Mbago, 2018). Fully funded training of hundreds of Tanzanians in Agrostudies by the Israel government has been one of the strategies geared towards improving this sector.

Furthermore, this year, Tanzania Minister of Agriculture, Japhet Hasunga took a six-day professional tour in Israel and met various stakeholders in the agricultural field in Israel to discussed upon areas for agricultural improvement. A meeting with the Israel Minister of Agriculture and Rural development, Uri Ariel saw to a unanimous agreement for improvement of agricultural productivity, research and technology. Also, Hasunga's meeting with the head of MASHAV, Gil Haskel and CEO of Agrostudies, Yaron Tamir, involved enhancement of skills and knowledges to Tanzanian students and professionals. The meeting with founder and director of Fair Planet, Mrs. Shoshan Haran focused on increasing smallholder farmers' productivity through the use of high-quality seed varieties. Other areas of improvement pointed

out by Hasunga included investing in irrigation systems so as to enhance the ability of Tanzanians to farm all year around (Embassy of URT, 2019b).

While only 4 (13.3%) respondents argued that the agricultural sector will benefit the most from the improved relations between Tanzania and Israel, the literature above further guarantees that this sector will benefit more. Apart from the tourism sector, the agricultural sector perhaps will be the most to benefit and it might even overtake the tourism sector in the long run.

4.2.2.1.5 Industry, Trade and Investment Sector

As a sector directly related to the motive of ‘economic incentives and needs’, this sector should have benefited the most under normal circumstances. But, with an infant industrial base and underutilized agricultural land, Tanzania’s ability to trade is affected since it cannot produce raw materials to feed its infant industries nor can it produce finished products for export. According to a World Investment Report of 2017, Tanzania only experienced inward flows of foreign direct investments (FDIs) with equivalent outward flows of FDIs (UNCTAD, 2018). This is a result of the absence of a strong industrial base, something which consequently affects much-needed earnings that enable a country’s ability to invest abroad. Therefore, with the improvement of the agricultural sector, the industrial sector will grow and make trade and investment more lucrative for Tanzania.

4.2.2.1.6 Defence and Security Sector

National security remains to be the primary goal of a foreign policy, which is the reason why every country maintains an army, police force and the power of states remains to be measured through their coercive abilities. National security is not only related to the integrity of territory nor security of national borders, it also entails the assurance of sovereignty, independence of home territory, self-preservation and strategic defence of vital areas like the economy and social values (Holsti, 1978:145).

Tanzania is located in a conflict prone region whereby her neighbours have and are experiencing various forms of conflicts like rebel insurgency in the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, and terrorism in Kenya. With Tanzania also being a victim of

terrorist attacks back in 1998, cooperation in security between Israel and Tanzania was expected and indeed has already begun to take place. In early 2019, a team of Israel Defence Forces' (IDF) finest trainers travelled to Tanzania to provide the Tanzanian Military with first class training in counterterrorism tactics, urban combat and hostage rescue (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019; TOI Staff, 2019). And since the Tanzanian army is often deployed for peacekeeping missions under the United Nations, this sector will continue to benefit from the reoriented relations between the two countries.

Basically, the results exposed that the reoriented Tanzania-Israel relations have and will continue to contribute to benefits on a multisectoral basis. However, the social sectors such as the educational, medical, and tourism sectors are seemingly reaping more immediate benefits compared to the agricultural as well as industrial and trade sectors. The infancy of the industrial sector together with the underdeveloped and subsistent nature of the agricultural sector have been the reason behind these sectors' minimal benefits.

4.2.2.2 Other Expected Political Implications

The revamping of Tanzania-Israel diplomatic relations is expected to have some repercussions not only between the two countries but also upon their relations with other countries as discussed below.

4.2.2.2.1 Likelihood of Israel Establishing its Embassy in Tanzania

The study looked at the political implication of whether Israel will reciprocate Tanzania's ambassadorial establishment in Tel Aviv by establishing its embassy in Tanzania. From three responses, no one chose 'no' upon the likelihood of Israel establishing its embassy in Tanzania, but 17 (57%) respondents 'did not know' while 13 (43%) respondents agreed that Israel would establish its embassy in Tanzania on the basis of reciprocity.

Table 4.9: Likelihood of Israel Establishing its Embassy in Tanzania

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	13	43.3%
I do not know	17	56.7%
Total	30	100.0%

Source: Field Data (2019)

With Tanzania having established its embassy in Tel Aviv in 2018, Dodoma has urged Israel to do the same. About 57% of the respondents were not sure if Israel would open its embassy in Tanzania implying that an ambassadorial move is solely an Israel decision and not a decision that can be determined by actors outside Israel. To justify this response, the Israel ambassador to East Africa, Malawi and Seychelles, Mr Noah Gal Gendler, proclaimed that Israel lost a lot when it comes to ambassadorial investment in the 1970s and it therefore approaches ambassadorial establishment in Africa cautiously. Mr Noah spoke of the tragic story of how Israel abruptly lost almost all its African missions. During such times, Israel was still a small country, hence such losses were tremendously debilitating (Masare, 2019).

However, 43% of the respondents were convinced that Israel would open its embassy in Tanzania, something which entails that relations between the two countries will improve rather than deteriorate. In support of the 43%, former Israel ambassador to Kenya who is the current head of MASHAV, Gil Haskel was quoted saying, “We were planning on opening a fully-fledged embassy in Dar es Salaam and that the only hinderance was budgetary constraints resulting from global economic challenges” (Magomba, 2014). Mr Noah also confirmed such a prospect when he sat down for an interview with *The Citizen* in July 2019 (Masare, *ibid*).

4.2.2.2.2 Tanzania’s Continued Support for Palestine

Tanzania has historically been at the forefront when it comes to fighting against oppression, social injustice, colonization and all their manifestations. When Israel displayed such behaviours against the Arab world, particularly Palestine, Tanzania-Israel relations took a sour turn as Tanzania aligned with the Arab world and Palestine from the 1960s. Ever since then, Tanzania has been supporting Palestinian claims of statehood, a state of its own which it seems it has been robbed in broad

daylight. Given the strengthened relations between Tanzania and Israel, the latter being Palestine's most antagonist counterpart, the respondents were asked on the likelihood of Tanzania continuing to support Palestinian claims of statehood as it has historically done. Only 2 (6.7%) respondents said 'no', 24 (80%) said 'yes', while 4 (13.3%) 'did not know'.

Table 4.10: Tanzania's Continued Support for Palestine's Statehood

Response	Frequency	Percentage
No	2	6.7%
Yes	24	80.0%
I do not know	4	13.3%
Total	30	100.0%

Source: Field Data (2019)

With the lack of defined territorial boundaries as a result of annexation, Palestine is not considered as a state and is unable to enjoy aspects like sovereignty. Israel is perhaps what stands between Palestine and its statehood. With Tanzania having severed relations with Israel in the past because of the Israel-Palestine conflict, the improved relations between Tanzania and Palestine brought up questions on Tanzania's continued support for Palestinian claims. As much as 80% of the respondents argued that Tanzania would continue to support Palestine as it has historically done. To validate this, the head of the MFA&EAC of the URT, Minister Augustine Mahiga proclaimed the following at the General Debate of the seventy-third session of the UN General Assembly:

'.... on the question of Palestine, Tanzania reiterates its position in resolving the conflict between Israel and Palestine by supporting the two-state solution. We understand that Palestine has the right to enjoy its independence and peace as is Israel in accordance is entitled to peace and security according to the UN Charter. It is our belief that it is within the creative and resourceful ability of Israel and the determination of the Palestinian people to reach a

peaceful solution that will permit Israel and Palestine to co-exist in peace and security’ (UN Tanzania, 2018).

4.2.2.2.3 Status of Tanzania’s Freedom-Fighting Legacy

Tanzania’s ties with the Arab World became closer because of long historical ties that began even before colonialism, the Swahili culture, religious ties and a common enemy back then which was Israel. And as Tanzania’s relations with the Arab world improved, it was at the expense of her relations with Israel which annexed part of Arab territories and other related violations of oppression. Despite Israel’s continued occupation of Arab territories to date and oppression of Palestinians, Tanzania has resumed relations with Israel.

“Does this mean that Tanzania has abandoned Nyerere’s freedom-fighting legacy or has it simply changed the way it pioneers for freedoms and equality of other countries?” From such a question, the responses were as follows: six (20%) respondents agreed that Tanzania has abandoned its freedom-fighting legacy; 22 (73.3%) respondents argued that Tanzania’s freedom fighting legacy has not been abandoned but rather shifted from radical stances to more accommodative ones such as by advocating for a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine. Only 2 (6.7%) respondents agreed that Tanzania’s freedom-fighting legacy remains the same through its continued support for Palestine in various international fora as it historically did in the twentieth century.

Table 4.11: Status of Tanzania’s Freedom-Fighting Legacy

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Abandoned	6	20.0%
Shifted	22	73.3%
Remains the Same	2	6.7%
Total	30	100.0%

Source: Field Data (2019)

Once upon a time, Tanzania was revered when it came to the fight against oppression, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism, and infringement of human rights in Africa and around the world. These principles were contained in Tanzania’s

traditional foreign policy under the Presidential Circular No. 2 of 1964. However, in the new foreign policy document of 2001, such principles no longer appear as a result of the economic and socio-political changes in the domestic and international contexts (URT, 2001:7, 12). This allowed for a shift from liberation to economic diplomacy and all of Tanzania's external relations have focused on her economic prosperity ever since. This has placed the freedom-fighting legacy in the back seat as concurred by 73% of the respondents who agreed that Tanzania has shifted from radical freedom-fighting to more accommodative stances.

4.2.2.2.4 Status of Relations between Tanzania and the Arab World

Israel's relations with most of the Arab world range between unfriendly to open hostility. As of 2019, Egypt and Jordan were the only official allies of Israel in the region. Israel has found it hard to garner support in the Middle East. For instance, when Egypt signed the Camp David Agreement with Israel in 1979, it received major backlash from the Arab World. Egypt was banned from the Arab League between 1979-1989, Syria severed its ties with Israel from 1979-2005, and the Egyptian president back then, Anwar Sadat was assassinated in 1981 by Egyptian Islam Jihad members.

With this in mind, the same scenario is not expected to happen in Tanzania but this study inquired the possibility of deterioration of relations between Tanzania and the Arab world as a result of improved relations with Israel. Five (16.7%) respondents agreed that there would be deterioration of relations between Tanzania and the Arab world; 23 (76.7%) respondents claimed that relations between Tanzania and the Arab World would not deteriorate; while 2 (6.7%) of the sample did not know.

Table 4.12: Status of Tanzania's Relations with the Arab World

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Deteriorate	5	16.7%
Not Deteriorate	23	76.7%
I do not know	2	6.7%
Total	30	100.0%

Source: Field Data (2019)

With the strengthening of relations between Tanzania and Israel, with the latter being at odds with various Arab countries, the study looked at the probability that such strengthened relations between the two countries would affect relations between Tanzania and the Arab World. About 77% of the respondents agreed that there would not be deterioration of relations between Tanzania and Arabic countries. In support of the findings, ever since the establishment of the Tanzanian embassy in Tel Aviv, there has been no sign of deterioration of relations between Tanzania and the Arab World. For instance, Tanzania has continued to receive credentials from Arab ambassadors such as from UAE Ambassador Khalifa Al Marzooqi in November 8th, 2018; Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic Ambassador Mahayub Mahafud in May 17th, 2019 (MFA&EAC, 2019).

Similarly, in January 2019, various representatives of companies from Saudi Arabia visited Tanzania so as to tie up trade and investment opportunities in an effort to address the growing imbalance of trade between the two countries (Christopher, 2019). Also, Tanzania extended the largest East African tender to build a hydropower dam over Rufiji River to 'Arab Contractors', a Cairo-based firm. The Egyptian firm was favored over 8,150 MNCs that were interested in the tender which is worth \$3 billion (Green, 2018). These and many other instances of the like stress upon the fact that Tanzania's relations with the Arab World are growing rather than deteriorating ever since Tanzania strengthened her relations with Israel.

In a nutshell, the reorientated Tanzania-Israel relations have had and are expected to have various political implications. These include: Tanzania's continued support for Palestinian territorial claims through the former's foreign policy principles of defence of freedom, justice and equality. Another political outcome has been the continuity of positive relations between Tanzania and the Arab World countries. Such an implication is different from that experienced by Egypt when she oriented its relations with Israel in the 1970s through the Camp David Accords. Finally, the reoriented relations have seemingly shifted Tanzania's freedom-fighting legacy whereby she now takes less radical stances when it comes to standing for what is right.

4.2.2.3 Anticipated Challenges

The third objective sought to identify and analyze the challenges that may arise from the improved relations between Tanzania and Israel. Triangulation was used to ascertain the challenges that might arise from the reoriented relations between Tanzania and Israel. The use of triangulation involved the use of more than one tool of data collection, and in this case, interviews, questionnaires and a variety of documents were utilized. Some of the expected challenges identified from the various methods were unequal gains and their hidden costs, Tanzania's relaxed position in supporting Palestine and shift in interest as a result of regime change. Such challenges are discussed below.

4.2.2.3.1 Likelihood of Unequal Gains

Given the trend of unequal gains between and among countries that are at different levels of economic development, this study saw it necessary to venture on the possibility that such a trend would also befall the newly improved Tanzania-Israel relations. The following 30 respondents had the following to say with regards to the likelihood of unequal gains among the two countries. Three (10%) respondents strongly disagreed that Tanzania-Israel relations involved unequal gains; 7 (23%) disagreed; 1 (3%) respondent did not know or was neutral; 8 (27%) agreed; while 11 (37%) strongly agreed on the unevenness of benefits between the two countries.

Table 4.13: Likelihood of Unequal Gains

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Disagree	3	10.0%
Disagree	7	23.3%
Neutral	1	3.3%
Agree	8	26.7%
Strongly Agree	11	36.7%
Total	30	100.0%

Source: Field Data (2019)

As countries at different levels of development, their gains from the improved relations will tend to differ. A combined 64% of the respondents concurred on the

presence of unequal gains between the two countries, subsequently making such relations a zero-sum game. From an interview conducted on July 18th, a foreign relations officer revealed,

...the socio-economic drives of the improved relations between the two countries are capitalistic, at least in the case of Tanzania which currently seems to be benefiting more than Israel in the tourism, health, defence and education sectors because the latter has extended various technical and economic opportunities to the former (Foreign Relations Officer, 2019).

The findings are related to a similar case back in the 1960s where newly independent African countries seemed to benefit more from Israel than Israel benefitted from them. However, such unequal gains came at a certain cost for African countries particularly in trade where Israel had a complete advantage. This is because many consider gains from trade to be the economic compensation for Israel's extended opportunities to Tanzania. Such was the scenario between 1960-67 where Israel exported more products to Africa while Israel imported mostly raw materials like unworked diamonds and cash crops from Africa (Lubetkin, 1971). Currently, Israel has economic desires of accessing the natural resources such as precious gems of gold and diamond, timber and oil; and a market for its goods.

Ostensibly, Israel's motives for improving relations with Tanzania and many other African countries both in the 1960s is the recognition of the Jewish's state existence in the territories in occupies (Savant, 1978). Today, a similar trend continues whereby Israel's assistance is geared towards ensuring that it receives valuable political support against the Arab World in international conferences (Bishku, 2017:80). Such a desire of Israel was realized when Tanzania voted in acknowledgement of Jewish historical ties to religious sites in Jerusalem during a UNESCO resolution (Eichner, 2016). Again, with Tanzania still being less industrialized, Israel continues to reap more from trade as a way of covering for the opportunities it has extended to Tanzania in the reoriented relations.

4.2.2.3.2 Tanzania's Position in Supporting Palestine

The respondents in this study were questioned on the likelihood that Tanzania has relaxed and might further relax her position in her support for Palestine. Three (10%) respondents strongly disagreed that Tanzania has or will relax her position when it comes to her support for Palestinian struggles. Eight (27%) respondents disagreed, 4 (13%) respondents were neutral, 10 (33%) agreed and 5 (17%) respondents strongly agreed that Tanzania's support of Palestine has been and will continue to be relaxed.

Table 4.14: Tanzania's Relaxed Position in her Support for Palestine

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Disagree	3	10.0%
Disagree	8	26.7%
Neutral	4	13.3%
Agree	10	33.3%
Strongly Agree	5	16.7%
Total	30	100.0%

Source: Field Data (2019)

Among the questions posed in the interviews and questionnaires was on Tanzania's political support to the Palestinian struggle. This aspect was asked because of Tanzania's revered historical political support for justice and freedoms around the world. From the literature, Balawi (2019) argues that the current position of Tanzania on Palestinian struggles may be an indication that Tanzania's days of fighting global injustice are being replaced by a more realistic "economic diplomacy." Tanzania's industrialization strategy seems to have relaxed Tanzania's position in its support for Palestine at various instances such as: in May 2018, Tanzania failed to condemn the killing by Israeli forces of over 60 Palestinian protesters. Such protesters were protesting against the shift of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem after the US had unilaterally proclaimed Jerusalem as Israel's new capital.

Also, in a reunion of representatives of liberations movements of southern Africa, held in Windhoek, Namibia in November 2018, a CCM representative made reservations when a declaration on the support for the people of Palestine in their

struggle for self-determination was presented. With regard to the responses, a combined 50% of the respondents agreed that Tanzania has relaxed its position in her support for Palestine and hence goes against some of its FP principles such as defence of freedom and justice. This implies that Tanzania's economic needs and desires affect it more today than they did in the past under liberation diplomacy. Balawi goes further by asking whether the positive Israel assistance to Tanzania is the price tag for Tanzania's silence when it comes to the Israel and Palestinian territorial deadlock (*ibid*).

In an interview conducted on 16th July, a respondent disclosed the following;

“..... Tanzania and many other African countries resumed relations with Israel on the promise that the Oslo Accords of 1993 would resolve the Israeli-Palestinian statehood stalemate. However, it has been more than 20 years and Palestine still remains stateless with its territories still under Israel's occupation. Meanwhile, Israel continues to strengthen its ties with other states, and thus increasing its recognition and reducing radical stances against its occupation of Palestinian territories” (Lecturer, 2019).

The accelerated reestablishment of ties between Israel and many African countries in the mid-1990s have consequently led to the continued reduction of many African countries' sympathy and support for the Palestinian cause. Israel has further been striving to establish ties with African states so as to give the impression that in spite of its military occupation of Palestinian land, it is a normal state that also seeks to establish external relations (Al-Sahli, 2019).

4.2.2.3.3 Regime Change and Shift in FP Interest

The presidency and regime in power have been very significant in the reorientation of relations between Tanzania and Israel. Similar to the period of Mwalimu Nyerere, Israel Ambassador to Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi and the Seychelles, Mr Noah Gal Gendler attributed what he called the “President Magufuli factor” to being the major factor in improvement of Tanzania-Israel relations (Masare, 2019). The constitution of URT provides that a president can serve for not more than ten years (in two five-year terms). With this in mind, respondents were questioned on the

phenomenon of the relationship between change in leadership and shift in FP interests. Six (20%) respondents pointed out that a change in leadership would lead to the shift in foreign policy interests, 4 (13%) respondents gave the neutral or not knowing response, while 20 (67%) respondents argued that there would not be a shift in foreign policy interests.

Table 4.15: Leadership Change and FP Shift in Interest

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Shift	6	20.0%
Neutral	4	13.3%
No shift	20	67.7%
Total	30	100.0%

Source: Field Data (2019)

One respondent had the following to say during an interview of July, 19th;

‘.... interests are always dynamic due to change in leadership which subsequently affects a country’s foreign policy relations. Just as is the current case in the United States where Trump’s administration has placed American interests at the forefront, leadership and regime change affect foreign policy and actions both mildly and tremendously. Such changes are in most cases aimed at self-interest, and are either masked or exposed depending on how they would affect the receiving country’ (Lecturer, 2019).

For Moon (1985) and Hagan (1989), the change in leadership and regime usually is accompanied by a shift in foreign policy relations because of an introduction of new actors with different exigencies, beliefs, ideas, preferences and objectives. A change in leadership and regime is also accompanied by changes in interests which at times may differ. For instance, during the 1960s when Israel ventured into Africa in search for diplomatic allies, interests between Israel and African countries differed. While Israel highly needed political support against the Arab states in international forums, East African and African countries in general stressed on receiving assistance and the

expansion of trade relations (Bishku, 2017:80). Nonetheless, the Israelites could not directly bring forth their interests and so hid them behind the assistance they provided to African countries.

Moreover, the aspect of regime changes and its effect on foreign policy reorientation can be exemplified when President Nyerere left office in 1985 to be replaced by President Mwinyi who re-established relations with Israel in 1995 after they had been previously severed in 1973. Additionally, in spite President Mkapa and Kikwete both ruling for 10-year periods each, they did not strengthen relations with Israel, though in the last years of Kikwete's second-term tenure, the TIDIF was formulated. When President Magufuli entered office in late 2015, as early as mid-2016 he had showed interest in strengthening relations with Israel. Hence, with every change in regime, change in foreign policy decisions and actions is prominent.

Therefore, a shift in the Tanzanian leadership has had significant effect on the reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations over the years. Additionally, the Israel Ambassador to Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi and the Seychelles, Mr Noah Gal Gendler pointed out how the Magufuli leadership has been vital for the reorientation of relations between Tanzania and Israel, which proves the importance of leadership in foreign policy reorientation. Also, a change in Israeli leadership is to be considered because so far, the current leadership has benefited Tanzania very well. This is due to reciprocity whereby as the "Magufuli factor" is pointed out in Tanzania, so must the "Netanyahu factor" be pointed out in Israel. In 2019, Israel underwent two elections, in April and September, and Prime Minister Netanyahu failed to form coalition governments in after both elections. This presented an opportunity for his rival, Benjamin Gantz to form the coalition government after the September election. Moreover, with Netanyahu facing political and legal woes, the Israel Prime Ministerial position seems more open for Gantz (Harkov, 2019).

The challenge comes as to whether when new regimes both in Tanzania as well as in Israel will be as vigorous in ensuring that relations between the two countries continue to grow and be mutually-beneficial. Whether such shifts in interests would be for the worse or for the better, one can only be determined by the succeeding leaderships and regimes in both countries.

Blavoukos & Bourantonis (2014:496), argue that foreign policy reorientation encompasses both intended and unintended consequences. Henceforth, these possible challenges are a reflection of the dynamic and varying nature of foreign policy reorientation when it comes to outcomes. This is why foreign policy reorientation today takes into account a number of complex internal and external circumstances in an effort to minimize a country's unprecedented challenges upon itself as well as upon other states which it is in relations with.

4.3 Chapter Summary

This chapter presented and discussed the data obtained from thirty key respondents. The presentation and discussion were conducted with reference to the objectives of the study. Various literature was used to support the quantitative research findings. Results of the first objective revealed that a mix of both internal and external circumstances influenced the reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations. Also, there is similarity in the types of motives that influenced the current reorientation and those that led to reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations in the early to mid-1960s. These motives are economic needs, technological needs and presidential exigency.

The findings of the second objective depicted that the reoriented Tanzania-Israel relations have and will continue to contribute to benefits on a multisectoral basis. However, the social sectors such as the educational, medical, and tourism sectors are seemingly reaping more immediate benefits compared to the agricultural as well as industrial and trade sectors. The chapter also presented and discussed various challenges that may arise from the reoriented relations. The findings also revealed a number of challenges associated with the reoriented Tanzania-Israel relations such as unequal gains and hidden costs as well as regime change and the shift in foreign relations' interests.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter provides the summary of the findings of this study, the conclusions and the recommendations. The chapter was organized into four parts, the first being a general summary drawn from the general and specific objectives. Secondly, the conclusions as drawn from the discussed research findings. The third part presents the recommendations while the last part provides the areas for further study.

5.1 Summary of the Study

5.1.1 The General Objective

The general objective of this study was assessing Tanzania's foreign policy, with specific interest on the reoriented relations between Tanzania and Israel. Tanzania's new foreign policy that was adopted in 2001 signified a shift from liberation diplomacy to concentration on economic diplomacy. Despite the new foreign policy adopting seven-out-of-nine principles from the traditional foreign policy of Tanzania which was contained in the Presidential Circular No. 2 of 1964, the new foreign policy is mostly guided by its objectives and strategies. Such objectives and strategies of Tanzania's new foreign policy are more economic than political and thus support the reorientation of relations between Tanzania and Israel.

However, the current foreign policy of Tanzania has not completely abandoned liberation diplomacy. The omission freedom-fighting principles like: the support for the struggles against racism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism; and the support for the oppressed people in the world (URT, 2001), have not silenced Tanzania when it comes to standing up for what is right. This is exemplified by Tanzania's continued support of Palestinian struggles for statehood. The continuation of Tanzania's liberation diplomacy is informed by principles such as the defence of freedom, justice and equality (*op. cit.*:12), which still appear in the Tanzanian foreign policy document. While it can be justified that most of the countries in the world had attained independence by the end of the twentieth-century, aspects like racism, neocolonialism, and oppression of various people in the world still continues. Hence, the reduced principles are still relevant.

Tanzania's decision to open up its embassy in Tel Aviv in May 2018, marked the official strengthening of relations between the two countries. Significant efforts towards improvement of relations between the two countries came under the Magufuli administration which adopted efforts by the previous president, Jakaya Kikwete through the TIDIF. Under President Magufuli, the Israeli embassy in Nairobi opened a visa handling center in Dar es Salaam in 2016. In the same year, Tanzania showed interest in establishing a permanent envoy to Israel and such interests materialized in 8th May, 2018 when Tanzania officially opened its embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel.

5.1.2 Specific Objectives

This study had three specific objectives:

5.1.2.1 Motives behind Strengthening of Tanzania-Israel Relations

The improvement of relations between the two countries were influenced by a mix of both internal and external factors as opined by 63% of the respondents. Some of the motives attributed to the reorientation of relations between Tanzania and Israel were: economic incentives and needs; social concerns and needs; military and security apprehensions; industrial and technological requirements; and the incumbent leadership led by President Magufuli. All the respondents (100%) agreed that 'economic incentives and needs' were the leading motive in the strengthening of Tanzania-Israeli relations. About 90% of the respondents pointed out 'social concerns and needs' like medicare and tourism as the major motive; while 83% of the respondents attributed 'presidential exigency' to being the major motive for Tanzania-Israel relations alteration.

5.1.2.2 The Expected Outcomes of the Improved Relations

Given the fact that the Tanzanian embassy in Tel Aviv has been operational for less than eighteen months, the study saw that it would be too quick to measure the actual outcomes of the improved relations between Tanzania and Israel. Hence, the study focused on the expected outcomes and pointed out some current outcomes that were already being experienced. The study looked at the expected sectoral benefits, that is, which sectors in Tanzania were expected to benefit the most from the improved relations. The study presented about six sectors: defence and security sector;

industry, trade and investment sector; educational, science, technology and vocational sector; agricultural sector; and social sectors like the tourism and medical sectors. The study attributed the last four sectors as social sectors and with a combined 63.3%, the social sectors were attributed as the sectors that will most benefit from the improved Tanzania-Israel relations. The tourism and medical sectors came out on top with 27% of respondents placing them as sectors that will benefit the most. And so far, the study indicated that such sectors have already begun to benefit, with the number of Israeli tourists rising in the country and with Israel already having financed an ICU ward at the Benjamin Mkapa Hospital in Dodoma.

Although the agricultural sector was not given much of a chance to benefit (13%), various literatures indicated this sector as showing promise of gaining more benefits because it underscores the Tanzanian economy and it is an area where Israel is much developed and an area it promised Tanzania to transform. Despite 'economic incentives and needs' being the major motive, the sector directly related to such a motive, that is, 'industry, trade and investment sector' was given a less chance of success (17%), because of the infancy of industries in Tanzania. About 20% of the respondents said that the defence and security sector would benefit the most and in early 2019, Israel had already begun to train the Tanzania military.

Other expected outcomes included the *likelihood of Israel establishing its embassy in Tanzania* in which 57% of the respondents did not know whether this would happen while 43% agreed that Israel would establish its embassy in Tanzania. On the issue of the *probability of Tanzania's continued support for Palestinian claims of statehood*, 80% of the respondents coincided that despite the strengthening of relations between Tanzania and Israel, the former would continue to support Palestinian struggles of statehood. With regards to *Tanzania's freedom-fighting legacy*, 73% opined that Tanzania has shifted its freedom-fighting status from radical stances to more accommodative stances. Finally, the study also posited that *relations between Tanzania and the Arab World were not affected* by the strengthened relations between Tanzania and Israel as proclaimed by 77% of the respondents.

5.1.2.3 Challenges That May Arise

With the establishment and even strengthening of relations between and among countries in the world, such FP moves are never smooth throughout. Some of the challenges that were associated with the strengthened relations between Tanzania and Israel included *unequal gains and their hidden costs* as postulate by 64% of respondents who agreed on the presence and continuance of unequal gains in the improved Tanzania-Israel relations. Another challenge was *Tanzania's relaxed position in support for Palestine* where a total of 50% of the respondents agreed that Tanzania had relaxed its support for Palestine in favor for more realistic economic diplomacy. Also, the *prospect of shift in interests due to regime change* was a challenge. Given the role played by the Magufuli administration and the Netanyahu administration, a change in either of the regimes might affect the strengthened relations between the two countries.

5.2 Conclusions of the Findings

The study concluded that economic needs and incentives were the major factor for the reorientation of relations between Tanzania and Israel. Such economic needs and incentives are reflected in both, the domestic policy (striving towards an industrial-based economy) and foreign policy (economic diplomacy) of Tanzania. Moreover, the role played by the Magufuli administration under John Magufuli has been very significant in reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations.

Despite economic reasons being the major motive in the improvement of relations, so far and even in the near future, it is the socio-economic sectors that have benefited and are expected to benefit the most. The tourism; medical; and educational, science and technological sectors have already begun to benefit and are seen as the sectors that will reap more benefits in the near future. Literature has favoured the agricultural sector as a field that will benefit most because even the students that have gone to study in Israel, will mostly receive training in Agrostudies. The sector directly related to economic reasons, that is, the 'industry, trade and investment sector' was not expected to benefit much especially in the near future due to the infancy of Tanzania's industrial capability.

The study also concluded that the improved relations between Tanzania and Israel did not affect relations between Tanzania and the Arab world which have mostly been at odds with Israel, especially Palestine. Tanzania continues to support Palestinian claims for statehood but the Tanzania support is no longer as radical as it was during Nyerere's time. In other words, Tanzania's freedom-fighting days and legacy is in the back seat and economic prosperity have taken the wheel when it comes to Tanzania's foreign policy and external relations.

Currently, Tanzania seems to be reaping more benefits from Israel than Israel is benefiting from Tanzania. Hence, the unequal benefits so far are mostly benefiting Tanzania. However, Israel also seeks valuable support against the Arab World in international conferences. In the long run, Israel seeks to gain access to the Tanzania market and natural resources in order to compensate for the aid it has offered so far to Tanzania.

5.3 Recommendations

From the discussions of the findings, the study evokes some commendations which are important to note.

- i. Principles that were responsible for liberation diplomacy such as support for the struggles against racism and neocolonialism, and support for the oppressed people in the world no longer appear in Tanzania's new foreign policy document. Although most of the countries in the world have gained independence, aspects such as racism, neo-colonialism, and oppressions still persist. Thus, the dropped policies are still relevant and need to be re-integrated in the new foreign policy document.
- ii. Tanzania should be cautious since it is currently benefiting more from her reoriented relations with Israel. It should ensure that it can handle the hidden costs of such benefits, since Israel did not strengthen its ties with Tanzania for philanthropic reasons. In other words, Tanzania should be cautious especially in the long run as Israel seeks to gain access to the Tanzanian market and natural resources.

- iii. The reoriented Tanzania-Israel relations which have been benefiting Tanzania to a large extent should not reduce Tanzania's support for Palestinian struggles and the Oslo Accords.

5.4 Areas for Further Study

- ❖ Given the fact that Tanzania-Israel relations have only improved recently, this study concentrated on the examination and analysis of the expected outcomes and the possible challenges that may arise. A further study of the actual outcomes and challenges of the reoriented relations should be done after a longer duration of time has passed i.e., after five years or more.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Interview Guide provided to the MFA&EAC Workers.

I: Thank you for taking the time to meet me today. My name is Richard Michael, a student at the University of Dodoma pursuing a Master's degree in International Relations.

R:

I: I am conducting an academic research on Tanzania's foreign policy with a specific interest in finding out the factors that have led to the strengthened relations between Tanzania and Israel.

R:

I: As worker in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, your knowledge, expertise and experience will provide immense input and aid my study.

R:

I: This interview will not take more than 20 minutes. Since I cannot write as you speak, hence I will be recording this session and any notes that I take would be simply for emphasis.

R:

I: Any and all of the findings from the respondent will be kept confidential and solely used for academic purpose.

R:

I: Whenever you are uncomfortable on a certain issue, we will move past it and the interview will be at your convenience.

I: Do you have any questions with regards to what I have just explained?

R:

I: Thank you for agreeing to do this interview.

For more information please contact me through:

Email: richiemc6@gmail.com

Mobile: +225 (0) 656 199 994

Section A: Interview Identification

S/No	Particular	
1.	Interviewer	Chonjo, Richard Michael
2.	Date of interview	
3.	Location	
4.	Start time	
5.	End time	

Section B: Respondents' general characteristic

- i. Gender [Male (), Female ()]
- ii. Age group [20 – 29 (), 30 – 39 (), 40 – 49 (), 50 – 59 (), 60+ ()]
- iii. Years in the ministry.....
- iv. Current position in the ministry

Section C: Respondents' perception, knowledge and expertise

1. The motives or factors for reinvigoration of relations between Tanzania and Israel

- In your opinion, what do you think are the factors that have led to the strengthening of relations between Tanzania and Israel.....? Which do you think is/are the strongest factor(s)?
- Despite resumption of relations back in 1995, and the pursuit of economic diplomacy since 2001, why have relations between the two countries only improved now?
- Resumption of relations between the two countries was based on the Oslo Accords which have not been realized to date. Do you think reorientation of TZ-Israel relations was not supposed to happen until such Accords were realized? Please illustrate your answer.
- Improvement of relations can be influenced by both internal (economic needs, incumbent regime) and external (military threats, structure of previous relations) factors, as well as a mixture of both. Which of the three has influenced the improvement of Tanzania-

Israel relations more? Please illustrate your answer with some examples

- It is argued that cooperation through international organizations (IOs), NGOs, MNCs can help improve foreign relations among countries. What groupings like these were involved in the reorientation of TZ-Israel relations? How did they facilitate this?
- Any other comments on the factors/reasons/motives?

2. The current and expected outcomes of such reorientation.

- So far, has there been an increase in exchange of people, goods and services between the two countries?
- By what extent has the Tel Aviv embassy facilitated in increasing exchange and improving relations between Tanzania and Israel?
- Would you care to mention some of the current and expected (positive and/or negative) outcomes of TZ-Israel relations?
- Which sectors in Tanzania will benefit more from the strengthened Tanzania-Israel relations? (Please numerically rank your answer from 1-6)
 - a) Defence and security sector
 - b) Industry, trade and investment sector
 - c) Educational, science, technology and vocational training sector
 - d) Agricultural sector
 - e) Social sectors like Tourism and Medical sectors
- How likely is Israel going to open up its embassy in Tanzania as well?
- In the past Tanzania severed relations with Israel because of the latter's conflict with Palestine and the Arab World. Since the conflict continues to date, do you think such a situation might repeat itself?

3. Challenges that may arise.

- What possible challenges do you see now and that will emanate from TZ-Israel strengthened relations?

- Will Tanzania's relations with Palestine and the Arab World deteriorate?
- Tanzania did not comment when President Trump proclaimed Jerusalem as Israel's capital. In light of such continued annexation of parts of Arab territory, what is the status of Tanzania's support to Palestinian territorial claims in all fora?
- Will Tanzania loosen its strong position when it comes to its freedom-fighting legacy, especially her previously popular moral responses against oppressions that were pioneered and practiced by President Nyerere?
- Will the gains from Tanzania-Israel improved relations be equal?
- Given that improved relations between Tanzania and Israel have come under this regime despite resumption of relations between the two countries in 1995, do you think when the current regime finishes its rule, there might a shift of interest by another regime?

Appendix II: Questionnaire to the MFA&EAC and Lecturers.

Respondent # _____

Section I: Personal Information (Circle the appropriate roman numeral)

1. Respondent's Age Group
 - i. 20 – 29
 - ii. 30 – 39
 - iii. 40 – 49
 - iv. 50 – 59
 - v. 60+
2. Gender
 - i. Male
 - ii. Female
3. Occupation
 - i. Foreign relations officer
 - ii. Lecturer
4. Years in the Ministry (to be answered by Foreign Relations Officer)
 - i. Less than 1 year
 - ii. 1 – 2 years
 - iii. 3 – 5 years
 - iv. 6 – 10 years
 - v. More than 10 years
5. Current Position in the Ministry (to be filled by Foreign Relations Officer)
.....
.....
.....

Section II: Addressing the Topic at hand.

A. Motives or reasons for Strengthening of TZ-Israel relations.

1. In your opinion, assign a response on the factors that have led to the strengthening of relations between Tanzania and Israel? Which do you think is/are the strongest factor(s)?

2. To what extent did the factors below influence the of in Tanzania-Israel relations?

S/N	STATEMENT	Strongly Disagree (SD)	Disagree (D)	Agree (A)	Strongly Agree (SA)
	Values of scale	1	2	3	4
1	Economic incentives and needs influenced change in Tanzania-Israel Relations				
2	Military and Security Concerns led to change in Tanzania-Israel Relations				
3	The President played a major role in improvement of the relations				
4	Industrial and Technological needs necessitated change in Tanzania-Israel relations				
5	Social Needs and Concerns encouraged improvement of Tanzania-Israel Relations				

3. Despite resumption of relations back in 1995, and the pursuit of economic diplomacy since 2001, why have relations between the two countries only improved now?
4. Resumption of relations between the two countries was based on the Oslo Accords which have not been realized to date. Do you think reorientation of

TZ-Israel relations was not supposed to happen until such Accords were realized? Please illustrate your answer.

6. Improvement of relations can be influenced by both internal (economic needs, incumbent regime) and external (military threats, structure of previous relations) factors, as well as a mixture of both. Which of the three has influenced the improvement of Tanzania-Israel relations more? Please illustrate your answer with some examples
7. It is argued that cooperation through international organizations (IOs), NGOs, MNCs can help improve foreign relations among countries. What groupings like these were involved in the reorientation of TZ-Israel relations? How did they facilitate this?

B. Expected outcomes of reorientation of Tanzania-Israel relations

9. Which sectors in Tanzania will benefit more from the strengthened Tanzania-Israel relations? (Please numerically rank your answer from 1-6)
 - a. Defence and security sector
 - b. Industry, trade and investment sector
 - c. Educational, science, technology and vocational training sector
 - d. Agricultural sector
 - e. Social sectors like Tourism and Medical sectors
10. Would you care to mention some of the current and expected (positive and/or negative) outcomes of TZ-Israel relations?
11. Will Israel open up its embassy in Tanzania as well?
 - a) Yes b) No c) I do not know
12. In the past Tanzania broke off relations with Israel because of the latter's conflict with Palestine and the Arab World. Since the conflict continues to date, do you think such a situation might repeat itself? Give reasons for your response.

C. Challenges that may arise.

13. What possible challenges do you see now and that will emanate from TZ-Israel strengthened relations?
14. Will Tanzania's relations with Palestine and the Arab World deteriorate? Why or why not?
15. Tanzania did not comment when President Trump proclaimed Jerusalem as Israel's capital. In light of such continued annexation what is the status of Tanzania's support to Palestinian territorial claims in all fora? Do you think Tanzania still supports Palestine as it has historically done and has not abandoned her freedom-fighting legacy?
16. Will Tanzania lose its strong position when it comes to its freedom-fighting legacy, especially her previously popular moral responses against oppressions that were pioneered and practiced by President Nyerere?
17. Will the gains between Tanzania and Israel be equal or at least compromisingly satisfactory? If not, which country do you think will benefit the most?
18. Any other comments on the challenges?

Appendix III: Questionnaire to other Foreign Policy stakeholders

Respondent # _____

Section I: Personal Information (Circle the appropriate roman numeral and fill where necessary)

1. Respondent's Age Group

- i. 20 – 29
- ii. 30 – 39
- iii. 40 – 49
- iv. 50 – 59
- v. 60+

2. Gender

- i. Male
- ii. Female

3. Occupation

- i. Graduate
- ii. Lecturer
- iii. Undergraduate

Section II: Addressing the Topic at hand (Please circle your answer and fill in where appropriate as instructed).

A. Awareness on the strengthened relations between Tanzania and Israel

4. Do you know the current Tanzania's foreign policy? If "Yes" can you mention it?

- a) Yes b) No

.....

5. Were you aware that Tanzania established its embassy in Tel Aviv?

- a) Yes b) No

6. Improvement of relations can be influenced by both internal (economic needs, incumbent regime) and external (military threats, structure of previous relations) factors, as well as a mixture of both. Which of the three has influenced the improvement of Tanzania-Israel relations more? Please

illustrate your answer with some examples

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

7. Can you mention some of the factors or reasons that have led to the improvement of relations between Tanzania and Israel? (please list them)

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

8. Can you rank the following motives from the highest to the lowest (1-5) by assigning a number?

Presidential preference, perception and personality

Economic incentives and needs

Military and security concerns like terrorism

Social concerns like healthcare, foreign aid

Technological and industrial needs

B. Expected outcomes of the strengthened Tanzania-Israel Relations

9. Which sectors in Tanzania will benefit more from the strengthened Tanzania-Israel relations? (Please numerically rank your answer from 1-6)

f) Defence and security sector

g) Industry, trade and investment sector

h) Educational, science, technology and vocational training sector

i) Agricultural sector

j) Social sectors like the Tourism and Medical sectors

10. The improved relations between Tanzania and Israel have led to increase in exchange of people, goods and services between the two countries ever since the establishment of the Tanzanian embassy in Tel Aviv?
a) Strongly disagree b) Disagree c) Neutral d) Agree e) Strongly agree
11. Do you think that Israel will also open its embassy in Tanzania?
a) Yes b) No c) I do not know
12. Has Tanzania abandoned Nyerere's freedom-fighting legacy or has it simply changed the way it pioneers for freedoms and equality of other countries?
a) Abandoned b) Shifted c) Remains the same
13. Will Tanzania continue to support Palestine in all fora as it has historically done before?
a) Yes b) No c) I do not know
14. Will Tanzania's relations with Palestine and the Arab World deteriorate?
a) Deteriorate b) Not Deteriorate c) I do not know


C. Challenges that may arise

15. Tanzania will loosen its strong position when it comes to its freedom-fighting legacy, especially her previously popular moral responses against oppressions that were pioneered and practiced by President Nyerere??
a) Strongly disagree b) Disagree c) Neutral d) Agree e) Strongly agree
16. There will be unequal gains between the two countries because of their differences in levels of development.
a) Strongly disagree b) Disagree c) Neutral d) Agree e) Strongly agree
17. Regime change may cause shift in interests as was the case when Tanzania-Israel relations were resumed in 1995, ten years after President Nyerere had left office.
a) Strongly disagree b) Disagree c) Neutral d) Agree e) Strongly agree

18. With Israel being a major target for terrorist groups, is Tanzania likely to experience an increase in terrorist activities within the country as is the case in Kenya which has had close ties with Israel?

- a) Yes b) No c) I do not know

Appendix IV: Research Permit from the University of Dodoma



THE UNIVERSITY OF DODOMA DEPUTY VICE CHANCELLOR ACADEMIC, RESEARCH & CONSULTANCY OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND CONTINUING EDUCATION

P.O. BOX 259, DODOMA, TANZANIA.

Tel: +255 26 23 10173; Fax: +255 26 23 10005; Email: graduate@udom.ac.tz; website: www.udom.ac

REF: UDOM/GRF/13 Vol VI/145

Tuesday, 02nd July 2019

Permanent Secretary,
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Co - operation,
P.O. Box 2933,
Dodoma, Tanzania.

RE: INTRODUCING MR. CHONJO, RICHARD MICHAEL

The above named candidate is enrolled at the University of Dodoma for the degree of Master in International Relations (MIR) with registration number HD/UDOM/170/T.2017.

As an essential requirement of the study programme, each candidate is required to submit a dissertation report on a research undertaken within an industry and supervised by a member of the University's academic staff. Where possible the research should relate to a practical situation in an organisation or firm selected by the candidate. Candidates are expected to use their own initiative to identify a possible research and negotiate access with a local firm or organization.

The above named candidate has developed the proposal titled "**AN ASSESSMENT OF TANZANIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND HER STRENGTHENED RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.**" which has been approved for data collection. The work may take the form of a survey, ethnography, case studies, etc. Where the research may contain confidential information and its publication could be harmful to the organization, confidentiality is assured by the University. Such reports will be seen only by the Supervisor and Examiner for examination purposes.

I would be grateful if you would provide the candidate with this opportunity to facilitate his studies while at the same time gaining some useful inputs for your own organization through the results of the research report.

Sincerely,

Kitinya, Emmanuel J.

For: Director, Graduate Studies and Continuing Education

C.c: Director, GS&CE