

**THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CULTURE ON CORRUPTION  
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN ZANZIBAR: A CASE STUDY OF  
ZANZIBAR PORT CORPORATION**

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**THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CULTURE ON CORRUPTION  
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN ZANZIBAR: A CASE STUDY OF  
ZANZIBAR PORT CORPORATION**

By

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A Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Public Administration of the University of Dodoma

The University of Dodoma

October, 2017

## **CERTIFICATION**

The undersigned certifies that he has read and hereby recommends for acceptance by The University of Dodoma a dissertation entitled, **The Impact of Political Culture on Corruption in the Public Sector in Zanzibar: A Case Study of Zanzibar Port Corporation**, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Public Administration of The University of Dodoma.

.....

Prof. Amukowa Anangwe

(SUPERVISOR)

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I, **Khatib, A. Juma**, declare that this dissertation is my own original work and that it has not been presented and will not be presented to any other University for a similar or any other degree award.

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## **DEDICATION**

This dissertation is dedicated to my beloved parents, Akama Ame Rajab, and, the late Juma Khatib Ame, for taking care of me and sending me to school.

## **ABSTRACT**

This study aimed at investigating the impact of political culture on corruption in the public sector in Zanzibar with special reference to the Zanzibar Port Corporation. The study was guided by specific objectives, namely, to identify the effects of beliefs on favouritism in the public sector in Tanzania; to assess the influence of values on embezzlement in the public sector; to examine the influence of norms on bribery in the public sector; and to identify measures to control the negative effects of beliefs, values and norms on favouritism, embezzlement and bribery.

The study used simple random and purposive sampling techniques. Interview, questionnaires and documentary review methods were also employed in data collection. Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected and analyzed. Qualitative data were subjected to content analysis while quantitative data were analyzed using descriptive statistics.

The study revealed that there is an impact of political culture on corruption in the public sector, resulting in regionalism, greed, bias, self-interest, dishonesty, selfishness and bureaucracy. The findings also showed that values and beliefs influenced embezzlement and favouritism respectively while norms had no influences on occurrence of bribery.

The study recommends that in order to respond positively to this situation, responsible measures are needed to control the negative impact of political culture on corruption in the public sector, for example, encouraging and promoting grass root re-orientation of societal norms and values. Also it should inculcate values, beliefs system and effective socio-cultural consciousness among the citizens through the use of family, peer group, media, religions and schools.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYMS**

CAG	Controller and Auditor General
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
DPMT	Department of Ports and Marine Transport
EAC	East African Community
GCB	Global Corruption Barometer
KMKM	Kikosi Maalum cha Kuzuia Magendo (Special force)
MP	Member of Parliament
NACSAP	National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan
PCCB	Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
TANU	Tanganyika National Union
UDOM	University of Dodoma
UGMP	Uganda Governance Monitoring Platform
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WVS	World Value Survey
ZAECA	Zanzibar Anti- Corruption and Economic Crime Authority
ZPC	Zanzibar Port Corporation
ZWC	Zanzibar Wharfage Corporation

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Introduction**

Challenges of corruption and the need to investigate the problem is imperative in order to fathom its extent and what needs to be done to solve it. There are many contexts of corruption in developing countries including Tanzania. But in the context of this study, an attempt is made to focus on the impact of political culture on corruption in the public sector in Tanzania. This chapter describes the background of the study, statement of the problem, general objective and specific objectives, research questions, scope of the study, and the significance of the study.

#### **1.2 Background of the Study**

Tanzania's efforts to fight corruption date back to 1968 with the establishment of one of the oldest Anti-Corruption Commissions in Africa (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2014). The country's anti-corruption efforts were strengthened in 1995 when the former president, Benjamin Mkapa, declared a "war" on corruption (Cooksey, 2011) and took a variety of steps to fight this issue. These included appointing presidential Commission against Corruption to evaluate the state of corruption in the country and formulate recommendations. The commission produced the "Warioba report" that led in 1999 to the adoption of a comprehensive National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (Cooksey, 2011).

In 2005, the former president, Jakaya Kikwete, renewed the country's commitment to fight corruption and has since implemented a revised NACSAP. Moreover, Tanzania had been in the process of revising its constitution, with the goal of having

a new constitution in place by the end of 2014. Although initially hopeful about the new constitution, civil society experts have criticized the constitution draft for being too weak on corruption. Despite the government's anti-corruption efforts, Tanzania continues to suffer from extensive corruption. Corruption is cited as one of the major restriction for doing business in the country. The country also ranked 111<sup>th</sup> out of 177 in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index in 2013, with a score of 33 out of 100 (Transparency International, 2013). However, when benchmarked against its neighbors, Kenya, Uganda, and Mozambique, the country is professed to be performing better. Nevertheless, international assessments seem to indicate that the situation in Tanzania is weakening (World Bank, 2013).

In the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), 69 % of respondents in Tanzania perceived the level of corruption in Tanzania to have augmented in the last two years preceding the survey (Transparency International, 2013). The Global Competitiveness Report of (2013-2014) revealed that respondent found corruption to have become worse and policy making less transparent than the previous year (World Economic Forum, 2014). While the World Bank's Worldwide Governance indicators demonstrate remarkable improvements in terms of government effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption from the late 1990s until the mid-2000s, the country's rating has experienced a decline since then (World Bank, 2013). For example, for the control of corruption indicator, Tanzania peaked at a 50% percentile rank in 2006 and has since dropped to just over 20% in 2012 (World Bank, 2013).

Corruption allegations against party members have also affected the image of Tanzania's ruling party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), which has been in power since the introduction of multi-party elections in 1995 (ISS -Africa, 2012). While several ministers have been dismissed, no high-profile CCM member has so far been convicted (ISS Africa, 2012). In 2012, a report by the Controller Auditor General revealed that millions of dollars in public funds from several ministries could not be accounted for, which led to the sacking of six cabinet ministers (Freedom House, 2013). In terms of citizens' experience of corruption, 61% of respondents in the GCB 2013 stated that corruption is a very serious problem in the country where by Tanzania ranked 111<sup>th</sup> out of 177, with a score of 33 out of 100 (Transparency International, 2013). Tanzania's neighbors score considerably better: Rwanda (24), Zambia (93), Mozambique (113), and Kenya (112) (Transparency International, 2013).

In spite of various measures taken by the Tanzania government, 50% of Tanzanian respondents in the GCB 2013 think their government's efforts against corruption were unsuccessful (Transparency International 2013). The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) had not prevented many government officials becoming involved in wide reaching corruption scandals (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2014). While the PCCB is in a position to combat corruption, it is politically constrained (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2014). Although President Kikwete took a strong stance against corruption when he came to power, observers argued that he had since taken a quitter stance in the fight (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2014). In general, corrupt office holders are not adequately prosecuted. For example, in 2013, the Audit office recommended that three former senior officials from Air

Tanzania be prosecuted over a controversial aircraft leasing contract that left the country with US\$41 million of debt. However, there was no indication in 2013 that the PCCB would file criminal charges against the officials (Thomas Reuters Foundation, 2013).

In Zanzibar, corruption remains a challenge and it keeps on growing day after day. It is argued that state institutions are directly linked to corrupt practices which affect good Governance. Zanzibar is not unaffected by corruption and that many public officers have been engaging in corruption. It has been notorious and pandemic in the community where people must pay for their rights to public services. It is an open secret that institutions dealing with the administration of justice are not spared from corrupt practices. It might not be easy to prove corruption in institutions the prevailing circumstances of the institutions leads one to conclude that there is corruption (Zanzibar Leo Newspaper, December, 2013).

Corruption cases are rarely reported in Zanzibar. Several reasons have been recognized for the abject corrupt problems. Among them are poor social services, absence of an anti-corruption body for a long time and lack of leadership ethics. Observations found that many people must offer something for services with courts and Police departments in the driving seat. Other driving factors on corruption in Zanzibar, according to the Draft Report and the Baseline Assessment of Anti-Corruption activities in Zanzibar include social cohesion, low salaries and poor conditions of work, complex government procedures breeding delays and a temptation to jump the queue (Tanzania Human Right Report, 2013). Others are court complications and formalities, lack of demonstrative leadership from

government and willingness and ability to fight corruption, excessive business regulations, low levels of public knowledge, insufficient legal framework, laxity in implementation of financial controls and nonaggressive complaint (Tanzania Human Right Report, 2012). It has been reported in the past on the loss of public funds through various channels. Dishonest officials in the government have been introducing many channels that will enable them to collect bribes fraudulently from the government (Tanzania Human Right Report, 2011).

Zanzibar is part of the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption of 2003 (Draft Report and Baseline Assessment of Anti -Corruption Activities, 2012), the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption of 2003 (Tanzania Human Right Report, 2012), the SADC Protocol against Corruption of 2001 and many other similar treaties to which Tanzania is a signatory (Tanzania Human Right Report, 2012).

Therefore, in supporting those conventions, the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar developed and adopted a good governance policy in 2011 and shortly thereafter the legislation that combats corruption was passed by the House of Representatives. This was different from similar Act in the Tanzania mainland because corruption efforts are not union matter; each country had separate notice and constitutional arrangement (Meena, 2003). The Zanzibar Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2012, has been put in place (Act.No.1-2012). The Act seeks to establish an independent and autonomous agency, the Zanzibar Anti-Corruption and Economic Crime Authority (ZAECA). Prior to this, the Constitution of Zanzibar, 1984, had introduced offences related to corruption and abuse of office

against any person holding public office (Zanzibar Constitution of 1984, sec.10b). According to the ZAECA, the functions of the Anti-Corruption Institutions include investigation of the complaints concerned corruption practices, breach of ethics or economic crimes against any public or private body. In addition, ZAECA advises any public or private entity on corruption occurrence issues and assists any law enforcement agency of the government in the investigation of the corruption or economic crime offences, examines the practices and procedures of public or private bodies in order to facilitate discovery of corruption practices and secure mechanisms of reversing the situation and educate the public on the dangers of corruption and economic crimes Tanzania Human Right Report, 2012).

The institutional framework of dealing with corruption comprises of at least 18 pieces of legislation passed over the years and covering such matters as criminal fraud, money laundering, public procurement, public financial control and audit, smuggling of goods, the trafficking in narcotics and recruitment and deployment of public service employees (Tanzania Human Right Report, 2012). The core anti-corruption institutions are ZAECA, the Controller Auditor General (CAG), the office of Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, the Judiciary, the Police, “Kikosi Maalum cha Kuzuia Magendo”(KMKM) and mechanisms under the Money Laundering Act (Tanzania Human Right Report, 2012).

However, corrupt practices in the public sector are still practiced and hinder the government efforts on enhancing the good governance in Tanzania (Tanzania Human Right Report, 2012).

### **1.2.1 Political Culture**

The intellectual interest in political culture is not a new phenomenon. Since Plato and Aristotle, political philosophers have recommended that collective, bonding human psyches for example, ethos or mores are important for sustaining a political community of any form. In a similar vein, the cycle of political change explained in social psychological terms appears recurrently well into the nineteenth century. Thus, the general agreement that Almond and Verba's work (1963) recommend is influential in the study of political culture. It may also be attributable to the fact that they made a case for the crucial role of political culture or "civic culture" to be exact, for a successful government drawing on the empirical analysis of one of the first large scale comparative surveys (Almond, 1980 and 1990).

The empirical inquiry into political culture has its share of ups and downs since its introduction to political science in the 1950s. The initial popularity was largely due to its more scientific, careful methodological posture, utilizing statistical analysis of survey data gleaned from random samples across multiple countries and cultural groups accompanied by sophisticatedly constructed interview schedules, among others. This systematic, quantitative approach to the study of political culture was a clear breakaway from a psycho-analytical and anthropological "reductionism," which had dominated the field since the turn of the century. Thus, political culture studies in the 1960s and the 1970s contributed to pioneering modern comparative politics. They intended to construct generalizable knowledge about an individual's political attitude and behavior in different political regimes based on modern scientific methods and systematic comparisons (Almond, 1980 and 1990).

The initial achievement of empirical political culture studies was eclipsed by academic challenges from the neo-Marxist on the left and rational choice advocates on the right. The former disputed the objectivity in general, and criticized Western ethnocentric tendencies in particular, of political culture studies. The latter discredited them for their theoretical and frequent post-hoc approach that did not acknowledge its fundamental assumption of universal rationality. Rational choice or positive political theory started dominating in the discipline of political science in the late 1970s and 1980s while the influence of the neo-Marxist criticisms waned to a point of unimportance at least in the academic community, which was most likely facilitated by the crisis and eventual collapse of the communist regime (Pye, 1972 and 1991; Almond, 1990 and 1993, Dalton, 2000). It is no happenstance that the popularity of modern political culture research declined in the same decades. However, the original justification for the study was still valid (Reisinger, 1995).

By the late 1980s, such famous scholars of political culture as Wildavsky (1987), Eckstein (1988), Inglehart (1988), and Almond (1990) had led a reaction to the criticisms and attempted to redress the balance in the field that had been dominated by rational choice models and to revitalize it. The signs of the times were also favorable to the movement of “the revitalization of culture.” There were a series of historical developments that were not accounted for effectively by economic factors alone. The pressure of religion and tradition was felt all over the world. Changes in the Catholic Church played a major role in the “third wave” of democratization in such traditionally Catholic countries as ones in the Mediterranean and Latin America as well as the Philippines, Poland, and Hungary. Muslim fundamentalism had become the most significant political factor in the Islamic world (Reisinger, 1995).

One cannot explain unprecedented, rapid economic development in East Asia without resorting to Confucianism. Furthermore, in advanced industrial societies, religion and “post-materialist” values had been exerting not only a durable but increasing influence on electoral behavior while social class voting had declined noticeably. All these social phenomena cried for a cultural explanation and students of political culture responded both with diverse perspectives and with the help of new technical and empirical capabilities (Inglehart, 1988; Huntington, 1991; Pye 1997). Inglehart (1990 and 1997) and Inglehart and Baker (2000), for example, first empirically reconfirmed the validity of the basic thesis of the civic culture and rebutted economic determinism and “linear” modernization theory. He made a cogent argument that political culture is a crucial intervening variable in the long-term relationship between economic development and the appearance of mass democracy and that it is a central factor in the survival of democracy. Inglehart also observed that advanced industrial societies had moved from the “Modernization phase” where traditional and survival cultural values are dominant, into a “Post modernization Phase” where secular –rational and subjective well-being cultural values are prevalent (Inglehart, 2005).

What makes Inglehart’s works distinguished, his case based on a body of evidence that was much larger than that available to Almond and Verba in terms of the number of countries and years covered (Inglehart, 2005). His *Culture Shift* (1990), which focused on advanced industrialized democracies, utilized not only the World Values Survey (WVS) of twenty five countries, 1981-1982 but also Euro-Barometers of twelve countries, 1970-1986, and a three nation panel study of the United States, West Germany, and the Netherland, 1974-1981 (Inglehart, 2005) .

Putnam (1993 and 2000) is another successor to the tradition of the Civic Culture and responsible for the revitalization of the study of political culture in the recent decades. His quest for an answer for what it would take to make a good democracy led him to examine cultural variations within two countries, Italy (1993) and the United States (2000). His answer lied in the theory of social capital or “social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity,” which has produced numerous policy as well as academic debate, also made a significant contribution to the revival of political culture research, especially after the fall of communism. He summarily hypothesized, “In the post-Cold war world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural... the most important groupings of states are no longer the three blocks of the Cold War but rather the world’s seven or eight major civilizations” (Huntington,1996). Although his broad-brush treatment of cultural zones and adversarial view based on anecdotal evidence invited much criticism from diverse discipline, it surely enhanced the field of political culture by increasing again the role of culture in world conflicts as well as in modernization or civilization to a point of scholarly contention (Hunington, 1996).

Current political culture research has geared towards more global issues and perspectives, armed with even more data sources collected over a longer period of time across countries (Geer, 2004; Kittilson, 2007). Harrison and Huntington (2000), for example, gathered for the “Cultural Values and Human Progress” symposium prominent experts on such diverse topics as the link between values and progress, the universality of values and western “cultural imperialism,” geography and culture, the relationship between culture and institutions, and cultural change and

asked them to shed light on the question of how culture “affects the extent to which and the ways in which societies achieve or fail to achieve progress in economic development and political democratization” (Harrison, 2000:214).

According to Harrison (2000: 214), despite the lack of agreement on the topics, the participants agreed that cultural values and attitudes are an important and neglected factors in “human progress” and hence called for “a comprehensive theoretical and applied research program with the goal of integrating value and attitude change into development policies, planning, and programming in third world countries and in anti-poverty programs in the United States.”

Inglehart has also stretched his lifetime perspective on political culture to “the theory of human development” with the colleagues in psychology as well as in political science. He first formulated the theory with Welzel and Klingeman (2003) and elaborated on it with “the human development syndrome” with Oyserman (2004) and “the human development sequence” with Welzel (2005). His latest co-authored work addressed the relationship among development, freedom, and happiness (Inglehart *et al*, 2008). Based on the World Values Surveys among others, which now spans almost three decades and covers the majority part of the world, these authors try to demonstrate that socioeconomic development, emancipative cultural change and democratization constitute a coherent syndrome of social progress. This cultural pattern or “human development syndrome” as they put it, has been universal in its occurrence across nations and cultural zones and as a whole contributed to lengthening human choice and freedom (Inglehart *et al*, 2008).

The political economies of the African states had so declined that this led to frequent military coups, political oppression, ethnic strife and economic degradation in 1980s. Some of the blame lay with African governments that often "pursued economic policies or created public institutions that became impediments to their economic progress" (Kitchen, 1988). There is a general agreement in most African countries that coups must end, corruption must be rooted out, and economies must be renovated. There is less agreement among Africans about the meaning of "democracy." Many Africans believe that the larger issue of governance is related to the general conditions in African countries (Uya, 1987).

In Tanzania, the national political culture did not develop all at once. It was slowly built and armored over the course of several decades. The growth of particular national values and institutions set Tanzanian history on a self-perpetuating path away from violence and division and towards a peaceful political sphere. James Mahoney's model of path dependence provides a useful explanation for Tanzanian political culture. Mahoney (2001) argues that antecedent historical conditions make certain policy decisions more likely than others. Thus, the possibilities for Tanzanian policy were largely determined by the pre-existing demographic, economic, societal, and political situation. However, Mahoney's argument is not only structural, when the country achieves a "critical juncture," the choice of one policy option can set the country on a specific path (Mahoney, 2001). In the case of Tanzania, the 1967 adoption of the Arusha Declaration was that critical juncture. In keeping with Arusha's statement of principles, the government carried out an extensive nation building project, a series of socialist economic reforms, and a consolidation of a single party rule. The combination of these societal, economic,

and political policies shaped a national political culture. This political culture set the country on a long-term path of internal peace (Mahoney, 2001).

However, the political culture of Tanzania started to be demolished in 1990's due to the introduction of multiparty system which jeopardize the national unity through ethnicity, regionalism and religion among Tanzanians (Okema, 1996). Thus this situation has made some national leaders as well as public officials in the government institutions to favor their groups in terms of distributing resources as well as provision of public services (Lonsdale, 1994; Ekeh, 1998; Weinstein, 2010; Kelsall, 2003).

Zanzibar is a part of Tanzania since the Unification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964. Nonetheless Tanzania was not homogeneous in terms of political culture. Zanzibar had different political history and culture derived from Arab colonization in 19<sup>th</sup> century which has had an enduring impact on political behavior of populace (Kelsall, 2003 and Rawlence, 2005). By and large the dominant Arab culture was inherently authoritarian and therefore even in the present era of democratization there were challenges in acceptance of pluralism. Historically, multiparty system was introduced in 1957 when Zanzibar was under the Arab colonization. There were three political parties namely Afro-Shirazi Party, Zanzibar National Party and Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (Karume, 2004).

Between 1957 and 1963, immediately after general election and towards the end of 1963 just before the 1964 Revolution, Zanzibar was troubled by political factionalism which led to political bickering and hatred among Zanzibaris because

the existed political culture based on racism, religious affiliation and regionalism which created the nature of politics in Zanzibar (Musoke,1992; Shivji,1990).

Consequently, the reintroduction of multi-party system in 1992 in Zanzibar empowered the inherited political culture and politics since it led to various political challenges including political corruption, religious politics, political repression, electoral fraud, malpractices, post election violence and religious violence (Msekwa, 1997; Mkaramba, 1997; Heilman and Ndumbaro, 2002; Dagne, 2011).

Thus, it is the aim of this study to investigate the impact of political culture on corruption in the public sector in Zanzibar.

### **1.3 Statement of the Problem**

Corruption has become a central and serious challenge for Tanzania, in terms of both governance and social development. The levels of petty and grand corruption identified in international and domestic surveys continue to be of considerable concern and affect all sectors of the economy from public service delivery to natural resource exploitation, industrial production and business (Shaidi, 1975). Civil servants were under pressure to abide by an alternative moral code that stressed their social obligations to family, friends, and clients (Ekeh, 1998). In case of Zanzibar, corruption became an extra source of income to many public servants. It has been notorious and norm in the community where people must pay for their rights to public services (Zanzibar Leo Newspaper, December, 2013).

Political culture in Tanzania was one among the factors that affected corruption in the society since it was under the influence of religion, regionalism and ethnicity (Okema, 1996). An increasing number of Tanzanians have come to view politics through ethnic, regional and religious lenses since introduction of multiparty system in 1990's (Lonsdale, 1994; Weinstein, 2010). In case of Zanzibar, political culture was inherited from Arab colonization. Subsequently, it created politics that influence religious affiliation and regionalism in various aspects of life, including public service delivery (Shivji, 1990).

Institutions such as the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) and Zanzibar Anti-Corruption and Economic Crime Authority (ZAECA) were established to fight against corruption and promote accountability and good governance in the country (Tanzania Human Rights Report, 2013).

However, anti-corruption efforts assumed that corruption was an "individual" problem thus it was unlikely to have much success, since norms that uphold the patronage system actively undermined reform. In order to address corrupt behavior in situations of rooted corruption, fundamental societal change including the development of new social norms, would be required (Heilman and Ndumbaro, 2002). What was not clear in the Zanzibar context was the extent to which political culture explained the occurrence of corruption in the public sector. So far there were few studies on the subject in Zanzibar.

## **1.4 Objectives of the Study**

### **1.4.1 General Objective**

To investigate the impact of political culture on corruption in the public sector in Zanzibar.

### **1.4.2 Specific Objectives of the Study**

- a) To identify the role of beliefs in causing favouritism in the public sector in Zanzibar.
- b) To assess the effect of values on embezzlement in the public sector in Zanzibar.
- c) To examine the influence of norms on occurrence of bribery in the public sector in Zanzibar.
- d) To propose measures to mitigate the negative effects of beliefs, values and norms on favouritism, embezzlement and bribery respectively in the public sector in Zanzibar.

## **1.5 Research Questions**

- a) What are the effects of beliefs on favouritism in the public sector in Zanzibar?
- b) How do values affect embezzlement in the public sector?
- c) In which ways do norms influence bribery in the public sector?
- d) What measures should be taken to mitigate the negative effects of beliefs, values and norms on nepotism, embezzlement and bribery respectively in the public sector in Zanzibar?

## **1.6 Scope of the Study**

This study investigated the impact of political culture on corruption in the public sector in Zanzibar. It covered the Zanzibar Port Corporation where the targets were the officers of the Zanzibar Anti-Corruption and Economic Crime Authority (ZAECA), the officers of Zanzibar Port Corporation, the passengers and workers at the Malindi port in Zanzibar.

## **1.7 The Significance of the Study**

The findings of this study help policy makers and key institutions pertaining to anti-corruption activities as well as maintenance of political culture to get inputs for reviewing the existing anti-corruption policy, political culture policy and strategies in order to strengthen anti-corruption activities in the country. Moreover, the study provides awareness to the society about its political culture and how it influence corruption matters in the country. Furthermore, the findings of this study are useful for the libraries as a source of information for further research. Also, it helps the establishment of the base line information that serves as a guide for the assessment of political culture in combating corruption. Lastly, it helps the government to find out the consequences of political culture in fighting against corruption in Zanzibar and to take the appropriate measures to solve the existing challenges.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the literature review relevant to this study. Both theoretical and empirical studies are critically reviewed. In addition, the chapter presents the definition of key terms, the research gap and the conceptual framework that guided this study.

#### **2.2 Definition of Key Terms and Concepts**

##### **2.2.1 Political culture**

Political culture consists of widely shared, fundamental beliefs that have political effects. Political culture shapes how individuals and the society act and react politically. It determines the types of governmental institutions, how much authority is vested in the government, who is given authority and power in the society and government, who is permitted to participate in decision-making, and various other elements which relate to the connections of the people with their leaders (Lane, 1992).

Political culture is a set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system (Almond and Verba, 1965). The concept supposes that the attitudes and cognitions of political behavior aren't unsystematic, instead they represent a consistent pattern, and a specific political culture can be beneficial for the consolidation of democracy. Such a culture is one of

moderation and accommodation, implying tolerance for other political beliefs and a sense of trust in political actors (Diamond 1993, Dahl, 1997).

### **2.2.2 Beliefs**

Is a mental representation of an attitude positively oriented towards the likelihood of something being true (Schwitzgebel, 2006). According to Repa (1998), beliefs encourage a sense of community among their followers, and the moral and cultural common ground of these communities makes them attractive to people with the same values.

### **2.2.3 Values**

Values refer to what is 'good' or 'desired'. In the descriptive sense, values can mean the worth of something as when an article is assessed. Values can be institutional and cherished by individual and by a group of people. Values can refer to the effectiveness of a thing which is a function of choice-making. In so far as values are universal, they can be material, spiritual, religious, moral, aesthetic, communal or individualistic (Omotehinse, 2001).

### **2.2.4 Norms**

Are regarded as shared representations of acceptable group conduct as well as individual perceptions of particular group conduct (Lapinski, 2005). They can be viewed as cultural products (including values, customs, and traditions) which represent individuals' basic knowledge of what others do and think that they should do (Cialidin, 2003).

### **2.2.5 Corruption**

Corruption is defined as a violation of contract with externalities, constituting at least a three agent game which can derive in the typology of contracts private, public, and political (Alemann, 1995). Corruption is always a process of exchange between two persons or groups. The corrupter (A), who has economic assets at his disposal, and the corruptible person (corruptee B), who has power assets at his disposal (Alemann, 1995).

Is the abuse of authority as a result of considerations of personal gain, which need not be monetary. Corruption takes many forms. Because there is no generally accepted definition of corruption, there is no universally valid typology of corruption (Bayley, 1966; Alemann 1989). Researchers on corruption have detailed multiple classifications. Weber (1964) developed a typology of corruption on the basis of subjective intentions that have or anticipate the individuals such as gaining power and influence, economic and business success, self-enrichment, social motives, opportunism, etc.

Weber (1964) presumes that corruption is a state centered phenomenon reflecting the malfunctioning of a rationalized bureaucracy acting according to rules and in the public interest of society reflected in a democratic political system. Corruption can be active or passive taking into consideration who is the person that has the authority of decision making or to whom is requested (Theobald, 1998; Atuobi, 2007). Corruption also can be private among particular individuals and public corruption that takes place in the public sphere of politics and government administration. In

the political realm, corruption weakens democracy and good governance by flouting or even subverting formal processes (Theobald, 1998; Atuobi, 2007).

Corruption in legislative bodies decreases accountability and distorts representation in policy making; corruption in the judiciary compromises the rule of law; and corruption in public administration leads to the unequal distribution of services. More generally, corruption destroys the institutional capacity of government as procedures are ignored, resources are siphoned off, and public offices are bought and sold. At the extreme, unbridled corruption can lead to state feebleness and destructive conflict, and plunge a state into “remitting cycle of institutional anarchy and violence”. Examples, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Bakassi peninsula, etc (Theobald, 1998; Atuobi, 2007). A basic categorization considers political corruption, economic corruption and public administration corruption (Pedersen and Johannes, 2008).

### **2.2.6 Political Corruption**

Political corruption results in gaining political power. There is political corruption when the behaviors diverge from the principles that guide politics and policies, adapting decisions with abuse of power, which means that the private interests dislocate the public and common interests. Power is utilized to serve the private interest (Pedersen and Johannes, 2008).

### **2.2.7 Economic Corruption**

Economic corruption can be defined as the forfeit of the principal's interest for the agent's interest. Economic corruption results in earning profits. Economic corruption

has implications of determining the loss of income, how and how much for the principal, the agent, the state, the consumer and the economy (Pedersen and Johannes, 2008).

### **2.2.8 Public Administration Corruption**

In the administrative corruption, the behaviors of public agents disregard the principles of efficiency, truthfulness and rightfulness. Public administration corruption results in transfer of public benefits to private benefits taking advantage of the entrusted authority, as for example, in the form of nepotism that results in the transfer of benefits from society to family members. Taking into consideration the size of corruption, the type of corruption can be grand corruption and petty corruption. According to the depth, corruption can be individual and systemic. Other typology of corruption also considers commercial scale illegal logging, and legal logging but contributions paid to gain access to concessions of assets. Some examples of forms of corruption are bribery, collusion, embezzlement of public funds and theft, fraud, extortion, abuse of discretion, favoritism, clienteles, nepotism, the sale of government property by public officials and patronage (Pedersen and Johannes, 2008).

### **2.2.9 Public Sector**

Public sector is all organizations which are not privately owned and operated but which are launched, run and financed by government on behalf of the public. This definition expresses the ideas that public sector consists of organizations where control lies in the hand of the public as opposed to private owners and whose

objectives involve the provision of services where profit making is not a primary objectives (Adams, 2004).

### **2.3 Theoretical Literature Review**

This section presents various perspectives and theories which are relevant to the study. Both political culture perspectives and theoretical studies are critically reviewed so as to support the findings of this study. The political cultures perspectives reviewed were Almond and Verba perspectives while the reviewed theories for this study were prebendalism theory, neo-patrimonialism theory, clientelism theory and theory of individualism.

#### **2.3.1 Almond and Verba Perspectives**

The term “political culture” was coined in 1956 by pioneering political scientist Gabriel Almond, who defined it as “a particular pattern of orientations to political action” (Almond, 1956: 391). Political culture, though not completely uniform in any country, has been used to explain differences in the way citizens of different states respond to similar political stimuli (Almond, 1956).

Most analyses of political culture have assumed the presence of a national, i.e., society-wide, political culture. To ascribe a political culture to a society implicitly assumes that the members of a society share some common attitudes and values. However, the hypothesis of common values is often better met by ethnic groups than by the aggregate population of an entire country. Ethnic identifications are a principal alternative to national relationship and the most likely source of systematic within-country variation in political culture (Geertz, 1973; Gurr, 1993).

The level of concurrence on basic political values by members of different ethnic groups in multiethnic societies may be critical to the functioning of democratic institutions and to the process of democratization in transition countries. While the nature of the relationship between democracy and ethnicity remains unsettled, the idea is widespread that the two bear on one another (Pye and Verba, 1965).

Almond and Verba (1965), construe political culture as a subjective mass phenomenon that consists of orientations towards key objects of the political system and toward the individual's role in it. Almond and Verba (1965), state that "the political culture of a nation is the particular distribution towards political objects among members of the nation". However, in the civic culture they assume a high degree of sharedness and permanence to such orientations. To represent political culture and not just recent or political opinion the core values must be as widely shared by individuals within a society and "lasting but not unchallengeable" (Inglehart, 1990).

The political culture approach argues "that; 1) people's reactions to their situations are shaped by subjective orientations, which vary cross-culturally and within subcultures; and 2) these variations in subjective orientations reflect differences in one's socialization experience, with early learning conditioning later learning, making the former more complex to undo. Accordingly, actions cannot be interpreted as simply the result of external situations: lasting differences in cultural learning also play an essential part in shaping what people think and do" (Inglehart,1990). Political culture put the framework, the scholarly environment,

within which government and politics take place. From political cultural beliefs one can, in Wildavsky's phrase, derive "miles of preferences" (Wildavsky, 1987).

The correlation is made to the words, behavior and actions of public officials, both elected and appointed, those looking for political office, leaders of political parties and interest groups, and others trying to influence public affairs and policies, in three general ways. First, political culture restricts their actions even if inclined otherwise; they usually abstain from taking positions or from implementing policies that blatantly violate the elements of the political culture. Second, it grants them with opportunities to propose and advance policies, to take action. Third, they can employ some element of the political culture in trying to justify their proposals and actions (Wildavsky, 1987).

According to Sisk (1992), there are two schools of thought on this issue. The first takes a situation-specific cum historical perspective that perceives democratic political culture as the end product of an evolutionary process. For example, Chilton (1991) argues that one country's institutions may be copied by another country to set up democracy. However, the primary prerequisite for success is "cultural suitability". This requires adaptation of institutions to specific cultural conditions. The debate on the compatibility of Islam with democracy is a case in point. A "liberal" perspective on this issue might be that basic Islamic tenets are compatible with democracy. However, current political interpretations of Islam in countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia are not compatible. An "Islamic" perspective would argue that Islam is not antithetical to democracy. However, the Islamic model lays emphasis on the community aspect of society and on the religious foundations of the

state. These two features are the opposite of individualism and the secular state that are hassled in the Western model of democracy (Sisk, 1992).

According to Almond and Verba (1963), there are three ideal-typical political cultures. These are parochial cultures, subject cultures, and participant cultures. In parochial cultures, typified by African tribal societies, citizens have low cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientation towards the political system. In these simpler traditional societies, there are no specialized political roles and little anticipation for political change. Here, “the individual thinks of his family’s advantage as the only goal to pursue, or conceives of his role in the political system in familistic terms” For examples, Nigeria and Mexico.

In subject cultures, there is high cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientation towards the political system and policy output, but orientations towards input objects (like political parties) and the self as active participants are minimal. Thus orientation towards the system and its outputs is distributed via a relatively detached, passive relationship on the part of the citizen. Subject cultures are most compatible with centralized, authoritarian political formation. Indeed, for the subject “the law is something he conforms, not something he helps shape” For examples, Germany and Italy.

In participant cultures, members of society have high cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientation to the political system, the input objects, the policy outputs, and recognize the self as an energetic participant in the polity. Social actors tend to be activist and mobilized. In general, participant cultures are most compatible with

democratic political structures. Here, the citizen is expected to have “the virtues of the subject – to obey the law, to be loyal – but he is also anticipated to take some part in the formation of decisions”. For examples, Tanzania, United Kingdom and the United States.

Almond and Verba note that political cultures rarely conform to the foregoing ideal-types; rather, they tend to be mixed cultures. Further, political culture does not always map onto functional political structures. Political systems may be featured by high congruence between culture and structure (which engenders allegiance), feeble congruence (which engenders apathy), and incongruence (which engenders alienation).

Additionally, these types of political culture are applicable in many countries in the world such as Tanzania where participant culture is experienced because the citizens are involved in decision making process pertaining to political, economic and social development such as constitutional amendment, introduction of new public policy and election of leaders.

### **2.3.2 Prebendalism Theory**

Prebendalism refers to political systems where politicians and government workers feel they have a right to a share of government revenues, and utilize them to benefit their supporters, co-religionists and members of their group. It was introduced by Max Weber applied the term to describe India and China in the early Middle Ages (Weber, 1951; 1958).

According to the theory of prebendalism, state offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by office holders, who utilize them to make material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups (Joseph, 1996). As a result of that kind of patron-client or identity politics, Nigeria has frequently been one of the lowest ranked nations for political transparency by Transparency International in its Corruption Perceptions Index (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2006). Joseph (1987) conceptualized it as the pattern of political behavior which reflects, as its justifying principle, that the offices of the state may be competed for and then utilized for the personal benefit of the office holders as well as that of their reference or support groups. Accordingly, he notes that in Nigeria, state political offices are primarily regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by the office holders to produce material benefits for themselves and for other ethnic, cultural or community groups (Joseph, 1987).

Prebendalism as it obtains in Nigeria can be professed from two major perspectives. One, as a situation where political offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by their holders and actually used as such to generate material benefit for themselves. Two, as a form of political clientele in which people ascend to political offices through the active support of power brokers (political God Fathers), tribal or kin groups who must be rewarded in various ways including using the trappings of such office. From these two perspectives, prebendalism could be taken to mean the use of political offices for direct selfish personal gains or to indirectly benefit political masters, cultural groups or other kin groups (Joseph, 1987).

### **2.3.3 Neo-Patrimonialism Theory**

"Neopatrimonialism" as a distinct term is generally held to have originated with Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, in his 1973 book "Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism" (Eisenstadt, 1973). It was derived from Max Weber's term, 'patrimonialism', who used the latter term to describe a system of rule based on administrative and military workers, who were responsible only to the ruler. Neo-Patrimonialism, which is a modern form of the traditional Patrimonial form of rule, is a mixed system. Here elements of patrimonial and rational-bureaucratic rule co-exist and are sometimes interlinked (Erdmann, 2006).

Neo-patrimonialism is a system of social hierarchy where benefactors utilize state properties in order to secure the loyalty of clients in the general inhabitants. It is an informal patron–client relationship that can reach from very high up in state structures down to individuals in small villages (Eisenstadt, 1973).

Neo- patrimonialism may underlie or supplant the bureaucratic structure of the state in that only those with acquaintances have the real power, not those who hold higher positions. Further criticisms include that it weakens political institutions and the rule of law, and is a corrupt (but not always illegal) practice. Neo-patrimonialism also has its benefits, however. Neo-patrimonialism can extend the reach of the state into the geographical and social peripheries of the country, give short term stability, and facilitate communal integration (Eisenstadt, 1973).

Neo-patrimonialism is a "form of organization in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type permeate a political and administrative system which is formally

created on rational-legal lines." It is a system in which an office of power is used for personal uses and gains, as opposed to a strict division of the private and public spheres (Erdmann, 2006).

Neo-patrimonialism is sometimes used as a way of explaining why African states have "failed" to affect neoliberal market reforms. This focus is contentious, with some complaining that the term is unclear, and others that its use has failed to take into account the politics of non-African states (Erdmann, 2006).

Another problem is that "neo-patrimonial" states in and outside Africa have pursued a wide range of policies including some that are squarely developmental. In other words, other than indicating the style of governance, neo-patrimonialism does not notify us much about what policies a state will pursue and with what achievement. In the African case "neo-patrimonialism" has been used to elucidate import substitution, export orientation, parastatals, privatization, the informal sector development, etc. The result is that, in seeking to explain everything, it elucidates nothing except perhaps that capitalist relations in their idealized form which are not pervasive in Africa (Thandika, 1998).

Resource distribution in neo-patrimonial systems is always aggravated by the patron's incentive to ensure incumbency. However, the specific resources and distributive mechanisms of patronage networks vary by the cultural, economic and political institutions found in particular countries. Circulation of resources or benefits might be primarily aggravated by personal relationships or ethnic / tribal loyalties. In such cases, distribution can take the form of personal favors such as, appointing relatives or people from the ruler's ethnic / tribal group to important

government posts. This has been found to be the case in countries such as Cameroon, Zaire, and Ghana (Jurg, 1999; Staffan, 2003).

#### **2.3.4 Clientelism Theory**

Clientelism is the exchange of goods and services for political support, often involving an implicit or explicit quid-pro-quo. It is a political system at the heart of which is an asymmetric connection between groups of political actors described as patrons and clients and political parties (Stokes *et al*, 2013). Clientelism as a set of actions based on the principle take there; give here, with the practice allowing both clients and patrons to gain advantage from the other's support. Moreover, clientelism is characterized by "exchange systems where voters trade political support for various outputs of the public decision-making process" (Davidson *et al*, 2011).

The origin of the practice has been traced to ancient Rome. Here relationships between the patron (*patronus*) and client (*cliens*) were seen as crucial to understanding the political process. While the compulsions between these were mutual, the key point is they were hierarchical. These relationships might be best viewed not as an entity but rather as a network (*clientela*), with the *patronus* himself perhaps being obligated to someone of greater authority, and the *cliens* perhaps having more than one patron. These extensions increase the possibilities of conflicting interests arising. While the *familia* was the fundamental unit underlying Roman society, the interlocking networks (*clientela*) acted as limits on their autonomy but allowed a more complex society to develop (Roniger, 2004).

Patronage and vote buying are a subcategory of clientelism. Vote buying is a direct transfer of products or services, in exchange for one's support and vote. The outcome for the good or service is a question of 'did you or will you vote for me?' (Goodin, 2009). A key to understanding clientelism might come in stressing not only the mutually beneficial relationships of exchange but also asymmetries in power or standing. Implied is certain selectivity in access to key resources and markets. Those with access, the *patrons* (and/or sometimes *sub-patrons* or *brokers*) rely on the subordination and dependence of the clients. In return for receiving some benefits, the clients should give political support (Stokes *et al*, 2013).

It is common to link clientelism with corruption; both involve political actors using public and private resources for private gain, but they are not synonyms. Corruption is commonly defined as "dishonest and fraudulent conduct by those in power, classically involving bribery." Political clientelism is seen as, "the circulation of benefits targeted to individuals or groups in exchange for electoral support" (Larreguy, 2014). It is common to associate the two together because they moderately overlap (Kawata, 2006). There are different forms of corruptions that have nothing to do with clientelism, such as voter intimidation or ballot stuffing. "Clientelism is considered negative because its intention is to produce 'private' revenue for patrons and clients and, as a result hamper 'public' revenue for members of the general community who are not a part of the patron-client arrangement" (Kawata, 2006).

Tanzania moved to a liberal economy in the mid-1980s and adopted multiparty politics in 1992. In 1995, the Elections Act was amended to allow MPs to create financial contributions to community development before the election campaign

period (Buchanan, 1965). The political and economic changes led to the increase in politicians' engagement with economic activities and in their use of money in building their relationships with voters by monetarily contributing to communities and buying votes (Hyden & Mmuya, 2008; Liviga, 2011). Political and economic liberalisation also allowed business people to gain power over politics and policy-making processes, sometimes leaving aside the welfare of the wider public (Liviga, 2011). MPs had to raise funds for their constituencies outside the party structure and the government budget, and the growing significance of the benefactor role of MPs increasingly placed pressure on them and created a political environment conducive to clientelism. Although the Tanzanian government made an endeavor to show its commitment to curb political corruption, the use of bribery continued in the 2010 elections (Eisentadt and Roniger, 1984).

### **2.3.5 Theory of Individualism (1792-1750 BC)**

This theory emerged in an ancient legal structure in Middle East in the laws of Hammurabi. Individualism refers to the strength of ties within small groups such as family and close friends. In such countries, family members and close friends have strong expectations from each other. People in these countries can smash rules and legal procedures to meet such expectation. Moreover, it is very common to favor a close friend or family member in recruiting or in allocating rewards and promotions (Javidan and House, 2001).

In societies that score high on individualism, people tend to look after themselves or their immediate families, individual goals take precedence over group goals, people highlight rationality, individuals are likely to engage in activities alone, and

individuals make fewer distinctions between in-group and out-groups (Gelfand *et al.*, 2004). Individualism makes collective action more complex because individuals pursue their own interest without internalizing collective interests (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2010). In-group collectivism, values and practices are negatively and significantly correlated with the achievement in basic science (Gelfand *et al.*, 2004). People in such societies tend to prefer tight social frameworks and strong belief in group decisions, and group fidelity is appreciated over efficiency (David and Ruhe, 2003).

In collectivist cultures, networks of friends and families are more oriented towards creating strong relationships that facilitate illegal transactions (Getz and Volkema, 2001). Therefore, family connections might encourage corruption (Gomez-Mejia *et al.*, 1998). Collectivistic cultures tend to apply different standards, laws, regulations and explanations to different groups and situations. Due to the existence of a double standard in a collectivist society, the level of corruption is expected to increase (Hofstede, 1991). Therefore, the higher the level of individual collectivism values, the higher the level of corruption. The higher the level of individual collectivism practices, higher the level of corruption (Davis and Ruhe, 2003).

## **2.4 Empirical Review**

### **2.4.1 Situation of Corruption in the World**

Corruption is a phenomenon that human societies have practised and attempted to overcome for thousands of years (Alatas, 1990). The problem of corruption can be traced to the beginnings of humankind's social interaction and the development of social organizations. It is a problem that appears to be widespread. Despite the

limited empirical evidence, much of the literature refers to corruption as being 'both pervasive and significant' throughout the world. It is important to highlight that corruption is a worldwide phenomenon, experienced in both developed and developing countries (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).

According to the Corruption Perception Index (2005), which include 159 countries versus 146 in 2004, more than two third of the nations surveyed score less than five. Nearly half of the countries score less than three, indicating a severe corruption problem. Corruption is professed as most rampant in Chad, Bangladesh, Turkmenistan, Myanmar and Haiti. Oil-rich countries also scored poorly. Some countries have deteriorated since 1995. Some of which have very high incomes such as Poland, Argentina, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Israel, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and Venezuela (in descending order of significance). One of the strongest improvement since 1995 is the Republic of Korea whose government has declared its goal belonging to the top ten countries (Halk and Poisson, 2007).

Elliott (1997), notes that an increase in international action concerned with corruption this decade is characterized by policies emerging bodies such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the International Chamber of Commerce, the World Bank (WB), the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Despite the limited empirical evidence on levels of corruption, the achievement and growth of international action against corruption indicates that there is real concern about corruption as an international issue. The reason for this increase in international awareness and action on

corruption is asserted. Commentators point to the increase in globalizing tendencies as an important influence in the growth of awareness of corruption, with the increased interrelatedness of countries making corruption harder to hide (Elliott, 1997).

Much of the literature discusses the increasing international integration in economic and trade arenas as important influences (Elliott, 1997). Other commentators point to the spread of values of democracy, and the increase in expectations of the accountability and Corruption and anti-corruption transparency of states as being influential (Elliott , 1997).

#### **2.4.2 Corruption in African Countries**

In post-colonial Africa, corruption has been a cause for concern because it diverts already inadequate funds, weakens economic progress and impedes policy changes required for development. Africa presents a typical case of the countries in the world whose development has been undermined and retarded by the danger of corrupt practices (Ayo, 1995).

A series of reforms have been carried out in all African countries so as to make the system (African states) efficient and result oriented. However, the expected gains of such efforts or reforms have not been noticeable due to series of factors which include that of corruption. The situation has gone so bad to the extent that whichever way one views corruption, it involves an abuse of public duty or deviation from high moral standards in exchange for (or in anticipation of) personal financial gains. It is connected with moral and dishonest acts (Ayo, 1995).

The effects of corruption are felt in the political and social, as well as the economic, spheres. Although the direct costs of corruption may be high in terms of lost revenue or funds diverted from their intended use, the indirect costs in terms of the economic distortions; inefficiencies and waste resulting from corrupt practices are more problematic over the long-term and thus make it more complex to address. Corruption increases the costs of doing business, wastes resources, hence radically decrease revenues accruing to the state. Different arguments have been put forward to explain the occurrence of corruption in Africa. These include poverty, the personalization of public office, the political culture and the inability of leaders to overcome their colonial mentality in respect of their perception of public office (Lawal and Tobi, 2001).

The effects of corruption in Africa can be analyzed from three main perspectives - political, economic and socio-cultural. From the political view point, corruption has the capacity of engendering political instability, breakdown of law and order, brain drain, inefficiency of the public service among others. Viewed from the economic perspective, corruption is no doubt an enemy of economic development in the international view, as it gives the continent poor image in interpersonal and business relationships (Ojaide, 2002). In the socio-cultural context, corruption apart from engendering poverty has the capacity of changing the social values of a good and progressive society dramatically to nothing else than the crazy pursuit of wealth affluence, power and society recognition. People no longer appreciate the virtues of good morals, conduct and practices (Ojaide, 2002).

Most African countries have long had legislation to prevent corrupt practices and stringent penalties for those found engaging in them, including blacklisting, seizing of assets, mandatory dismissal from public office and sometime, legal action. In most cases however, these have been unsuccessful because they have not been invoked or because important figures have been exempted. Political will is therefore essential to make sure that anti-corruption legislation and administrative measures are enforced (Paulo, 1996).

In East Africa, corruption has evolved from a taboo issue into a critical policy area and governance reform priority (Okong'o, 2010). Many East African countries have engaged in notable anti-corruption efforts, such as anti-corruption investigations and convictions and prevention activities for example, Kenya whose anti-corruption activities have been followed in other countries. However, corruption remains a key challenge in East Africa (Okong'o, 2010). Although member states of the East African Community (EAC) have adopted and ratified a range of anti-corruption conventions, protocols and measures, corruption is considered to be an institutionalized and acceptable part of everyday life – in the police, health sector or any other service (Tindifa, 2009 and UGMP, 2009). Although Uganda, for example, has espoused numerous laws and established various institutions to fight corruption, it has over the last five years regressed in its efforts to achieve greater transparency and accountability (UGMP, 2009).

### **2.4.3 Public Sector in African Countries**

With the attainment of independence by most African countries in the late 1950s and 1960s, the public sector is generally viewed as the pivot that would promote

socioeconomic development. The basic function of the public sector, which comprises a number of institutions for the making and implementation of decisions with regard to interests of various kinds, was to provide goods and services to citizens based on “realization and representation of public interests and its possession of inimitable public qualities compared to business management” (Haque, 2001).

However, the public sector was not able to perform its function effectively because of its “accumulation of excessive power, lack of accountability and representation, indifference towards public needs and demands, official secrecy and inaccessibility, and role in depoliticizing the public sphere” (Garnham, 1990; Haque, 1994). This ineffectiveness coupled with the economic crises of the late 1970s and 1980s and the apparent lessons from international experience of the success of market-friendly economies have combined to produce what some scholars have referred to as the “redefinition of the role of the state or public sector” (Fiszbein, 2000).

By the late 1990s the need for a market-friendly economy had become widely accepted throughout Africa. It implied a reduced role for the state in national economic management. The state was instead anticipated to provide an enabling environment for private sector economic activities by implementing appropriate economic policy reforms and providing the necessary legal and regulatory framework. It was also anticipated to provide some of the social and physical infrastructure, sometimes in partnership with Community Based Organizations (CBOs). Yet these new roles for the state were not necessarily easier and in many

compliments may be beyond the capacity of many developing countries' governments (Fiszbein, 2000).

For instance, "good governance" programs suggested by donors, may require that the state must initiate policies and programs that, inter alia would create a conducive political, legal and economic environment, protect vulnerable groups, improve government efficiency and responsiveness, empower people and democratize the political system, decentralize the administrative system, close the gap between the rich and the poor, encourage cultural diversity and social integration, protect the environment and uphold gender equality (Campbell *et al.*, 1991; Nickson, 1995; UNDP, 1995; 1997; World Bank, 1997; Peterson, 1997 and Collins, 2000).

These ambitious political and social goals required, at the very least, both strong political legitimacy and competent administration. Above all, if the state has to rely on non-state agencies in the private and citizen sectors to provide services which it once provided directly, then there was an enormous premium on its ability to standardize and manage public-private partnerships as well as sectors which have been fully privatized (Batley, 1996).

#### **2.4.4 Public Sector in Tanzania**

In 1961 up to 1966 , the state adopted a nationalistic approach and nationalized all major means of the economy, decolonization of administrative system, politicization of the army and proclamation of one party state under TANU in 1965 (Mushi, 2000). These were just a few notable reforms which were taken by the new independent state. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 up to the late 1980s, Tanzania

saw a dramatic extension in the role of the state in all areas of the economy. State enterprises, whether newly created or expropriated from the private sector, were heralded as the driving force of economic growth. Wealth produced by these enterprises was planned to finance the expansion of a civil service, which would provide free health care, education and other public services to create a well-educated and healthy socialist utopia. Initial results were encouraging with impressive improvements in indicators such as literacy and child mortality rates. However, the growth of the civil service, though apparently unstoppable, was evidenced more in terms of employment than productivity (Graham and Richard, 1999).

At the same time, the institutional environment for the civil service declined as the quality of governance fell. Political interference increased, and the civil service became a source of patronage, nepotism, corruption and influence. Increasingly, the civil service became used as a guaranteed source of employment, particularly for graduates. Production and productivity were of lesser significance. Results, in terms of the delivery of services, became less important than political influence or self-enrichment, as civil servants stopped to be held accountable for non-performance and non-compliance with financial and administrative regulations. Public confidence in the competence and integrity of the civil service plummeted and deteriorated hence the government institutions lost legitimacy and integrity from the public (Graham and Richard, 1999).

As the socialist economy failed to deliver the anticipated dividends, public finances were squeezed and real pay levels in the civil service worsened year by year. Hence

the legitimate rewards of working for the civil service - status and salary – were devalued, and overtaken by illegal (and if not officially condoned, then at least overlooked) benefits from the abuse of public office. Not surprisingly high quality professional and managerial staffs, who are the backbone of any competent public service, sought careers elsewhere. In the late 1980s, the Tanzania Government tried to address the disastrous state of the national economy by breaking with the old socialist model. It attempted to redefine the boundaries of the state and give greater space to the private sector and third sector institutions. However, it lacked any effective execution mechanism (Graham and Richard, 1999). The Civil Service, despite employing more staff than at any time in its history (350,000 in 1990), no longer had the capacity or the resources to develop and implement new policies. The reforms of the civil service happened to be a priority, and the civil service reform program was launched in 1990's. These reforms were affected with a focus to make sure that the public sector is able to provide quality effective and efficient public services to the citizens (Graham and Richard, 1999).

## **2.5 Research Gap**

From the reviewed literature, it is found that most of the researches conducted in Tanzania, East Africa and Africa in general, focused on the causes (Agbu, 2001), types of corruption, (Chambua *et al*, 2002), forms of corruption and political will, (Krupedeh, 2001), anti-corruption strategies (Agbu, 2001). Moreover, other researchers conducted investigation on types and effects of corruption such as Ogundiya (2009), Heyneman (2002), Rose-Ackerman, (1999), (East Africa Bribery Index, 2010) and Research Report on Governance in Southern and Eastern Africa, 2011). However, there were some researches conducted in Asian and European

countries concerning with perception of people towards corruption such as Thomas, (2011) and Jandosova, (2003). This reveals that there is a gap of information about the impacts of political culture on corruption in the public sectors in Tanzania, a case of Zanzibar Port Corporation in which this study intended to add knowledge in this organization.

## **2.6 Conceptual Framework**

Onen and Oso (2008) note that a conceptual framework is a diagrammatic presentation of a theory that is presented as a model so that research variables and the relationship between them, are translated into a visual picture to illustrate the interconnections between the independent, intervening and dependent variables. Before describing the conceptual frame work of this study, let us describe the theory of prebendalism that will be applied to formulate the conceptual frame work of this study.

Prebendalism refers to political systems where politicians and government officials feel that they have a right to a share of government revenues, and use them to benefit their followers, co-religionists and members of their group. It was developed by Max Weber used the term to describe India and China in the early Middle Ages (Max Weber, 1951; 1958).

Joseph wrote in 1996, "according to the theory of prebendalism, state offices are considered as prebends that can be appropriated by office holders, who use them to produce material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups (Joseph, 1996). As a result of that kind of patron-client or identity politics, Nigeria

has frequently been one of the lowest ranked nations for political transparency by Transparency International in its Corruption Perceptions Index (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2006).

Joseph (1987) conceptualized it as the pattern of political behavior which reflects, as its justifying principle, that the offices of the state may be competed for and then used for the personal gain of the office holders as well as that of their reference or support groups. Accordingly, he notes that in Nigeria, state political offices are primarily regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by the office holders to make material benefits for themselves and for other ethnic, cultural or community groups (Joseph, 1987).

Prebendalism as it obtains in Nigeria can be professed from two major perspectives. One, as a situation where political offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by their holders and actually used as such to produce material benefits for themselves. Two, as a form of political clientele in which people ascend to political offices through the energetic support of power brokers (political God Fathers), ethnic or kin groups who must be rewarded in sundry ways including using the trappings of such office. Due to these two perspectives, prebendalism could be taken to mean the use of political offices for direct selfish personal gains or to indirectly benefit political masters, cultural groups or other kin groups (Joseph, 1987).

In this study, the researcher will apply the theory of prebendalism to conceptualize the impact of political culture on corruption in the public sector for basing on two

variables namely, “political culture” which is an independent variable and “corruption” that is dependent variable. The researcher will apply this theory because it explains how the political culture influences corruption in the society since some tendencies of political culture are caused by prebendalism. Political culture includes norms, values and beliefs which shape the political system of a nation (Almond and Verba, 1965; Camp, 2001; Inglehart, 2005).

In this study, political culture as an independent variable leads factors that affect corruption as dependent variable. According to prebendalism theory, these factors are unequal distribution of resource, self-interests, greed, selfishness, tribalism, discrimination, hypocrisy, conflict of interest, individualism, bias, ethnicity, regionalism, parochialism, dishonesty, laziness, distrust, unfairness and injustice. Additionally, these factors are based on prebendalism which exists in some societies in Tanzania.

## **2.7 The Concept of Beliefs**

Belief is the condition of mind in which a person thinks something to be the case, with or without there being empirical proof to prove that something is the case with factual certainty. Another way of defining belief sees it as a mental representation of an attitude positively oriented towards the likelihood of something being true (Schwitzgebel, 2006). In the context of Ancient Greek thought, two related concepts were identified with regards to the concept of belief: *pistis* and *doxa*. Simplified, we may say that *pistis* refers to "trust" and "confidence", while *doxa* refers to "opinion" and "acceptance" (Leicester, 2008).

In the African traditional belief, God is the explanation of all things. The world was created by him. The Africans therefore believe that the surroundings is knitted to the presence of God. Africans believe that the ancestors played prominent roles in the continuance of morality in the community hardly dies, even today, “God is the explanation of man’s origin and nourishment; it is as if God exists for the sake of man.” God’s agents are charged with the responsibility of maintaining law and order in the society. Thus, both physical and supernatural forces are always present in the administration of the society (Mbiti, 1969).

Beliefs encourage a sense of community among their followers, and the moral and cultural common ground of these communities makes them attractive to people with the same values. Moreover, beliefs promote peace, security, fairness, equality and justice in the society (Repa, 1998). The English word "orthodoxy" derives from *doxa*. Jonathan Leicester suggests that belief has the purpose of guiding action rather than indicating truth (Leicester, 2008).

In sum, African values, norms and beliefs constitute the frameworks of the development of societies. Every society is obliged to maintain its own history in order to develop its culture upon which its development, liberation, civilization and identity should be based (Magesa, 1997). However, Robert (1968) argued that culture (norms, values, beliefs, attitude, and folkways) manipulated the existence and perpetration of certain corrupt practices in African countries such as theft, stealing, looting, distrust and abuse of authority.

## **2.8 The Concept of Values**

Values may be ideas that propel man's daily actions. In other words, they are the standard which members of the community adhere to in their personal and communal interaction towards the success of the goals. They are the ones (Values) that determine those who are to be congratulated or reprimanded for their actions. In another sense, values refer to what is 'good' or 'desired'. In the descriptive sense, value can mean the worth of something as when an article is assessed. Values can be institutional and cherished by individual and by a group of people. Values can refer to the effectiveness of a thing which is a function of choice-making. In so far as values are universal, they can be material, spiritual, religious, moral, aesthetic, communal or individualistic (Omotehinse, 2001).

Godwin (1993), wrote that "African values...may be taken to mean a set of institutionalized ideals which conduct and direct the patterns of life of Africans." Africans share mutually; they care for one another, they are interdependent and they solidarise. Whatever happens to one happens to the community as a whole (Mbiti, 1969). Responsibility, kindness, honesty, hospitality, accommodation, generosity, compassion, faithfulness, fruitfulness, love, dignity, diligence and brotherhood are examples of values in African societies (Gyekye, 1996).

Values express the worth and approval of the society, as well as it reflects a person's sense of right and wrong or what "ought" to be. Furthermore, values tend to influence attitudes and behavior. Again, values create behavior and influence the choices made by an individual as well as it may help solve common human problems for survival by proportional rankings of value, the results of which provide

answers to questions of why people do what they do and in what order they choose to do them. Moreover, values identify what should be judged as good or evil (Rokeach, 1973; Maiese, 2003).


## **2.9 The Concept of Norms**

Norms are informal understandings that govern the behavior of members of a society. Social psychology recognizes smaller group units, such as a team or an office, may also endorse norms separately or in addition to cultural or societal expectations (Jackson, 1965). In other words, norms are regarded as shared representations of acceptable group conduct as well as individual perceptions of particular group conduct (Lapinski, 2005). They can be viewed as cultural products (including values, customs, and traditions) which represent individuals' basic knowledge of what others do and think that they should do (Cialidin, 2003; Sharif, 1936). Examples of norms are shaking hand, giving gift, expressing gratitude, attending funeral and wedding, greeting, visiting friends and relatives, etc. (Collin, 2002; Gerber *et al*, 2009; Vanderliden, 2003 and Dike, 2002 ).

Norms guide behavior in a certain situation or environment as "mental representations of suitable behavior"(Aarts, 2003). For example, it has been shown that normative messages can promote pro-social behavior, including decreasing alcohol use and increasing voter turnout and sustainability (Collin, 2002; Gerber *et al*, 2009; Vanderliden, 2003). Moreover, norms have a way of maintaining order and organizing groups (Haung *et al*, 1994). Norms also allow an individual to assess what behaviors the group deems important to its existence or survival, since they represent a codification of belief; groups generally do not discipline members or

create norms over actions which they care little about. Norms in every culture create conformity that allows people to become socialized to the culture in which they live (Hackman, 1992).

**Figure 2. 1: The Conceptual Framework**



**Source:** Literature Review, 2017

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the research methodology which was employed in undertaking this study. It is divided into subsections, namely, introduction, area of the study, research approaches, research design, target population, sampling procedures, sample size, data collection methods, data analysis, validity and reliability and ethical considerations.

#### **3.2 Area of the Study**

Kombo and Tromp (2006) argue that it is important to be careful in selecting the research area, as that it is likely to influence the usefulness of the information produced. This study was conducted in Zanzibar Port Corporation (ZPC) especial at Malindi port. The reason for choosing this institution is due to the fact that Zanzibar Port Corporation was one among the public institutions which were faced by a serious challenge of corruption in Zanzibar (Degraaf, 2013). Zanzibar Port Corporation is a Parastatal Organization established by the Government of Zanzibar under the ZPC Act No 1 of 1997. It is located in the Urban district in Zanzibar. The Corporation was launched to take over the functions which were performed by the Department of Ports and Marine Transport (DPMT) (under the Ministry of Communication and Transport) and the Parastatal Organization known as the Zanzibar Wharfage Corporation (ZWC) (de Graaf, 2013).

This major responsibilities as stipulated in the Act include managing, operating, developing and promoting port industry in Zanzibar. Zanzibar Port Corporation is anticipated in particular to perform the role of an operator in terms of commercial activities of port sector on the Islands of Zanzibar (Unguja and Pemba). The establishment of ZPC was a result of Government major restructuring program of the economy, started in the early 1990's. The principal objective of the program was to enlarge the economy's capacity to produce and deliver goods and services, primarily through the private sector, strengthening the public sector's ability to standardize the economy and reduce its role in production and businesses activities (de Graaf, 2013).

Zanzibar Ports Corporation under the Ministry of Infrastructure and Communication manages and operates two main ports and three small ports in Unguja and Pemba Islands. The main ports of Zanzibar are port of Malindi, port of Mkoani, Port of Mkokotoni, Port of Wete and port of Weshu (de Graaf, 2013).

### **3.3 Research Approaches**

The study adopted both qualitative and quantitative approaches. Qualitative approach to research is concerned with subjective assessment of attitudes, opinions and behavior. Research in such a situation is a function of researcher's insights and impressions. Such an approach to research generates results either in non-quantitative form or in the form which are not subjected to rigorous quantitative analysis. Generally, the techniques of focus group interviews, projective techniques and depth interviews are used (Kothari, 2004). Quantitative approach involves the generation of data in quantitative form which can be subjected to rigorous

quantitative analysis in a formal and rigid fashion (Kothari, 2004). In this study, qualitative approach was used to obtain deep description of the data from the study area including the effect of values on embezzlement in the study area while quantitative approach was adopted for some phenomenon that required numerical data such as quantification of relationship between gender and employment in the study area.

### **3.4 Research Design**

According to Kerlinger (1964:275) research design refers to the plan, structure and strategy of investigation conceived so as to obtain answers to research questions and control variance. On the other hand, Zikmund (2003:65) is of the opinion that research design is a master plan specifying the methods and procedures for collecting and analyzing the needed information. It is a framework or blue print that plans the action for research project. It is important because every research proposal needs a blue print for planning the action.

Research design was needed because it facilitated the smooth sailing of the various research operations, thereby making research as efficient as possible, yielding maximal information with minimal expenditure of effort, time and money (Kothari, 2004).

This study employed a cross-sectional research design. It was the research design which examined more than one group of people (of different ages) at one point in time. For example, a study of depression might examine adults of varying ages (say 40, 50, and 60 years old). It allowed data to be gathered at one point in time on several variables of interest (Kothari, 2004). Moreover this design was proper when

time and money was the limiting factors, it was inexpensive; it could address to specific population of interest and it was proper for short duration studies (Thisted, 2006).

### **3.5 Target Population**

Kombo and Tromp (2006) state that a population involves a group of individuals, objects or items from which samples are taken for measurement. The population therefore, could be seen as a large group from which a researcher could draw a representative sample for the sake of collecting information relevant to the study being conducted.

The target populations for this study were officers from Zanzibar Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Authority (ZAECA), officers from Zanzibar Port Corporation, workers from Zanzibar Port Corporation, Zanzibar Board of Standard, Zanzibar Revenue Authority, Tanzania Revenue Authority, Immigration office, Zanzibar Food and Drug Board, Police Force and Association of Sailors of Dhows and Boats at Malindi port. Also it involved passengers at that port.

The researcher chose officers from ZAECA because they were the key stakeholders of combating corruption in Zanzibar. Again, he selected officers from ZPC since they were the ones who managed the provision of services in Zanzibar Port Corporation. Also, the researcher collected data from workers and passengers at Malindi port in Zanzibar because they were the ones who were influenced to receive or give bribe respectively in terms of service delivery.

### **3.6 Source List**

According to Kothari (2004), it is also known as ‘sampling frame’ from which a sample is to be drawn. It contains the names of all items of a universe (in case of finite universe only). If source list is not available, the researcher has to prepare it. Such a list should be comprehensive, correct, reliable and appropriate. It is extremely important for the source list to be as representative of the population as possible. For the purpose of this study, sampling frame was the list of the officers from ZAECA, ZPC, workers and passengers at Malindi port in Zanzibar. The sampling frame was obtained by the assistance of the management of ZPC and ZAECA with the aid of introduction letter from the University of Dodoma (UDOM).

### **3.7 Sampling Procedure**

It is a process of selecting a number of individuals or objects, from a population such that the selected group contains elements representative of the characteristics found in entire group (Orodho and Kombo, 2002). On the other hand, a sample is defined as subset of units selected from a larger set of the same units (McNabb, 2002).

This study adopted both probability and non probability sampling techniques. Purposive sampling to select the officers (key informants) from ZAECA and ZPC was conducted. For the purpose of this study, purposive sampling was applied for selecting five (5) officers for each mentioned institution above to make a total of ten (10) respondents. The researcher used purposive sampling in order to get detailed and relevant information about the study. It made the study flexible, and less costly in terms of technical issues and time constraints.

Furthermore, simple random sampling was adopted to select forty five (45) workers and twenty five (25) passengers at Malindi port in Zanzibar. This technique helped to avoid bias because all units had equal chance to be selected into sample size from the target population.

### **3.8 Sample Size**

According to Kothari (2004), sample size refers to the number of items to be selected from the universe to constitute a sample. The size of sample should neither be excessively large, nor too small, it should be optimum. An optimum sample is one which fulfills the requirements of efficiency, representativeness, reliability and flexibility. To meet these requirements, Kothari recommends the sample of at least 10% of the total population of the study area. While deciding the size of the sample, the researcher must determine the desired precision and an acceptable confidence level for the estimate. The parameters of interest and costs in a research study must be kept in view while deciding the size of sample.

Therefore, the estimated sample size for this study was eighty (80) respondents which comprised five (5) officers from ZAECA, five (5) officers from ZPC , forty five (45) workers comprising of : ten (10) workers from Zanzibar Port Corporation, five (05) workers from Zanzibar Board of Standard, five (05) workers from Zanzibar Revenue Board, five (05) workers from Tanzania Revenue Authority, five (05) workers from Immigration office, five (05) workers from Zanzibar Food and Drug Board, five (05) workers from Association of Sailors of Dhows and Boats, five (05) workers from Police Force and twenty five (25) passengers at Malindi port in Zanzibar. The researcher decided to use such a size of sample because of the limited

resources include time and financial resource. Moreover, the issue of corruption was so complex, sensitive and technical in dealing with it.

**Table 3. 1: Sample Size Distribution**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Number of respondents</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Key informants	10	12.50
Workers	45	56.25
Passengers	25	31.25
<b>Total</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Source:** Field data, 2017

### **3.9 Data Collection Methods and Tools**

Research methods refer to the methods the researchers use in performing research operation (Kothari, 2004). In other words, all those methods which are used by the researcher during the course of studying his research problem are termed as research methods. Since the object of research, particularly the applied research, is to arrive at a solution for a given problem, the available data and the unknown aspects of the problem have to be related to each other to make a solution possible (Kothari, 2004). This study used three methods. These were:

#### **3.9.1 Interview**

Semi-structured interviews were used to collect the primary data from key informants, namely five (5) officers of ZAECA and five (5) officers of ZPC. Furthermore, it was applied to interview twenty five (25) passengers at Malindi Port in Zanzibar. Moreover, the researcher conducted individual interviews with officers and passengers. Also the researcher used personal interviews. Personal interview method required a person known as the interviewer asking questions generally in a

face-to-face contact to the other person or persons. In this study, personal interview helped to gather large amount of information in a relatively short time (Kothari, 2004).

The researcher also used interview guide that had list of key points to be covered in the interview. This study used the semi- structured interview so as to allow some flexibility according to how the interviewees respond. Furthermore, this method enabled to probe more deeply, encourage respondents to express themselves, provide a room to request for more supplementary questions such as clarifications to the answers (Rogan, 2004). Moreover, this method was employed because of the nature of the study and the respondents. For example, the passengers had no enough time to fill the questionnaires. It also facilitated the collection of concerning data about their feelings, and opinions about this research. Also, it was conducted to get in depth views about the impacts of political culture on corruption in the public sector.

### **3.9.2 Questionnaire Survey**

A questionnaire is a research instrument consisting of a series of questions and other prompts for the purpose of gathering information from respondents (Burns, *et al*, 2010). Thus, this study used structured questionnaires as simple to administer and relatively inexpensive to analyze. The provision of alternative replied, at times, helped them to understand the meaning of the question clearly. The structured questionnaire was applied to collect data from forty five (45) respondents (workers) at Malindi port in Zanzibar. Both open and close ended questions were used to solicit data from respondents in this study. Closed ended questions enabled this

study together data that allowed a quick comparison of responses. Questionnaires had advantages over some other types of surveys in this study because they were cheap and did not require as much effort.

Before the actual collection of data, questionnaires were pre-tested (Pilot Survey) by administering them to five (5) respondents. The number of members involved during the pre-testing was recorded by the researcher to be adequate to identify potential weakness in the questionnaire. In this study, questionnaire pre -testing allowed the researcher to assess the average interview time, relevance of questions to be asked and how easy the questions could be understood by the respondents. The results of the pre-testing showed that the questions were clear, relevant and were in the correct order. Any queries raised by respondents were solved by making clarification by the researcher but with care not to influence or give leading answers to the respondents.

### **3.9.3 Documentation**

These are secondary data which refer to as a source of information which are found in a published or unpublished documents, reports, statistics, manuscript, letters and diaries possessed by individuals, institutions and organizations (Kothari, 2004). Loosejes (1962), defined documentation as the systematic access to written texts. In this research; relevant documents from the library, the internets and institutions such journals, newspapers, annual reports of working performance of some public institutions at Malindi port, Tanzania Human Rights Report of 2013 and Zanzibar Human Rights Report of 2013 were reviewed so as to supplement the primary data. This documentary review helped the researcher to verify the findings obtained from primary data.

### **3.10 Types of Data Required**

The study required both secondary and primary data. Questionnaire survey, interview and documentation methods were used since the study was expected to be of qualitative and quantitative in nature.

#### **3.10.1 Primary Data**

Spiegel (1972) defined it as those collected first hand information from original sources that are the carriers/holders/owner of such data. Such data are usually obtained from the field through interviews, surveys, planned experiments, observations or recording of official transactions.

The data obtained were in the form of values and in relation to the operational definition of terms of the study. Primary data included data collection through interviews and questionnaires. The interview was applied to the officers of ZPC and ZAECA. Also it was used to collect data from the passengers at Malindi port in Zanzibar where by the questionnaire was applied to collect data from workers at that port.

#### **3.10.2 Secondary Data**

Are those which have already been collected by someone else and which have already been passed through the statistical process (Kothari, 2004). In this study, secondary data related to political culture and corruption were collected from books, journals, reports, files, publications, brochures, and unpublished materials. For example, Tanzania Human Rights Report of 2013 and Zanzibar Human Rights Report of 2013 were reviewed so as to supplement the findings of this study.

### **3.11 Data Analysis**

Kothari (2004) defines data analysis as a process of editing, coding, classifying and tabulating data collected so that they are amenable. Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected from questionnaires, interview and documentary reviews. Qualitative data were subjected to content analysis by classifying and organizing them to key themes, concepts and emergent patterns. Moreover, quantitative data were analyzed using descriptive statistics in order to produce different sequences and percentages with the use of Statistical Package for Social Science version 20 and Microsoft Excel. The statistical package for social science was applied because of its availability as compared to other softwares which were relatively expensive. Data coding was the first step in analysis by transforming questionnaires data into another format that the computer could understand. After being coded, data were entered directly into a computer program for analysis.

### **3.12 Validity and Reliability**

Osondu (2010) defines validity as the procedure adopted in ensuring that the instrument used had measured what it was designed to measure. It is very important to establish and report one form of validity or the other for the instrument, so as to enhance the strength of the work.

The validity of the data was achieved through the use of various methods of data collection, and careful sampling and appropriate use of instruments. In this study, validity was maximized by clearly pointing out the objectives and use of both English and Kiswahili languages in data collection so as to enable respondents to freely express their views and experiences.

Osondu (2004) said that reliability concerns the consistency with which an instrument measures whatever it measures. The test and retest process was used to establish the reliability of the instrument. This shows that the constructed questionnaires were distributed at intervals more than once to the same group of persons, to discover how consistent each element of the group was in the scoring of the instrument. This was shown by labeling the group from number one to five. The researcher was satisfied that the instruments were reliable because the responses from the group at different times remained constant.

### **3.13 Ethical Considerations**

Research ethics involve requirements on daily work, the protection of dignity of subjects and the publication of the information in the research (Johnstone and Bioethics, 2009). Ethical consideration in the research was important since it protected the rights and welfare of participants and minimized the risk of physical and mental discomfort, harm or danger from research procedures. Also, it protected the rights of the researcher to carry out any legitimate investigation as well as the reputation of the University for research conducted or sponsored by it.

The researcher sought permission from the relevant authorities including the University of Dodoma, Zanzibar Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Authority, Zanzibar Port Corporation and other concerned institutions. Confidentiality and anonymity was adhered in order to protect the informant's personhood.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION**

#### **4.0 Introduction**

This chapter presents the data, analyses and discusses the findings. The findings are presented based on the objectives of this study, which were; to identify the role of beliefs in causing favouritism in the public sector in Zanzibar, to assess the effect of values on embezzlement in the public sector, to examine the influence of norms on occurrence of bribery in the public sector and to propose measures to mitigate the negative effects of beliefs, values and norms on favouritism, embezzlement and bribery respectively in the public sector in Zanzibar. A questionnaire was distributed to 45 workers at Malindi port in Zanzibar. All questions from respondents were successfully asked and incorporated in the research.

#### **4.1 Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Respondents**


This sub-section identifies and describes the socio-economic characteristics of respondents based on gender, age, level of education and working experience.

##### **4.1.1 Gender**

The study surveyed a total of 45 workers at Malindi port in Zanzibar. The data showed that 75.6% of workers were male and 24.4% were female. These data meant that many workers at Malindi port were male. This was because of the working environment and the nature of tasks at the port. Therefore, this led to the increase in corrupt practices in this port since men were more economically responsible for their families due to the culture of Zanzibar. The same argument was provided by Dollar *et al.*, (2001), who found that a higher percentage of male civil servants is

associated with higher levels of corruption in the public sectors. Figure 4.1 provides a summary of gender distribution of the respondents.

**Figure 4. 1: Distribution of Respondents by Gender**




**Source:** Field data, 2017

#### 4.1.2 Age

The data showed that the majority of the respondents (about 37.8%) were above 41 years old. From these data, it could be said that, many respondents were aged and therefore active in providing enough and relevant information for the study. Similarly, 53% of the respondents were above 50 years old in the Afro Barometer Survey pertaining to corruption which was conducted in 2005 in Tanzania. The data of age distribution of respondents are shown in Figure 4.2

**Figure 4. 2: Distribution of Respondents by Age**



**Source:** Field data, 2017

#### **4.1.3 Level of Education**

The data indicated that, the majority of the respondents (about 28.9%) were holding Bachelor degrees, followed by 22.2% holding Master degrees, as shown in Table 4.1. This indicated that the majority of the respondents were knowledgeable to provide appropriate information to the study. These data were parallel with the study of Akure South Local Government Area in Ondo State (2013) that assessed corruption in the public sector in Nigeria. The study showed that 51.1% of the respondents had first degrees.

**Table 4. 1: Distribution of Respondents by Educational Qualification**

<b>Level of education</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Post graduate	10	22.2
Degree	13	28.9
Diploma	8	17.8
Advanced level	2	4.4
Ordinary level	8	17.8
Others	4	8.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source:** Field data, 2017

#### 4.1.4 Working Experience

Also, the researcher had an interest to observe the respondents' working experience at Malindi port. The data showed that the largest proportion of the respondents, about 37.8% were above 6 years of experience at Malindi port. This implies that much of the information gathered were detailed and relevant to the study. Table 4.2 summarizes respondents' working experience at Malindi port.

**Table 4. 2: Distribution of Respondents by Experience**


<b>Experience</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
less than 1 year	11	24.4
1-2 years	7	15.6
3-4 years	2	4.4
5-6 years	8	17.8
Above 6 years	17	37.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source:** Field data, 2017

#### 4.2 The Role of Belief in Causing Favouritism in the Study Area

This was the first objective which aimed at identifying the effects of belief on favouritism in the study area. The findings revealed that 68.9% of the respondents agreed that belief affects favouritism in the study area while 31.1% of the respondents did not agree that belief affects favouritism as shown in Figure 4.3. These results indicate that belief was one of the factors which affect favouritism in the public sector. The findings were supported by Robert (1968) who argued that culture (norms, values, beliefs, attitude, and folkways) causes the existence and perpetration of certain corrupt practices in the public sector.

**Figure 4. 3: Respondents' Views on the Role of Belief in Causing Favouritism**




**Source:** Field survey data, 2017

### 4.2.1 The Role of Beliefs in Causing Favouritism

The findings depicted that 38.8% of the respondents showed that there existed a belief in favouritism due to blood relationship, whilst 34.7% viewed that there was a belief in favouritism due to blood relationship, whilst 34.7% viewed that there was a belief in cronyism based on friendship, 24.5 % based on religious affiliation while 2.0% of the respondents identified that belief was influenced by regionalism as shown in Figure 4.4. Robert (1968); Lipset and Lenz (2000) stated that traditional rulers, religious priests and pastors encouraged corruption by receiving gift from corrupt leaders, sharing the looted or stolen money or wealth, and even praying for God's protection for the corrupt leaders to escape punishment. Sometimes they pray for God to change the wealth from evil to holy. This is how our system of beliefs and norms encourage corruption and corrupt behaviour in some African societies.

**Figure 4. 4: The Role of Beliefs in Causing Favouritism**



**Source:** Field survey data, 2017

Generally, the findings showed that beliefs negatively affect favouritism in the study area since civil servants and clients had relationship that based on favouritism, cronyism, religion and regionalism. This influenced favouritism between them in

service delivery and other public transactions in the study area. Further discussion with the key informants and passengers showed that rules and regulations of work were exempted if there was certain relationship between a civil servant and client at the working place. One of the respondents during the interview had the following to say:


*Belief affected favouritism in the public sector in Tanzania due to the presence of relationship between the civil servants and their clients which caused the exemption of the existing rules and regulations in the service delivery.*

The same argument was provided by Joseph (1996) who asserted that state officers were regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by office holders, who utilized them to make material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups.

#### **4.3 Effect of Values on Embezzlement of Public Resources**

This was the second objective which aimed at identifying the consequences of values on embezzlement of funds in the study area. The findings indicated that 88.9% of the respondents agreed that values affect embezzlement of funds, whereas 11.1% of the respondents did not agree that values influence embezzlement as shown in Figure 4.5. These findings showed that values influence people to engage in embezzlement of funds in the public sector. The results were in agreement with Robert (1968) who argued that values influenced the occurrence of certain corrupt practices in African countries such as theft and stealing of public resources.

**Figure 4. 5: Respondents' views on the consequence of value on embezzlement**




**Source:** Field data, 2017

#### **4.3.1 How values affect embezzlement**

The findings revealed that 28.2% of the respondents viewed that values affect embezzlement due to greed whereby some civil servants desired for more wealth than their real needs, 24.4% indicated that values affect embezzlement through theft which happened when some public servants steal public properties such as public funds, 19.2 % of respondents reported about self-interest, when some public officials consider their own interests instead of caring about things that would help other people in the nation, 11.5% reported about dishonesty, which suggests that there were some civil servants who were not truthful in managing public resources. In addition, 11.5% of respondents showed that values affect embezzlement through selfishness where by some public servants purposefully destroyed public assets so as to let others don't benefit from those assets, 2.6 % reported about lack of morality which meant that some public employees had bad behaviors such as forging of public

documents while 2.6% of respondents identified that values influence embezzlement due to lack of integrity which indicated that some public officials do not abide by ethical principles of their offices as shown in Figure 4.6. These results were in agreement with Kari and Ernest (2013) who stated that lack of contentment, greed, selfishness, breakdown of social norms and values contributed vastly to the high rate of corruption in African countries.

**Figure 4. 6: How Values Affect Embezzlement**



**Source:** Field data, 2017

In general, the results depicted that values primarily affect embezzlement since some civil servants have bad values including dishonesty, selfishness, greed, immorality, self-interest, theft and lack of integrity which influenced them to conduct embezzlement in their working places. Further conversation with key informants and passengers indicated that some civil servants were nurtured in bad values such as greed and theft since their childhood hence they continue with such behaviors at their working place. One respondent during the interview also said,


*Some civil servants were dishonesty and insatiable. Furthermore, working environment was poor and the government paid low salary as a result such officials conducted corrupt practices.*

These findings were supported by Onongha (2007) who asserted that corruption can be blamed on greed and an insatiable appetite people to accumulate wealth.

#### **4.4 The Influence of Norms on the Occurrence of Bribery**

This was the third objective which intended to identify the influence of norms on occurrence of bribery in the study area. The results revealed that 66.7% of the respondents did not agree that norms influenced bribery while 33.3% of the respondents agreed that norm influenced bribery as shown in Figure 4.7. These findings indicated that norms are inconsequential influencing people to engage in bribery. The results were inconsistent with Fisman and Miguel (2006) who evaluated the parking tickets given to diplomats stationed in New York City, and found that diplomats from high-corruption countries tended to commit parking violations more often. This suggested that they bring the social norms of their home country with them to New York City.

**Figure 4. 7: Respondents' Views on the Influence of Norms on Occurrence of Bribery**




**Source:** Field data, 2017

#### **4.4.1 How Norms Influence the Occurrence of Bribery**

The findings indicated that 55.6% of the respondents reported that norms had no correlation with bribery, 22.2% had not experienced the effect of norms on bribery at their working place. On the other hand, about 11.1% of respondents were of the opinion that Islamic civilization discourages bribery while 11.1% stated that laws and regulations were followed in their working places. Consider Figure 4.8 below for more details. In addition, the researcher conducted interviews with key informants and passengers about the influence of norms on occurrence of bribery where by one of the respondents had the following to say:

*Norms did not affect bribery in our office since we perform our tasks according to the existing laws and regulations and not norms of the society.*

**Figure 4. 8: How Norms Influence the Occurrence of Bribery**



**Source:** Field data, 2017

The results of this objective generally depicted that norms rarely influence the occurrence of bribery in the study area since there was no correlation between them. Further arguments with key informants and passengers showed that norms do not influence bribery as well because they are two different things. This was proved from one of key informants during the interview, who argued that:

*Norms especially in Zanzibar did not influence bribery because no correlation between them in the public service delivery except clients themselves behave with ideas that they could not get services promptly and cheaply without giving bribery to public official in the public sector.*

These findings were in agreement with the study of Kapoor and Shamika (2009) who investigated the correlation between cultural norms and corruption in the public sector in the New York City in order to challenge the findings of Fisman and Miguel (2006) pertaining to the same topic. Consequently, Kapoor and Shamika

found that government effectiveness and the quality of institutions were better predictors of corruption than cultural norms.

#### **4.5 Measures to Mitigate the Negative Effects of Belief, Values and Norms on Favoritism, Embezzlement and Bribery**

This was the last objective of this study which intended to identify the measures to control the negative effects of beliefs, values and norms on favouritism, embezzlement and bribery respectively in the public sector. The findings from both interviews and questionnaires revealed that there were several measures which could be put into practice so as to control this phenomenon as shown in Table 4.3. The suggested measures from the respondents were:

##### **4.5.1 Enforcement of Laws and Regulations**

The findings indicated that 37.5% of the respondents indicated that the government should enforce its laws and regulations so as to terminate corrupt behaviors in the public sector and society in general. Further conversation with key informants and passengers highlighted that enforcement of law is the key measure to combat corruption in our country. On top of that, UNODC (2004) argued that corruption has been the subject of legal prohibitions for centuries. In anti-corruption terms, a state's legal system play a unique role in raising awareness by authoritatively articulating undesirable conduct, and in their potential to deter corrupt conduct by prosecuting and imposing penalties.

#### **4.5.2 Accountability and Transparency**

The results showed that 12.5% of the respondents were of the opinion that public sectors should improve accountability and transparency so as to improve service delivery. Further discussion with key informants and passengers revealed that the presence of poor accountability and transparency influenced corrupt practices in the public sector. Moreover, the findings were in agreement with the study of Reinikka and Svensson (2005) on anti-corruption strategies in the educational sector in Uganda who found that an information campaign to monitor local officials can reduce corruption and increase educational outputs.

#### **4.5.3 Political Will**

The findings revealed that 10 % of the respondents proposed that both government leaders and political leaders should be able to spell out clear anti-corruption policies and interventions and effectively implement them without fear, favor and regardless of who is involved. Similarly, Simon (2004) argued that political leaders must be able to setup a special public inquiry to probe corruption scandals and act on the recommendations of the inquiry.

#### **4.5.4 Good Salary**

The results indicated that 8.75 % of the opinions from the respondents showed that the government should increase salary of the public servants so as to improve their living standards because poverty was one of the factors that influenced corruption in African countries. However, this result contradicted with OECD (2007) and Johnson *et al.*, (2012) argued that salary increase is unlikely to be effective tool to address

corruption hence they proposed e-government initiatives to combat corruption in the public sector.

#### **4.5.5 Provision of Education**

The findings revealed that 7.5% of the respondent commented that the government should provide education to the society about the effects of corruption. This was because the majority of people are involved in corrupt practices without being aware of its effects to themselves and their country in general. Similarly, Huberts (1998) asserted that anti - corruption strategies aim at altering the attitudes and values of the population and civil servants alike via training and education campaigns and engagement of the media.

#### **4.5.6 Youth to Join National Service**

The results also showed that 7.5% of the respondents were of the opinion that the government should reintroduce the National Service Program in which the youth would be taught good values and patriotism before being employed in the public sector. It should be compulsory to any person who wants to be employed by the government. One of the key informants during the interview argued that:

*In 1980's, the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar used to encourage its youth to join the National Service Program so as to be prepared for employment in the public sectors. This helped to get public servants who were honest and patriotic to their nation. Unfortunately, this program declined in 2000's something which may have caused many youths who are employed nowadays to lack truthfulness and patriotism in their nation.*

#### **4.5.7 Reduction of Red Tape**

Moreover, the findings revealed that 5% of the respondents stated that corruption was influenced by bureaucracy in the provision of public services that is why people looked for alternative means to get service promptly. Similarly, Rose-Ackerman (1998) and Quah, (2007) argued that delay or inefficiency in the civil services was one of the factors that influenced corruption in the public sector.

#### **4.5.8 Application of Electronic Services/Transactions**

This study also revealed that 5% of the respondents suggested that all financial transactions should be done electronically so as to block corrupt channels which occur in the public sector. These results were in agreement with the study of Lewis-Faupel *et al.*, (2011) who examined the impact of electronic procurement for road projects in India, taking advantage of a staggered rollout across Indian states. Similarly, Hors (2000) studied the customs administration in Senegal and found that computerization had helped to reduce the level of fraud by 85% between 1990 and 1995.

#### **4.5.9 Harsh Punishment**

About 3.75% of the respondents also were of the view that the government should prosecute and impose harsh punishment to any corrupt official and citizen so as to terminate this occurrence in the long run in the country. These findings were supported by Huberts (1998) who asserted that stringent punishment should be put in place for public office holders who misuse their positions and made to realize that they were elected into power to serve and not to impoverish the people.

#### **4.5.10 Staff rotation**

It was moreover suggested by 1.25% of the respondents that public officials should be periodically changed from one station of work to another in order to control familiarity between public officials and clients that cause corrupt practices in the public sector. Similarly, Huberts (1998) argued that staff rotation reduced the propensity for individuals to establish themselves in entrenched corruption.

#### **4.5.11 Management of Culture**

The results also showed that 1.25 % of the respondents suggested that it was an obligatory duty for parents, community leaders and religious priests to train members of the society to be law abiding citizens to conform to norms, values and beliefs of the society in order to grow up with good behavior. Consequentially, the nation would have public servants and citizens who are patriotic and honest to speed up the expected level of development in the country. Furthermore, Robert (1968) argued that most of the African values, norms and beliefs prohibited theft, stealing, looting, distrust and abuse of authority.

**Table 4. 3: Participants’ Views on the Measures to Mitigate the Negative Effects of Beliefs, Values and Norms on Favoritism, Embezzlement and Bribery**

<b>MEASURES</b>	<b>FREQUENCY</b>	<b>PERCENTAGE (%)</b>
Accountability and transparency	10	12.5
Education on the effects of corruption	6	7.5
Reduction of red tape	4	5
Enforcement of laws and regulations	30	37.5
Political will	8	10
Good salaries to public servants	7	8.75
Introduction of electronic transactions in the public services	4	5
Youth to join National Services Program before being employed	6	7.5
Harsh punishment to corrupt people	3	3.75
Staff rotation	1	1.25
Management of culture	1	1.25
<b>Total</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Field Data, 2017

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

Based on the specific objectives of this research, this chapter summarizes the findings of the study as presented in chapter four, draws conclusions, makes recommendations and suggests areas for further related research.

#### **5.2 Summary of the Findings**

The study indicated that beliefs affect favouritism since some public officials favor their clients and fellow workers in the provision of public services such as collection of taxes and availability of employees' rights including promotion. This favouritism was found to be based on cronyism, regionalism, religious affiliation and nepotism where some civil servants used their beliefs to smash the laws and regulations of work in order to achieve their spiritual interests and the interests of their relatives and friends in public service delivery and availability of workers' privileges. Some of the respondents also commented that favouritism led to the discrimination and disparity of public service delivery. Therefore, rules and regulations must be obeyed to ensure equality and justice in the service delivery.

The findings also revealed that values influence embezzlement in the study area because some public servants were dishonest, selfish, greedy, immoral, self-interested, thief and untruthful in performing their duties as well as in protecting public properties. Hence, these behaviors influenced those employees to conduct embezzlement of funds in the working place in order to enrich themselves as well as their relatives and friends. This happened when some public officials did not record

the actual amount of taxes and charges which they collected from their customers in for the purpose of pinching some amount of that collected taxes and charges. Some of the respondents argued that some civil servants were dishonest and greedy, something which made them to abuse public funds. Hence, transparency and openness in government revenue and expenditures must be encouraged in the study area.

Furthermore, the study indicated that norms had no correlation with bribery in the study area due to the fact that most of the Tanzanian norms especially Zanzibar's norms do not influence people to practice bribery in the public sector. However, the findings discovered that bribery was influenced by existing bureaucratic procedures in the provision of public services in the study area. Hence citizens or clients found alternative means to get services promptly and effectively. Therefore, there should be effective monitoring and evaluation system of public service delivery so as to facilitate the availability of public services in the study area.

Lastly, the findings proposed various measures to mitigate the negative effects of beliefs, values and norms on favouritism, embezzlement and bribery respectively. These included enforcement of laws and regulations, encouragement of grass root re-orientation of societal norms and values, values and belief system and effective socio-cultural consciousness among the citizens through the use of family, peer group, media, religions, national service programs and schools. Also, presence of harsh punishment to corrupt offenders, provision of education to the society on the malevolence of corruption and presence of political will to fight corruption, publicity of corrupt cases through mass media and improving of living standard of

the people. Basically, the results indicated that enforcement of legal frame is most necessary to mitigate corrupt practices in the country.

### **5.3 Conclusions**

The findings revealed that beliefs basically influence favouritism of public services delivery in the study area which based on cronyism, regionalism, religious affiliation and nepotism between the civil servants and their clients. This determines the quality and effectiveness of public service delivery in the study area. Hence, the study concludes that belief was causal factor that influence the public servants to do favouritism in the provision of public services in the study area since some civil servants provide services to their clients according to the influence of their beliefs something which led to the discrimination, inequality, red tape and complaints in service delivery to the clients. As a result, some public service ethics such as impartiality were exempted in the study area. Therefore, effective application of rules and regulations is important in order to ensure efficient and effective provision of public services at the working places.

The findings also discovered that values primarily affect embezzlement in the study area since there are some public servants who have bad behaviors such as theft, greed, selfishness and self-interest. The findings also showed that some civil servants had no good values due to their families' backgrounds. Moreover, the findings indicated that some public officials were not faithful to manage public resources since they used their posts to enrich themselves and their relatives through employment opportunities and collection of government revenue such as taxes in their working places. Therefore, the study concludes that erosion of public servants'

ethics to some public employees lead to the misuse of public properties such as public funds because some public servants do not care for public interests and instead they consider their own interests. As a result, the government fails to achieve its objective of having efficient and effective utilization of public resources such as public funds in the country. Hence, transparency of government income and expenditure as well as declaration of assets for public servants is necessary in order to curb the misuse of public assets such as public funds in the study area.

Furthermore, the findings of the study basically revealed that norms rarely influence the occurrence of bribery in the study area because norms of people of Zanzibar do not correlate with corruption practices at all. Moreover, the findings indicated norms do not influence corrupt practices in the working places since the majority of people and public servants do not use their norms in the process of public service delivery in Zanzibar. Hence, the study concludes that it was the bureaucratic procedures which led to the delay of public service delivery in the study area, something which influenced the occurrence of bribery in the working places because clients use alternative means to get services promptly. Therefore, the process of public services delivery must be well monitored and evaluated by the management so as to facilitate availability of quality provision of public services to the citizens in the study area.

Finally, the study proposed some measures to mitigate the negative effects of beliefs, values and norms on favouritism, embezzlement and bribery in the study area. Those measures were believed to be effective in alleviating corruption since they focused on involvement of core stakeholders including the government, public officials, civil societies and citizens in the process of fighting against corruption in

the country especial in the study area. Those measures include enforcement of laws and regulations, management of culture, application of electronic services, reduction of red tape, accountability and transparency and political will. Therefore, the study concludes that the continuation of corrupt practices to some public servants, politicians and clients is influenced by the failure of implementing the existing laws and regulations in the public sectors. Therefore, none of those suggested measures to mitigate this battle in the study area is less useful but these findings emphasized the fact that in order to alleviate this phenomenon, enforcement of laws and regulations should be given special contemplation.

#### **5.4 Recommendations**

The government should initiate and encourage national orientation programs, national services and anti-corruption crusade to increase social awareness on the economic, social, legal and cultural implications of corrupt behavior in our society. This could help the government to get patriotic citizens who could be employed in the study area.

Moreover, the society should be in front line to ensure that youths and new generations are nurtured in good values, beliefs and norms which correlate with their original culture in their societies. This nurture would be introduced by social institutions such as families and schools. This could assist the government to get youth who are patriotic and faithful citizens to defend the interests of their country before and after being employed in the public sector. Robert (1968) argued that most of the African values, norms and beliefs prohibited theft, stealing, looting, distrust and abuse of authority

Furthermore, the government should encourage its public servants and citizens to obey the public service ethics such as impartiality as well as existing rule and regulations in serving clients without considering cronyism, regionalism and religious affiliation in the working places. This could ensure the presence of equality and justice in the provision of public services, something which lead to the improvement of service delivery in the study area.

Additionally, public and political declaration of assets for all politicians and public officers should be encouraged and enforced without fear or favor. Institutionalization of transparency and openness in government income and expenditures must also be encouraged. This could facilitate the efficient and effective management of public resources such as public funds in the study area. The study of Reinikka and Svensson (2005) on anti-corruption strategies in the educational sector in Uganda found that an information campaign to monitor local officials can reduce corruption and increase educational outputs.

Moreover, there was a need to improve the financial control system in the study area to cope with modern technology such as application of electronic financial transactions or services such as payment of taxes and other charges, more supervision and monitoring, and very strictly law for those who could be caught for corruption and misuse of public funds for their own interest. Okereke (2012) asserted that corruption is not tender in the government institutions but among the public servants who operate in the public sectors although corruption cannot be completely eliminated in the government sector but should be minimized in a very high rate.

Also, there must be an effective monitoring, evaluation and supervision of process and procedures in the provision of public services because the existing bureaucratic procedures in the study area seem to be friendly to the emergence of corrupt environment since they caused the delay of service delivery to the people. This influenced clients to use illegal procedures so as to get service promptly. Therefore; this could help to mitigate existing red tape and to improve efficiency, effectiveness and accountability in the provision of public services in the study area. Rose-Ackerman (1998) and Quah, (2007) argued that delay or inefficiency in the civil services was one of the factors that influenced corruption in the public sector.

Lastly, the government should also encourage the application of rule of law, practice of constitution, effective leadership, effective law enforcement agencies, judicial reform and independence so as to ensure that public services are provided according to the existing rules and regulations and those public servants and clients who smash the rules and regulation must be prosecuted and punished according to the existing laws. Huberts (1998) asserted that stringent punishment should be put in place for public office holders who misuse their positions and be made to realize that they were elected into power to serve and not to impoverish the people. UNODC (2004) argued that corruption has been the subject of legal prohibitions for centuries. In anti-corruption terms, a state's legal systems play a unique role in raising awareness by authoritatively articulating undesirable conduct, and in their potential to deter corrupt conduct by prosecuting and imposing penalties.

## **5.5 Areas for Further Research**

The findings have identified a few gaps and potential areas for further research. Firstly, research on the assessment of the role of political culture on public service ethics towards corruption in the public sector in Zanzibar. This will help to manage the moral principles of public servant towards corruption in the public sector in Zanzibar. Secondly, research on government initiatives to mobilize society to practice good values, norms, beliefs and attitudes on supporting anti-corruption campaign in Zanzibar. This will reveal the extent at which the revolutionary government of Zanzibar involves its citizens on fighting against corruption. Lastly, there is a need to conduct a study on the effectiveness of the existing legal frame work on combating corruption in Zanzibar, because despite the presence of legal frame work, the problem of corruption are not yet mitigated in the country.

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**APPENDICES**

**Appendix I: Questionnaire for Workers at Malindi port in Zanzibar.**

My name is Ame Juma Khatib, a student at Dodoma University, pursuing a Master of Public Administration (MPA). I am carrying out a research on **The Impact of Political Culture on Corruption in the Public Sector in Tanzania: A Case Study of Zanzibar Port Corporation**. I kindly request you to provide me with information. It will be treated as confidential and used for academic purpose only.

**SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION** (*Tick the right option or fill the right answer in the space provided*).

- 1) District.....  
 2) Shehia.....  
 3) Sex: a) Male  b) Female   
 4) Date.....

5) What is your age? (*Please tick under only one of them*).

Age	Under 20 years	20-25 years	26-30 years	31-35 years	36-40 years	Above 41 years
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

- 6) Marital status: a) Married  b) Unmarried  c) divorced

7) Level of education (*Please tick under only one of them*)

Qualification	Post graduate	Degree	Diploma	Advanced level	Ordinary level	Other (Specify please)
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

8) Occupation .....

9) How long have you been working at this port?

- a) Less than a year  b) 1-2 years  c) 3- 4 years  d) 5-6 years   
 e) Above six years

10) Mobile phone .....

**SECTION B: INFORMATION OF THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CULTURE ON CORRUPTION AT MALINDI PORT IN ZANZIBAR**

11 a) Do beliefs affect favouritism in the public sector in Tanzania?

YES  NO

b) If YES, explain how?

.....  
.....  
.....

12a) Do you agree that values affect embezzlement in the public sector?

YES  NO

b) If YES, how?

.....  
.....  
.....

13a) Is there any impact of norms on occurrence of bribery in the public sector?

YES  NO

b) If YES, please mention them.

.....  
.....  
.....

14) What measures should be taken to mitigate the negative effects of beliefs, values and norms on favouritism, embezzlement and bribery respectively in the public sector in Tanzania?

.....  
.....  
.....

***THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION***

**Appendix II: Interview Guide for Officers from Zanzibar Port Corporation  
and Zanzibar Anti-corruption and Economic Crime Authority.**

My name is Ame Juma Khatib, a student at Dodoma University, pursuing a Master of Public Administration (MPA). I am carrying out a research on **The Impact of Political Culture on Corruption in the Public Sector in Tanzania: A Case Study of Zanzibar Port Corporation**. I kindly request you to provide me with information. It will be treated as confidential and used for academic purpose only.

**SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

1) District..... 2)  
Shehia.....

3) Sex: a) Male  b) Female  4) Date.....

5) What is your age?

Age	Under 20 years	20-25 years	26-30 years	31-35 years	36-40 years	Above 41 years

6) Marital status: a) Married  b) Unmarried  c) divorced

7) Level of education:

Qualification	Post graduate	Degree	Diploma	Advanced level	Ordinary level	Other (Specify please)

8) Position of respondent .....

9) How long have you been employed in this organization?

a) Less than a year                      b) 1-2 years                                            c) 3- 4 years                     

d) 5-6 years                     

e) Above six years                     

10) Mobile phone ...

**SECTION B: INFORMATION OF THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CULTURE ON CORRUPTION AT MALINDI PORT IN ZANZIBAR**

11) To what extent do beliefs affect favouritism in the public sector?

.....  
.....  
.....

12) How do values affect embezzlement in the public sector?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

13) In which ways do norms influence bribery in the public sector?

.....  
.....  
.....

14) What measures should be taken to mitigate the negative effects of beliefs, values and norms on favouritism, embezzlement and bribery respectively in the public sector in Tanzania?

.....  
.....  
.....

***THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION***

**Appendix III: Interview Guide for Passengers at Malindi port in Zanzibar.**

My name is Ame Juma Khatib, a student at Dodoma University, pursuing a Master of Public Administration (MPA). I am carrying out a research on **The Impact of Political Culture on Corruption in the Public Sector in Tanzania: A Case Study of Zanzibar Port Corporation**. I kindly request you to provide me with information. It will be treated as confidential and used for academic purpose only.

**SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION** (*Tick the right option or fill the right answer in the space provided*).

1) District..... 2)

Shehia.....

3) Sex: a) Male  b) Female  4) Date.....

5) What is your age? (Please tick under only one of them).

Age	Under 20 years	20-25 years	26-30 years	31-35 years	36-40 years	Above 41 years

6) Marital status: a) Married  b) Unmarried  c) divorced

7) Level of education (Please tick under only one of them).

Qualification	Post graduate	Degree	Diploma	Advanced level	Ordinary level	Other (Specify please)

8) Occupation .....

9) Mobile phone .....

**SECTION B: INFORMATION OF THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CULTURE ON CORRUPTION AT MALINDI PORT IN ZANZIBAR**

10 a) Do beliefs affect favouritism in the public sector in Tanzania?

YES

NO

b) If YES, how?

.....  
.....

11a) Do you agree that values affect embezzlement in the public sector?

YES

NO

b) If YES, explain briefly?

.....  
.....

12a) Are there any effects of norms on occurrence of bribery in the public sector?

YES  NO

b) If YES, what are they?

.....  
.....  
.....

13) What measures should be taken to mitigate the negative effects of beliefs, values and norms on favouritism, embezzlement and bribery respectively in the public sector in Tanzania?

.....  
.....  
.....

***THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION***

#### Appendix IV: Comments and corrections from external examiner

SN	Comments from external examiner	Corrections
1	The Title to be changed: The Impact of Political Culture on Corruption in the Public Sector in Tanzania: A Case of Zanzibar Port Corporation. Title page.	The Impact of Political Culture on Corruption in the Public Sector in Zanzibar: A Case Study of Zanzibar Port Corporation. Title page.
2	The Background to the Problem: It has scanty details and information on Zanzibar (page 1-13).	It has been improved (page 4, 5, 6 and 13).
3	Chapter on the Legal frame work: There should be a separate chapter on the legal framework on anti-corruption campaigns (page 3-6).	It has been already done in the Background to the Problem (page 3-6).
4	Baseline survey(s) on political culture in Tanzania and Zanzibar to be inserted (page 7-13).	It has been inserted in the Background to the Problem (page 1-13).
5	Dissertation length: Chapter one to chapter five (91 pages).	Not necessary because it conforms to the set limit.
6	Chapter two is very long (page 19-52)	Sub -section <b>2.4.3</b> : Corruption as Moral Theological Problem has been removed (page 40-41).
7	In –text citations, no page numbers provided for direct quotes (page 11, 19, 21, 24 and 29).	Some text citations have been provided page numbers while others have been changed (page 11, 19, 21, 24 and 29).
8	Candidate often cites Kothari (2004) in chapter three.	Some citations have been changed (page 55, 57, 62 and 64).
9	References are relatively adequate (page 92-104).	Some references have been added while others have been removed due to emergence of some changes in the report from external examiner (page 92-104).
10	Editing of the entire draft	Entire report was edited by professional editor from the University of Dodoma.
11	Choice of sampling technique : Purposive sampling was not given strong justification (page 58)	Justification has been improved (page 58).
12	Areas for further study: This sub-section has to be revisited (page 91).	It has been revisited and improved (page 91).
13	To reduce the length of Statement of the Problem (page 13-16).	It has been reduced (page 13-14).
14	The candidates could accomplish the study by using three objectives( page 16)	No correction because those specific objectives are adequate and comprehensive (page 16).